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5Preface 
It all started with a big bang, approximately 14 billion years ago. While continents 
drifted, life started to form, slowly. Some of the first evidence of life on earth is 
dated between 3.5 to 4.1 billion years ago.1 Nevertheless, it would still be a long 
time before humans first came along.
Humans split off from the apes around 7 million years ago, first walked upright 
about 4 million years ago, and started using primitive tools 2.5 million years ago. 
Our direct ancestor, homo erectus, came into being around 1.7 million years ago 
and started spreading out of Africa around 1 million years ago. Sometime after 
that - nobody knows when exactly - homo sapiens evolved, and spread all over 
the world.2 
For more than 99% of the time that modern humans exist, we were living in small 
bands of hunter-gatherers, semi-sedentary or sedentary in regions with abundant 
natural resources, but usually migratory. This all changed with the invention of 
farming, approximately 10,000 years ago. Farming allowed humans to sustain 
dense populations in small areas and develop societies.
In these initial societies the family was the cornerstone. Production took place 
within and for the family. However, as farming became more productive societies 
became larger. Larger societies needed rulers, which needed to be fed from the 
surplus production of others. In addition, farming required productive assets, and 
hence protection of property rights. While migratory hunter-gatherers owned 
only as much as they could carry, the sedentary life-style made possible by the 
invention of farming allowed for capital accumulation.3 
It is therefore not surprising that Adam Smith describes this development in the 
first book ever written on economics (1776).4 He distinguished four evolutionary 
stages in the history of civilization: the hunting and pastoral periods of pre-feudal, 
nomadic cultures, then the farming stage, and finally the commercial era. Smith 
sees the development of civil society as protection of property rights.
While Smith’s view is naturally coloured by the lens of his period and incomplete 
when it comes to the history of human development, it does bring home an 
important point. Without farming there is no property, and hence no economics. 
The success of farming made human and economic development possible. Given 
the rate at which the world population is growing, we will rely more than ever 
before on increases in farm productivity to feed the world. It is only through the 
exchange of farming knowledge that it is possible to achieve the productivity 
required for the world to sustain such a large human population. Agricultural 
development is human development. 
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9Summary
Big business has long been able to avoid dealing directly with small farmers. The 
high fixed costs of transactions makes dealing with many small farms far costlier 
than dealing with a few larger farms, leading to a dual system of capitalized large 
farms delivering to heavily regulated modern supply chains on the one hand, and 
small farms depending primarily on family labour delivering to local markets on 
the other. This situation is changing. A rapidly growing and urbanising world 
population requires agricultural production to increase and become integrated 
into modern supply chains. Taking more land into use is no longer an option: 
agricultural activity already covers every nook and cranny of the arable part of the 
earth. Therefore, increasing output is only possible by increasing productivity on 
existing agricultural land. The land where potential productivity gains are largest 
is in the hands of small farmers in low and middle income countries. Most of these 
farmers do not have the resources or access to credit to close the productivity gap 
on their own; linking with modern supply chains might prove an opportunity to 
overcome these limitations and consequently increase their income. The question 
is how. 
The transaction linking small-scale farmers to the next level in the supply chain 
is called an inclusion mechanism. In the first part of the thesis, the focus was 
on inclusive business models, a broad subset of inclusion mechanisms. Ten case 
studies from Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, and South Africa with 
governance structures ranging from almost spot markets to complete vertical 
integration were analysed using transaction cost theory. In chapter 2, Williamson’s 
transaction characteristics and Ménard’s dimensions of hybrids were used to 
analyse the extent to which existing theory can explain the type and specific 
form taken by inclusive business models. Results show that although transaction 
cost theory is a useful starting point for analysing inclusive business models, it 
is not yet able to perfectly explain the specific form they take, their ‘personality’. 
Financial constraints of participating small-scale farmers was identified as one of 
the factors which might help to explain this personality. 
How exactly financial constraints of farmers affected the personality of inclusive 
business models was analysed in chapter 3. More specifically, the effect of the 
combination of firm investment and appropriability hazard on the level and 
type of safeguards contained within the governance structure was investigated. 
All studied business models were operating in the context of a weak institutional 
environment, meaning the local justice system could not be relied upon to 
cost-effectively mediate conflicts between firm and farmers. In combination 
with the financial constraints of farmers, this meant that firms had to make the 
largest share of the investment in the model and find some other way to control 
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appropriability hazard – the risk of opportunistic behaviour by farmers. Results 
show that the level of firm investment and the level of safeguards go hand in hand: 
more investment means more safeguards. However, when appropriability hazard 
is high, investment is not made in the first place, and a governance structure is 
adopted which is closer to a take-it-or-leave-it market transaction. 
The second part of the thesis focused on measurement of the farm-level impact 
of inclusion mechanisms. Since small farmers are often poor, the public sector 
has an interest in finding out the poverty alleviation potential of inclusion 
mechanisms, to determine if it is worthwhile to invest in them. Unfortunately, 
measuring this impact is far from straightforward. It requires careful thinking 
about how and what to measure. In chapter 4 a common measure of impact, the 
Household Dietary Diversity Score (HDDS), was analysed using household-level 
data from over 1,000 small farmers on both sides of the border of Colombia and 
Ecuador. Rasch analysis was used to determine to what extent the indicator was 
validly measuring food security, one of the outcome targets set in the Millennium 
Development Goals. Results show that for the sample as a whole, the indicator 
was not valid. Further analysis showed that its performance could be improved 
by taking local dietary patterns into account and discarding groups which for 
particular sub-populations showed abnormal behaviour. Even then, the extent to 
which the indicator was actually measuring food security was questionable. 
Although indicators are a popular method to assess the impact of inclusion 
mechanisms, there is a risk that such an approach misses broader behavioural 
impacts. That such broader impacts exist was shown in chapter 5, in which the 
impact of coffee certification and its corresponding access to specialty coffee 
markets on the behaviour of small-scale farmers close to the poverty line in the 
south of Colombia was investigated. The analysis was based on the concept of 
livelihoods, which holistically considers the set of activities individuals undertake 
to make a living. Results show that certified farmers obtain a larger share of their 
income from coffee, because they obtain higher prices and yields and dedicate 
a larger share of their land to coffee. However, their overall income increases 
by less than their coffee income. These results might indicate that adhering to 
certification standards takes so much time and effort that it forces farmers to 
reduce their participation in other income-generating activities. These broader 
impacts should be taken into account when assessing the impact of certification.
Considering and analysing inclusion mechanisms as a group, rather than as 
separate mechanisms, allowed focusing on the way their governance structures 
solve the farmer inclusion problem. It was shown in chapter 2 that inclusion 
mechanisms can be analysed using transaction cost theory, although some 
particular characteristics of the big-business small-farmer transaction they govern 
- such as the recognition of the importance of financial constraints – require 
further theory building. In chapter 3, a first step was taken in this direction by 
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delving deeper into how these financial constraints affect governance structures, 
and which factors mitigate or strengthen their influence. These chapters constitute 
the first academic research on the governance structure of inclusive business 
models. 
Two contributions were made to the measurement of farm-level impact. A novel 
methodology was used in chapter 4 to analyse the relationship between the HDDS 
food security indicator and dietary patterns of farm households in Colombia and 
Ecuador. This methodology, Rasch analysis, allows verifying the contribution of 
each component of the indicator to the underlying latent variable, food security, 
providing far more insight than traditional methods like Cronbach’s alpha, which 
only shows the overall fit. Moreover, it was the first time the HDDS was tested for 
validity. In chapter 5, the importance of considering farm-level behaviour was 
demonstrated. Most research on coffee certification focuses on outcomes which 
are directly influenced by the certification, such as prices and production. An 
increase in coffee income is often taken as evidence that the certification improves 
farmer well-being. However, our research shows its impact has effects beyond 
those on coffee income and demonstrates how a recently developed econometric 
technique may be used to measure these. 
These findings contain several implications for policy makers. First, that the 
imbalance in power between firm and farmer, which is often found in inclusion 
mechanisms, is a direct response to the weak institutional environment. As long 
as firms cannot rely on public enforcement, the power imbalance might be the 
price that needs to be paid in order for the firm to make any investment at all. 
Second, that the ability of the government to overcome this power imbalance – 
or encourage the firm to include farmers which are poorer than those farmers 
it prefers to trade with – might be limited. When risks are high, farmers have to 
be able to demonstrate a credible commitment to the agreement before firms are 
willing to invest. Such a commitment is not credible when it is made with donated 
funds. Third, whenever policy makers face a choice between different inclusion 
mechanisms, the way the alternatives are evaluated requires careful consideration. 
A choice needs to be made regarding which outcomes to measure and how to 
measure these outcomes. If indicators are used, the should be adequately verified. 
In addition, a too narrow focus on a single indicator or outcome area might lead 
to wrong conclusions. 
12
13
Table of contents
Preface  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Members of the jury . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Chapter 1 
General introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Chapter 2  
Investigating inclusive business models with transaction cost theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Chapter 3  
How firm investment and appropriability hazard shape governance structure  . . . . . . 59
Chapter 4  
Verifying validity of the Household Dietary Diversity Score . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
Chapter 5  
The effect of specialty coffee certification on household livelihood strategies . . . . . . . 125
Chapter 6  
General conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
Samenvatting voor de leek  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
List of abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
Curriculum vitae  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
14
List of figures
Figure 1.1.  Stylized depiction of the current organisation of the farm-
level impact literature   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 23
Figure 1.2.  Conceptual framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Figure 1.3.  Inclusive Business Models, Inclusion Mechanisms, and the 
scope of this thesis  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Figure 4.1.  Structure of the results section  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 97
Figure 4.2.  Item response functions (IRFs) Colombia . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
Figure 4.3.  Item characteristics curve (ICC) of food group 5 (meat) . . . 100
Figure 4.4.  Item response functions Ecuador, Kichwa households . . . . 102
Figure 4.5.  Item response functions Ecuador, migrant households   .  .  .  103
Figure 4.6.  Item characteristics curve of food group 7 (fish) for migrant 
households   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  104
Figure 4.7.  Seasonality in food insecurity for Colombian households . . 109
Figure 4.8.  Seasonality in food insecurity for Kichwa households  . . . . 110
Figure 4.9.  Seasonality in food insecurity for migrant households . . . . 110
Figure 5.1.  Location of certified and non-certified farms . . . . . . . . . 131
Figure 5.2.  Study area: the Department of Nariño, Colombia . . . . . . . 133
15
List of tables
Table 1.1.  Control of activities and asset ownership per governance 
arrangement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Table 2.1.  Control of activities and asset ownership per governance 
arrangement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Table 3.1.  Case studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Table 3.2.  Firm investment   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 73
Table 3.3.  Asset specificity and appropriability hazard . . . . . . . . . . . 74
Table 3.4.  Safeguards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
Table 4.1.  Descriptive statistics  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
Table 4.2.  Food group consumption by Colombian households.  .  .  .  .  . 98
Table 4.3.  Food group consumption by Ecuadorian households  .  .  .  .  101
Table 4.4.  Cronbach’s alpha statistics for selected Household Dietary 
Diversity Score groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
Table 4.5.  Reason for removal and difficulty ranking of food groups 
for refined indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
Table 4.6.  HDDS used in Colombia   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  112
Table 4.7.  HDDS used in Ecuador  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  113
Table 4.8.  2PL model Colombia including eggs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
Table 4.9.  2 PL model Kichwa including roots/tubers and fish  .  .  .  .  .  114
Table 4.10.  2 PL model migrants including meat and legumes  . . . . . . 115
Table 4.11.  In- and outfit statistics Colombia (final model) . . . . . . . . 116
Table 4.12.  In- and outfit statistics Kichwa (final model)  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  116
Table 4.13.  In- and outfit statistics migrants (final model)   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  116
Table 4.14.  1PL model with interaction between item and household 
groups (DIF)   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  117
16
Table 4.15.  ANOVA test for DIF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
Table 4.16.  1PL versus 2PL Colombia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
Table 4.17.  1PL versus 2PL Kichwa   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  118
Table 4.18.  1PL versus 2PL migrants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
Table 5.1.  Certified sales versus certified production . . . . . . . . . . . 130
Table 5.2.  Farm certification and size by municipality  . . . . . . . . . . 131
Table 5.3.  Income distribution between and within income sources  . . 134
Table 5.4.  Income by source and quintile   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  135
Table 5.5.  Instrument relevance: certification status  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  140
Table 5.6.  Durbin - Wu - Hausman endogeneity tests  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  141
Table 5.7.  Estimated correlation coefficients of the residuals   .  .  .  .  .  .  142
Table 5.8.  Participation in specific income-earning activities  . . . . . . 143
Table 5.9.  Income obtained from specific income-earning activities  . . 145
Table 5.10.  Income obtained from specific income-earning activities 
(instrumented)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
Table 5.11.  Total income effects and income pathways   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  147
Table 5.12.  Assumptions power calculation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
Table 5.13.  Descriptive statistics  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
17
Chapter 1 
General introduction
18
Strange bedfellows? Big business meets small farmer  Wytse Vellema
19
General introduction 
Problem statement
The growing and urbanising world population is transforming the food system. 
By 2050, world population is expected to reach 9.6 billion of which 6.3 billion will 
live in cities (UN Population Division, 2014). As almost all the land suitable for 
agriculture is already being used, the agricultural production required to feed the 
world needs to come from increased productivity on existing agricultural land. 
Most of this increase has to come from low-income countries, where the yield gap 
– the difference between potential yield and actual yield – is largest (FAO, 2014). 
Producing more food is one thing, getting it to consumers quite another. 
Urbanisation means that food that was traditionally grown and consumed locally 
increasingly depends on intermediaries in the food value chain. The resulting 
anonymity between farmer and consumer requires formalized control systems 
to guarantee food quality and safety (Ruben et al., 2007). Complexity is further 
increased by the interest of consumer groups in high-income countries in the 
social and environmental conditions under which food is grown. Taken together, 
these requirements lead to an increased need for coordination within value chains 
(Daviron and Vagneron, 2011; Nadvi, 2008; Ponte and Gibbon, 2005; Swinnen, 
2007). This raises the question: how can farmers be included in these value chains 
and how does the inclusion affect them?
A first step to answering this question is to turn it around: which farmers are 
currently excluded and why? Most research identifies farm size as the most 
important factor determining exclusion: small farms are often excluded (Barrett 
et al., 2012; Reardon et al., 2009). Recent estimates suggest there are around 570 
million farms in the world (FAO, 2014). Most of these farms are small and family-
operated; in low and lower-middle income countries, more than 95% of farms 
are smaller than five hectares (FAO, 2014). These farms are an important source 
of national income, especially in low-income countries. Of the 3.1 billion people 
living in their rural areas, the vast majority depends directly or indirectly on 
agriculture to make a living (IFAD, 2010; World Bank, 2007). Most are making a 
meagre living at best; 60% are considered poor and 35% - over 1 billion people - 
extremely poor1 (IFAD, 2010). Not all small farms should be considered excluded. 
Below a certain size, the farm provides insufficient income to sustain a family 
or even to contribute substantially to their income. Such farmers would benefit 
equally from opportunities outside their own farm or even outside of agriculture. 
However, many small or medium-sized farms do have the scale to contribute 
meaningfully to agricultural production, evidenced by their current production 
for local markets. Why are so many of these farmers not producing for modern 
supply chains, which ostensibly offer higher returns? Accessing and using markets 
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is costly. The costs of using the market are transaction costs, which include per-
unit costs such as transportation fees and fixed costs which do not vary with 
the size of the transaction (Goetz, 1992; Key et al., 2000). Fixed transaction 
costs include searching for potential partners, bargaining over the terms of the 
agreement, and enforcing the agreement once it is in place. These costs depend 
in part on the institutional environment; enforcement costs are higher when 
the rule of law is weak (Fafchamps, 2004; North, 1990). Transaction costs also 
differ between marketing channels. Modern supply chains generally have more 
requirements on quality, safety, and growing conditions than local markets 
(Maertens and Swinnen, 2009; Ruben et al., 2007). Meeting these requirements 
frequently involves investments with a large fixed cost component, effectively 
increasing the scale of production at which it becomes profitable for farmers 
to participate. Although for many farmers reaching this scale of production is 
technically feasible by increasing yields, most have insufficient financial resources 
or access to credit to make the required investments. This combination of high 
fixed transaction costs, small landholdings, and financial constraints exclude 
many small farmers from modern supply chains.
Given the growing world population and the consequent increasing demand for 
food, the need to include small-scale farmers is becoming ever more pressing. 
Several food companies have recognised this need and have started to include 
specific targets for smallholder inclusion in their annual reports.2 Industry-wide 
learning platforms have also sprung up in which research organisations and the 
public and private sector share information on best practices. Two examples of 
such learning platforms are the Seas of Change Initiative and the Sustainable Trade 
Initiative3, which have broad membership from food companies. Governments 
and multilateral donor organisations are playing an important role in funding 
such initiatives, which are part of a broader shift in the focus of development 
spending. Governments are increasingly undertaking development projects 
together with the private sector. In agriculture, several of these projects take the 
form of ‘inclusive business models’4, which are discussed in this thesis. This is 
partly for efficiency reasons: it allows NGOs to focus on farmer training, while 
private partners provide a stable outlet for the farm products. This way, farmers 
are only encouraged to grow products for which there is an actual demand. On 
the other hand, the co-investment structure allows governments to maintain the 
same level of projects while reducing development spending, a process encouraged 
by the financial crisis. To maximize the effectiveness of development spending 
and maintain control over the way the funds are used, donors have embraced 
impact evaluation, in the process making monitoring and evaluation a standard 
component of almost all development projects. In doing so, a market was created 
for knowledge on the way such impacts should be measured.
21
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The market for knowledge on farm-level impact
Impact measurement of specific projects and general development methods has 
rapidly gained prominence over the last decade. Government and multilateral 
donor interest in aid effectiveness started in earnest with the formulation of the 
millennium development goals in 2000, which set out specific targets for reducing 
poverty and improving education and health that the combined development 
effort should attain by 2015 (UN, 2000). These goals were followed up with the 
Sustainable Development Goals, which set targets for the next fifteen years.5 
Having such clear targets created the need to be able to objectively assess the 
contribution of individual development projects to attaining the overall targets, 
to direct spending to the most effective projects, and thus increase overall aid 
effectiveness. This ambition towards increased measurement and accountability 
was formalized in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) and signed 
by governments, multilateral donors, and civil society organisations. Whereas the 
Paris Declaration focuses on the impact of development projects, the discussion6 
surrounding the process towards aid effectiveness encouraged academic and 
research organisations working on the agriculture in the developing world to 
investigate the impact of programs and methods to alleviate poverty leading to 
a surge of publications on their impact. In agricultural economics, studies on the 
impact of contract farming and certifications on the well-being of small-scale 
farmers in developing countries are particularly frequent. 
Contract farming is an agreement between a firm and a farmer which gives the 
firm exclusive buying rights to the contracted crop. Contracts reduce transaction 
costs by overcoming market imperfections (Bardhan, 1989; Key and Runsten, 
1999). In low-income countries, it is common for contracts to provide farmers 
with seeds, fertilizer, and other inputs at the start of the growing season, which are 
repaid with part of the harvest (Prowse, 2012). Such inputs are often not available 
at local markets, and when they are available, farmers frequently do not have the 
resources or access to credit required to acquire them. Measuring the farm-level 
impact of contract farming has been far from straightforward, because of limited 
comparability between contracts in different crops and countries and containing 
different requirements and support services. Not surprisingly, reviews of the 
literature find heterogeneous effects (Prowse, 2012; Wang et al., 2014). Impact 
measurement is complicated further by differences between studies in outcome 
variables. Some studies measure the effect on production, while others focus on 
food security. Finally, many contracts specify production requirements based 
on third-party labels or certifications, such as global GAP, which makes it hard 
to disentangle to impact of the contract from the impact of the certification. In 
addition, the contract details are inconsistently provided, making impacts hard to 
compare across different studies. 
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Certification is “the action or process of providing someone or something 
with an official document attesting to a status or level of achievement” (OED, 
2008). In agricultural sourcing, this means that by giving a farmer certification, 
an organisation guarantees that certain conditions have been met in the 
production of the product. Conditions may take almost any form, from detailed 
documentation of production practices, abstaining from using certain chemicals 
in the production process, or membership to a democratic foundation responsible 
for spending social premiums. The discussion here is restricted to business-to-
consumer (B2C) certification - visible on packages in supermarket shelves. B2C 
certification was born out of the fair trade and organic movements of the 1960s 
and 1970s (Daviron and Vagneron, 2011; Raynolds, 2000). The first product to 
receive fair trade certification was coffee7, which is still the single most important 
certified crop (Kolk, 2013). Certified products command a premium in the market, 
which consumers are willing to pay in exchange for the guarantee that products 
are produced under certain conditions. Part of the premium is used up in the 
value chain to pay for certifying organisations and marketing, the remainder is 
redistributed to farmers. Evidence of farm-level impact of certification is limited 
to specific cases. Most studies focus on the benefits of certification, comparing 
price, yield, and crop income between certified and non-certified farmers or 
between different types of certification (Barham and Weber, 2012; Valkila, 2009; 
Weber, 2011). This emphasis on benefits rather than costs is to be expected, since 
benefits are easier to measure. The main cost of adhering to strict certification 
standards is borne by family labour, which is notoriously hard to accurately 
quantify. Since rural households in developing countries are known to depend 
on a variety of income sources, all of which require family labour, looking only 
at those factors directly affected by certification or contract farming might 
overestimate impact. Moreover, differences in how outcome indicators are 
measured and which outcome indicators are measured makes it hard to compare 
impacts between different studies, especially when these studies concern different 
types of economic relationships. 
Bringing together related strands in the literature
The academic literature on farm-level impact of different types of relationships 
between firms and farmers such as contract farming, certification, and 
cooperatives is currently organized into separate strands, with little cross-
referencing between them. Moreover, there is a tendency to focus on the effect 
of these separate mechanisms on farm-level outcomes such as food security, 
production, and poverty. A stylized depiction of the way the literature is currently 
organized is shown in Figure 1.1. This is not a criticism per se; the statistical rigour 
required to allow some degree of causal inference requires a clear and narrow 
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focus. Data limitations, often caused by financial and time constraints, exacerbate 
this tendency. Yet, even if this emphasis on unidirectional and narrow effects is 
entirely understandable, it is paramount to realize it deviates from reality in at 
least two important ways.  
First, the implied distinction between contract farming, certification, and 
cooperatives is far from clear-cut. In reality, most forms are diffuse, blending 
characteristics of one mechanism with those of another, or even completely 
overlapping. For example, most contract farming involves some process control, 
which is commonly implemented by requiring farmers to adhere to existing 
standards such as GlobalGAP (Prowse, 2012). Similarly, Fair Trade International 
and FLO-Cert only certify coffee producers who are organized in cooperatives8, 
making it nearly impossible to differentiate the impact of the certification from the 
impact of the cooperative. What is problematic is that in practice this overlap is 
hardly ever made explicit, making the allocation of the study to any of the ‘strands’ 
primarily based on the preference of the researcher. Moreover, once the study has 
been allocated, the probability of it being cited in papers in one of the other strands 
in the literature drops substantially. Therefore, the current separation between 
different types of relationship between firms and farmers is not only artificial, it 
might even be considered an impediment to knowledge building.
Second, considering uniformly applied farm-level outcomes as indicative of 
true impact is overly simplistic. This tendency is particularly worrying when the 
outcome is measured with indicators whose validity and reliability has not been 
verified. Indicators might be particularly sensitive to certain behavioural changes, 
resulting in invalid comparisons between groups with different preferences. 
Furthermore, even if the outcome is measured accurately,  it might still not be 
very informative. The finding that food security increased in one instance but not 
in another is of little value without knowing why the effect was different. And if 
food security increased, was this because of increased food spending or increased 
productivity of crops grown for home consumption? In other words, to measure 
true impact, the interaction between behaviour and outcomes in which household 
Figure 1.1. Stylized depiction of the current organisation of the farm-level impact literature
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Figure 1.2. Conceptual framework
livelihood choices are likely to play an important role should not be ignored. 
In recognition of the limitations associated with the framework in Figure 1.1, in 
this thesis a more open framework was chosen (Figure 1.2). The different types 
of relationships between firms and farmers were considered jointly as inclusion 
mechanisms, defined as organisational structures going beyond arms’-length 
market transactions governing the economic relationship between a firm and 
rural households in developing countries, which allows the firm to purchase 
agricultural products from these households or employ household members in 
agricultural production or processing.9 By grouping these mechanisms according 
to their function – linking small-scale farmers to markets – the analytical focus 
could be placed on what the different forms have in common and how differences 
between forms might be explained. 
Measurement issues
Accurate measurement of farm-level impact is complex and recent years have 
seen substantial progress in methodological developments. In agricultural and 
development research, most of this effort has been concentrated on improved 
targeting and sampling (Banerjee and Duflo, 2011; Ravallion, 2008). The main 
objective of sampling is to select study participants such that the sample is an 
unbiased representation of the study population of interest. Targeting concerns 
the way beneficiaries of a particular intervention are selected. Adequate sampling 
and targeting ensures that the impact of the intervention is measured in isolation 
from other factors affecting the outcome variable.
A topic which has received less attention, at least in the field of agricultural 
economics, is indicator validity and reliability. Validity refers to “the extent to 
which an empirical measure adequately reflects the real meaning of the concept 
under consideration” (Babbie, 1989), while “a scale or test is reliable to the extent 
that repeat measurements made by it under constant conditions will give the 
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same result” (Moser and Kalton, 1989). Validity and reliability matter because 
of the increased use of indicators to measure progress towards the targets of the 
Millennium Development Goals, which focus on food security, poverty, and 
health outcomes. Impact measurement is expensive and uses resources which 
could have been used for operational activities generating the impact. To save 
resources, rather than collect detailed income or food consumption data to 
determine poverty and food security status, indicators are used: a limited set of 
questions that allow rapid assessment. Such indicators are particularly common 
for poverty and food security. Unfortunately, tests of their validity and reliability 
are scarce (Desiere et al., 2015; Heady and Ecker, 2013), yet, such tests are an 
essential first step to verify whether these indicators measure what they were 
developed to measure.
An intervention, whether it is a development project or the inclusion of a farmer in 
the value chain, has a myriad of impacts. Although the Millennium Development 
Goals might encourage aid effectiveness by increasing the emphasis on outcome 
measurement, at the same time they encourage a narrow focus on a limited set of 
outcomes. Such a focus is problematic when it prevents a deeper understanding 
of long-term behavioural impacts of the intervention (Pritchett and Woolcock, 
2004). There is a difference between distributing monthly food rations and 
providing households with the capability to grow the same amount of food that 
is not picked up when only values on ultimate outcomes like poverty or food 
security indicators are considered. Thankfully, most researchers interested in the 
impact of specific inclusion mechanisms are not bound by such constraints. And 
yet, even in this literature there appears to be a preference for relatively easy-to-
observe outcomes like price, production, and marketed surplus (e.g. Barham and 
Weber (2012), Prowse (2012), Valkila (2009)). This narrow focus is particularly 
surprising given the now well-established finding that off-farm income sources 
play an important role for small-scale farmers (Ellis, 1998, 2000) and that rural 
households rely on a broad set of income-generating activities to sustain their 
livelihood (Davis et al., 2010; Scoones, 1998). 
When it comes to the impact of inclusion mechanisms, such broader impacts 
deserve to be taken into account. If, perhaps because of time or financial 
constraints, the decision is made to rely on indicators to evaluate impact, these 
indicators should first be validated. It should also be clear which specific inclusion 
mechanism is evaluated to be able to assess how it compares to available alternatives. 
To define what constitutes such an available alternative, more research is needed 
on the governance structures of inclusion mechanisms. Such research starts with 
a clear definition.  
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Table 1.1. Control of activities and asset ownership per governance arrangement
Definition Institution
1
Those [business models] which do not leave behind small-scale farmers and 
in which the voices and needs of those actors in rural areas in developing 
countries are recognised (Vorley et al., 2008).
FAO
2
Inclusive businesses include low-income people on the demand side as 
customers, and on the supply side as employees, producers and entrepreneurs 
serving at various points within the value chain. They build bridges between 
business and the poor for mutual benefit (UNDP, 2008).
UNDP
3
Inclusive business models expand access to goods, services, and livelihood 
opportunities for those at the base of the pyramid in commercially viable, 
scalable ways (Jenkins et al., 2011). 
IFC
4
Inclusive business models are a private sector approach to providing goods, 
services and livelihoods on a commercially viable basis, either at scale or 
scalable, to people at the base of the pyramid by making them part of the 
value chain of companies' core business as suppliers, distributors, retailers or 
customers (Hertveldt et al., 2012). 
IFC, G20
5
A profitable core business activity that also tangibly expands opportunities for 
the people at the base of the economic pyramid (BoP): as producers, suppliers, 
workers, distributors, consumers – or even as innovators (BIF, 2012). 
BIF, DFID
6
Inclusive business models include the poor on the demand side as clients, 
and on the supply side as distributors, suppliers of goods and services, or 
employees at various points in the value chain. In so doing, these business 
models build bridges between business and the poor for mutual benefit 
(Tewes-Gradl et al., 2013). 
Endeva
7
Inclusive business models make a positive contribution to the development of 
companies, the local population and the environment (Gradl and Knobloch 
2010).
Endeva
8
An inclusive business is an entrepreneurial initiative seeking to build bridges 
between business and low-income populations for the benefit of both 
(WBCSD and SNV, 2008).
SNV-
WBCSD
9
An inclusive business is an economically profitable, environmentally and 
socially responsible entrepreneurial initiative, which integrates low-income 
communities in its value chain for the mutual benefit of both the company and 
the community. It seeks to improve the livelihoods of low-income populations 
while increasing returns to the company (…) (SNV-WBCSD, 2011).
SNV-
WBCSD
Inclusive business models, inclusion mechanisms, and the scope of this 
thesis
There are numerous organisations working on inclusive business models, many 
of which choose to use their own definition. An overview of some of the most 
current definitions as well as the organisation using them is provided in Table 1.1. 
Although the definitions differ in their wording and sometimes in their emphasis, 
there are at least four aspects they have in common. First, their focus on the 
poor, variously defined as small-scale farmers (1), low-income people (2, 8, 9), 
or those at the base of the pyramid (3, 4, 5). Second, an acknowledgement of the 
necessary win-win for both the company and those it includes. This is framed in 
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terms of mutual benefit (2, 6, 8, 9), commercial viability (3), or profitability (5, 
9). Third, the stated interest of the for-profit business partner in the well-being 
of the poor which are included through the business model, recognising their 
voices and needs (1), contributing to development (7), and seeking to improve 
their livelihoods (9). Fourth, the mechanism used to include goes beyond an 
arms-length market transaction, reflected by terms like making them part of (4), 
building bridges (2, 6, 8) and integrate (9). The idea is that certain vulnerable 
populations are excluded from participating in the mainstream market, and that 
something extra is required to allow them to participate.
In this thesis, inclusive business models are defined as private sector for-profit 
initiatives which include the poor with the stated intention to improve their well-
being through mechanisms going beyond arm’s-length market transactions. 
At first sight, there appears to be little difference between inclusive business 
models and inclusion mechanisms. Both include small-scale farmers, require 
profit for both the firm and the farmer in order to be durable, and go beyond an 
arms’-length, spot market transaction. This overlap means that in many cases, 
a model can be an inclusive business model and an inclusion mechanism at the 
same time (Figure 1.3). However, there is one big difference between the two. 
Inclusive business models require something which inclusion mechanisms do 
not: the stated intention to make the included population better off. Without such 
a stated intention, an inclusion mechanism should not be considered an inclusive 
business model but a ‘commercial and inclusive value chain’ (Harper et al., 2015), 
whose definition explicitly excludes inclusion mechanisms which have increasing 
the well-being of the people they include as an objective. Another difference 
between inclusive business models and inclusion mechanisms is that the former 
may also concern consumers. Such consumer-oriented models fall outside the 
scope of this thesis. 
All cases studied in this thesis concern inclusion mechanisms – as defined in 
relation to Figure 1.2 – which may also be considered inclusive business models, 
because of their stated interest in the well-being of the farmers they attempt 
Figure 1.3. Inclusive Business Models, Inclusion Mechanisms, and the scope of this thesis
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to include. This is not to say that the well-being of farmers does not matter for 
other inclusion mechanisms, quite the contrary. When farmers do not expect to 
benefit, they will not participate in any inclusion mechanism (Barrett et al., 2012). 
And when expected benefits do not materialize, they are unlikely to be willing to 
continue the relationship (Gow and Swinnen, 2001). Hence, even those inclusion 
mechanisms which include small farmers purely out of self-interest may logically 
be expected to have a positive effect on the well-being of farmers. Therefore, even 
though the studies in this thesis exclusively concern inclusive business models, 
which are a subset of inclusion mechanisms, the results are expected to extend to 
most non-IBM inclusion mechanisms. 
Thesis outline
The overall objective of this thesis was to contribute to the understanding of the 
way small-scale farmers in developing countries are included in globalized food 
value chains and the measurement of the impact of this inclusion on their well-
being. In researching the subject, it became clear why smallholders are currently 
excluded from these value chains, and that there exist many different mechanisms 
for smallholder inclusion. A diverse sub-group within these inclusion mechanisms, 
inclusive business models, were studied in this thesis. What sets inclusive business 
models apart from other inclusion mechanisms is their stated interest in the well-
being of the rural households they include, which makes accurate and complete 
measurement of their impacts on this well-being all the more relevant. The thesis 
is divided into two parts and contains four independent chapters: the first part 
considers the governance structure of inclusive business models, the second part 
the measurement of farm-level impact.  
This thesis is built on two sets of case studies, one set with data at the level of 
the governance structure, the other with farm-level data. The first data set on 
governance structures contains ten case studies of inclusive business models in 
Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, and South Africa. In chapter 2, one 
of these ten case studies was selected for in-depth within-case analysis, which 
is a recommended approach to generate detailed understanding of complex 
organisational processes (Eisenhardt, 1989; Hartley, 2004; Yin, 1994). In chapter 
3, the other ten case studies were compared using across-case analysis, which 
is useful to identify differences and similarities across cases (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
The second data set contained farm-level data from around 1,000 households 
in Colombia and Ecuador. In chapter 4, data from both countries was used to 
check the internal validity of a food security indicator which is frequently used to 
measure the farm-level impact of development interventions. In chapter 5, data 
from Colombia was used to test the impact of farm certification – an inclusive 
business model – on the livelihood strategies of small-scale farmers. 
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In chapter two, the same theory which was used to identify the reason for the 
frequent exclusion of small-scale farmers from globalized food value chains, 
transaction cost theory, is applied to three distinct governance structures governing 
the purchase of sugar cane from small-scale farmers in KwaZulu-Natal, South 
Africa. The objective of this chapter is to discover the extent to which transaction 
cost theory, developed mostly for businesses in high-income countries, can 
explain governance structures in inclusive business models. Specifically, it applies 
Williamson’s (1975) transaction attributes of frequency, uncertainty, and asset 
specificity and Ménard’s (2004) dimensions of monitoring mechanisms, rent 
allocation, and enforcement mechanisms to explain the specific form taken by 
these governance structures. Financial constraints of farmers were identified as 
an important explanatory factor of their form, not taken into account by existing 
theories on governance structures. 
In chapter three, the effect of the financial constraints of farmers  - and the 
consequent onus to invest placed on firms - on the governance structure of a set 
of ten case studies of inclusive business models in Africa was studied. All cases 
share a context of a weak institutional environment requiring the firms to rely on 
safeguards contained in the governance structure to ensure contract compliance. 
Transaction cost theory was complemented by positive agency theory to 
investigate which factors determine the risk of the investment, and the extent to 
which safeguards are able to mitigate these risks. 
The second part of the thesis concerns the measurement of farm-level impact. 
In chapter four, the validity of a frequently used indicator of food security, the 
Household Dietary Diversity Score (HDDS), was tested. This indicator was 
developed in 2006 (Swindale and Bilinsky, 2006) and is widely used.  However, 
its validity had never been tested, creating the risk that the indicator might not 
actually measure what it was developed to measure: household food access, a 
dimension of food security. Rasch analysis was used to test the indicator’s internal 
validity, i.e. the extent to which the questions of which the indicator is made up 
appear to be related to the same underlying construct. Results are disappointing, 
and harbour potentially bad news for donors which have been relying on this 
indicator to evaluate programs.  
In chapter five, the effect of coffee certification on the livelihood of small-scale 
coffee producers in the south of the Colombian Andes was studied. Certification 
of small-scale farmers is a classic example of an inclusion mechanism which 
states to be interested in the well-being of farmers. Rural households are known 
to rely on many different activities to generate their income. The objective of this 
chapter is to analyse if certification had effects on the income-generating activities 
other than coffee production, thus explicitly going beyond directly observable 
outcomes, such as price and productivity. The relative attractiveness of coffee 
production with certification is analysed using the economic principle of revealed 
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preference. Results show certification indeed increases the relative attractiveness 
of coffee production, but that increases in income from coffee are at the expense 
of income from other sources. 
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Notes
1 A person was considered poor if his or her income was less than 2 USD/
day and extremely poor when it was less than 1.25 USD/day
2 See for example the annual reports for 2014 of Cargill and Unilever.
3 Websites: www.seasofchange.com and www.idhsustainabletrade.com.
4 “Private sector for-profit initiatives which include the poor with the 
stated intention to improve their well-being through arms’-length 
market transactions.
5 http://un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-development-goals.
6 The fire was fuelled by publication of Moyo’s book ‘Dead Aid’ (2009), in 
which the author argues that past aid has been not merely ineffective, 
but even counterproductive.
7 Mexican coffee, to be precise. In 1988 the first fair trade coffee appeared 
in Dutch supermarkets under the Max Havelaar label.
8 On 31 December 2011, FT USA split from Fair Trade International 
because it believed non-organized coffee producers should also be 
eligible for certification. See www.fairtradeusa.org for the official 
announcement and explanation (15 September 2011).
9 This definition was developed for the purpose of this thesis. It explicitly 
includes rural households as employees, to allow for changes in 
agricultural production systems such as those described by Maertens 
and Swinnen (2009).
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Abstract
Inclusive business models are a diverse set of governance structures linking 
small-scale farmers to modern food value chains, often taking the form of public-
private partnerships or private sector developments with poverty alleviation or 
increasing food security as their specific objective. Although these models have 
been described extensively in case studies conducted by donors and development 
organisations, there have been few attempts to compare cases and link them 
to theory. In this chapter, an attempt is made to fill this void. More specifically, 
to investigate to what extent transaction cost theory can be used to analyse 
inclusive business models as a single heterogeneous group. Three governance 
structures used simultaneously by the same company to purchase sugar cane 
from small-scale growers are described in detail. One of these structures is close 
to a market arrangement, the other two are hybrids. Williamson’s discriminating 
alignment hypothesis and Ménard’s recent work on hybrid models are used to 
explain the factors driving the choice for a hybrid arrangement and determining 
their specific form. Results indicate that at least two areas would need to be 
included to explain the specific form taken by the studied governance structures: 
production characteristics and financial constraints of the transacting parties. In 
addition, national and local regulations are shown to have an important effect on 
organisational form. Direct government involvement in designing the governance 
structure also had a large influence on the degree of inclusiveness. However, some 
care is warranted: overly restrictive inclusion criteria might have an adverse effect 
by endangering the long-term survival of the model.
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Introduction
Institutional and regulatory changes are affecting agri-food value chains 
worldwide. Although some trends and changes might be global in nature 
(Reardon et al., 1999), the way organisations are affected depends equally on the 
country-specific or even local institutional environment. In South Africa, there is 
a history of extensive government intervention in agricultural markets (Kirsten 
et al., 2009). The end of apartheid marked a strong shift in policy towards re-
integrating the formerly excluded black population into the productive process. 
One of the most important pillars of this policy in the agricultural sector was 
land reform, combined with extensive opportunities for government to encourage 
participation of small landholders in agri-food value chains. These recent policy 
shifts have had a profound influence on the organisation of the agricultural sector. 
An understanding of the organisation of any economic activity, including 
agriculture, requires an explanation of the conditions determining why some 
activities are performed jointly while others are performed independently. Such 
an understanding ranges from the division of labour in a needle factory (Smith, 
1776) to the boundaries of the firm (Coase, 1937). These boundaries can be 
studied by considering the transaction as the unit of analysis, in particular the so-
called make or buy decision. In his 1975 book, Williamson (1975) distinguishes 
two main governance structures for transactions: markets and hierarchies. In 
transactions governed by markets, asset ownership and decision rights are split 
between two or more autonomous firms, whereas in hierarchies ownership and 
decision-making are in the hands of a single firm.
Empirical studies on governance structures have shown that there are more than 
two ways to govern transactions (Blois, 1972). In the economics literature, these 
other governance structures are jointly named hybrids, a term coined by Rubin 
(1978). They are defined as ‘arrangements in which two or more partners pool 
strategic decision rights as well as some property rights, while simultaneously 
keeping distinct ownership over key assets, so that they require specific devices 
to coordinate their joint activities and arbitrate the allocation of payoffs’ (Ménard, 
2004) and are considered an intermediate form in the continuum between 
markets and hierarchies (Williamson, 1985). As such, they are commonly 
analysed by contrasting them with markets and hierarchies, using the transaction 
characteristics of asset specificity, uncertainty, and frequency originally developed 
by Williamson (1991).
However, these ‘mainstream’ characteristics might be insufficient to explain the 
specific form taken by hybrids, their ‘personality’ (Ménard, 2012a). Theoretical 
and applied research has identified a large variety of hybrid governance 
structures, with terminology and classification depending on whether the study 
was conducted within the field of economics, management, or sociology. This 
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variety with partly overlapping categories has complicated advances on the study 
of factors driving the choice of hybrid structure. One of the first attempts in this 
regards was made by Ménard (2004), who used monitoring mechanisms, rent 
allocation, and enforcement mechanisms as identifying characteristics. The extent 
to which these dimensions explain the specific form taken by hybrids is one of the 
main objectives of this paper. 
Existing theory on hybrids will be applied to a case study containing two agricultural 
sourcing arrangements which may be considered inclusive business models, so-
called because of their explicit inclusion of the poor or disadvantaged (UNDP, 
2008). Inclusive business models are rapidly gaining prominence in development 
programs, yet have received little consideration in academic thinking. Because 
these models more often than not take hybrid forms they fall within the scope 
of transaction cost theory. Yet, their complexity raises questions on the extent to 
which commonly used elements of the transaction cost lens enable reading and 
understanding these inclusive business hybrids. All of the arrangements studied 
in this paper govern the same transaction by the same company - sugar cane 
sourcing from small-scale growers - but differ in their details. Hence, the case 
study allows a clear distinction between common and unique elements. The aim 
of this paper is to understand the ‘personality’ of each of these structures, and the 
way in which they have been shaped by South Africa’s institutions, in particular 
regarding industry policies, regulated price setting, and land reform. 
Before the description of the transaction and the governance structures used to 
govern it, the method used to analyse the case and the data collection is explained. 
After that, the characteristics of the studied transaction is described in terms of 
Williamson’s (1991) discriminating alignment hypothesis, focusing on frequency, 
uncertainty, and asset specificity. The fourth section contains historical and 
descriptive information on relevant aspects of the institutional environment. 
Particular attention is given to historical and current sugar industry-specific 
regulation, as well as the local implementation of the land reform policy. The 
studied governance structures are described in more detail in section five, 
comparing control over activities and ownership of assets by each party. In the 
sixth section the relationship between transaction characteristics and governance 
structures is studied, looking first at reasons to go hybrid and second at the 
personality of the specific forms chosen. In the final sections main findings are 
discussed and summarized. 
Method
The different sourcing arrangements were analysed in-depth using the rationale 
of discrete structural analysis (Simon, 1978). Williamson (2002) argues in favour 
of this approach to build understanding of complex microeconomic organisation. 
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The principal burden of analysis should be based on comparisons of transaction 
costs between economic institutions. Therefore the analysis will be based on a 
combination of within-case and cross-case analysis. The case study method is well 
suited for in-depth study of a phenomenon in its real-life context (Yin, 1994), 
particularly to research questions requiring detailed understanding of complex 
social or organisational processes (Hartley, 2004). In this paper we combine 
within-case with cross-case analysis. The first is helpful for in-depth analysis 
and description, the latter to analyse similarities and differences across cases 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). It is therefore a descriptive and comparative approach. 
Inclusive business models are a relatively recent but increasingly common 
phenomenon, which has received little attention in the academic literature. It was 
therefore not possible to directly apply or test existing theory. Therefore, in this 
paper a case study approach was chosen, in combination with a broadly scoped 
research question, namely ‘to what extent can existing theory explain the specific 
form taken by inclusive business models and what are possible areas that require 
further study?’. Such a broadly scoped question was considered appropriate given 
the paucity of existing theory (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). 
The selected case study was part of a broader set of ten case studies on inclusive 
business models, described in detail in Sopov et al. (2014). These case studies were 
selected not to be representative of the population of inclusive business models, 
but rather to demonstrate the variety within the population. Since the project 
constituted the first attempt to consider these models as a group, few a priori 
criteria existed. Therefore, a more explorative approach was chosen. Research 
and practitioner organisations in sub-Saharan Africa were contacted and asked 
to provide short descriptions of inclusive business models they were familiar 
with. Out of these descriptions, ten cases were selected that were (1) as diverse 
as possible regarding their governance structures and (2) included different 
products, with different end-markets, in different parts of the continent. The full 
set of case studies is described in more detail in Chapter 3. 
From the broader set of ten case studies in the research project, sugar cane sourcing 
in South Africa was selected. This case was considered to be particularly relevant 
to study how transaction cost theory might be applied to the phenomenon of 
inclusive business models, since it contains multiple governance structures 
governing the same transaction. Therefore, it allows a differentiation between 
common and unique elements which is not possible when comparing governance 
modes between different transactions or institutional settings. An additional 
motivation to select this specific case was that it is located in South Africa, which 
provides a well-developed institutional and regulatory environment. This density 
of the institutional environment generates variation, which allows discovery 
of the finer interactions with organisational form. Furthermore, due to South 
Africa’s long history of well-developed institutions, information on policies and 
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regulations was well-documented an easily accessible. 
To collect detailed information on the different governance structures and local 
situation, face-to-face interviews were held on location. Such an interview-based 
method is particularly useful to generate insights into how and why questions 
(Pettigrew, 1990). Interviews were complemented with desk research for 
triangulation (Yin, 1994), especially on relevant laws and regulations. Interview 
protocols were standardized to facilitate comparisons (Miles and Huberman, 1994). 
Using pre-developed questions also allowed maintaining a link between existing 
knowledge and inductive elements of the study (Pettigrew, 1990). Questions were 
built on the LINK methodology, which was developed to understand inclusive 
trading relationships between farmers, farmer organisations, and formal markets 
(Lundy et al., 2012). 
Data collection for the cooperative model took place over a two-week period in 
October 2013 and was initiated via emails explaining the objective of our study. The 
first interviews were held with the company managers responsible for developing 
the cooperative model. During these interviews, we learned about the existence of 
the third-party model. Interviews for this model, which was located in a different 
area, were conducted in August 2014. Interviews with managers were followed up 
by interviews with board members of successful and less successful cooperatives, 
field staff, and contractors. For the third party model, interviews were also 
held with managers and employees of the management company. After having 
interviewed the stakeholders, follow-up interviews were held with company 
management to clarify issues that came up. During writing up, additional contact 
by email and telephone was used to check details and obtain missing information. 
Data
The selected case study was part of a broader set of ten case studies on inclusive 
business models, described in detail in Sopov et al. (2014). These case studies were 
selected not to be representative of the population of inclusive business models, 
but rather to demonstrate the variety within the population. Since the project 
constituted the first attempt to consider these models as a group, few a priori 
criteria existed. Therefore, a more explorative approach was chosen. Research 
and practitioner organisations in sub-Saharan Africa were contacted and asked 
to provide short descriptions of inclusive business models they were familiar 
with. Out of these descriptions, ten cases were selected that were (1) as diverse 
as possible regarding their governance structures and (2) included different 
products, with different end-markets, in different parts of the continent. These 
case studies are described in detail in chapter 3.
From the broader set of ten case studies in the research project, sugar cane 
sourcing in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa, was selected for an in-depth analysis. 
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This case was considered to be particularly relevant to study how transaction 
cost theory might be applied to the phenomenon of inclusive business models, 
since it contains multiple governance structures governing the same transaction. 
Therefore, it allows a differentiation between common and unique elements which 
is not possible when comparing governance modes between different transactions 
or institutional settings. An additional motivation to select this specific case was 
that it is located in South Africa, which provides a well-developed institutional and 
regulatory environment as well as very particular historical reasons to focus on 
inclusion. This density of the institutional environment generates variation, which 
allows discovery of the finer interactions with organisational form. Furthermore, 
due to South Africa’s long history of well-developed institutions, information on 
policies and regulations was well-documented and relatively easily accessible. 
To collect detailed information on the different governance structures and local 
situation, face-to-face interviews were held on location. Such an interview-based 
method is particularly useful to generate insights into how and why questions 
(Pettigrew, 1990). Interviews were complemented with desk research for 
triangulation (Yin, 1994), especially on relevant laws and regulations. Interview 
protocols were standardized to facilitate comparisons (Miles and Huberman, 1994). 
Using pre-developed questions also allowed maintaining a link between existing 
knowledge and inductive elements of the study (Pettigrew, 1990). Questions were 
built on the LINK methodology, which was developed to understand inclusive 
trading relationships between farmers, farmer organisations, and formal markets 
(Lundy et al., 2012). 
Interview questions could be subdivided into three main categories: (1) What 
is the current structure of the chain? (2) How is the current inclusivity of the 
chain? (3) How many inclusivity be enhanced further? Questions on the current 
structure focused on the chain organisation and key actors, as well as product, 
payment, services, and information flows. Questions on the current inclusivity 
identified drivers, development phases, provided support, the perceived value 
of this support, and success factors. Finally, questions on enhancing future 
inclusivity focused on willingness to invest, areas for improvement, areas with 
potential, and policy support. The core set of specific questions were developed by 
the corresponding author and adapted and complemented in the field by whoever 
was conducting the interviews, as the situation commanded. 
Data collection for the cooperative model took place over a two-week period in 
October 2013 and was initiated via emails explaining the objective of our study. 
The first series of interviews was held by the corresponding author with the 
company managers responsible for developing the cooperative model. During 
these interviews, we learned about the existence of the third-party model. 
Interviews for this model, which was located in a different area, were conducted in 
August 2014. This second series of interviews was held by Wytske Chamberlain, a 
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PhD student at the University of Pretoria working on the UP-PGSARD1 project. 
Interviews with managers were followed up by interviews with board members 
of successful and less successful cooperatives, field staff, and contractors. For the 
third party model, interviews were also held with managers and employees of 
the management company. After having interviewed the stakeholders, follow-up 
interviews were held with company management to clarify issues that came up. 
During writing up, additional contact by email and telephone was used to check 
details and obtain missing information.
Transaction characteristics
The basic transaction studied is the purchase of sugar cane from growers by a 
processing company operating a sugar mill. This company or miller is the ‘driving 
actor’ which decides - within the limits of the possible - on the arrangement used 
to govern the transaction. The transacted product, sugar cane, undergoes several 
value-adding transformations before arriving at the sugar mill. As the governance 
structures studied affect the scope of the transaction governed, it is instructive to 
comprehensively describe these transformations (Gereffi and Korzeniewicz, 1994; 
Porter, 1985). In this value chain, the locus lies on the arrangements millers make 
with growers in production, procurement, and sales of sugar cane. 
Sugar cane grows from a perennial rootstock, which when properly maintained 
yields sugar cane for up to ten years. Soil preparation and planting only has to take 
place in the first year; all other activities take place per crop cycle. In KwaZulu-
Natal, our study region, these crop cycles are 12 to 15 months long. Ratoon 
maintenance takes place during the first six months of each cycle and consists of 
applying fertilizer and controlling pests and weeds.2 Harvesting is done manually, 
with a machete. First, the field is burned to remove excess foliage and reduce the 
presence of snakes and subsequently cut into stacks. Tractors are used to haul the 
stacks from the field to dedicated loading areas, scattered throughout the cane 
growing region. Here, the cane is loaded onto trucks which transport it to the 
sugar mill. 
Governance structures economize on transaction costs, which result from 
transaction attributes (Williamson, 1996). In institutional economics, the most 
important attributes of governance structures are considered to be transaction 
frequency, uncertainty, and asset specificity, with the latter being particularly 
important (Joskow, 2005; Klein, 2005). For sugar cane purchasing, transaction 
frequency is low when considered as the times the miller buys from an individual 
grower. With production cycles of 12-15 months and small landholdings, the 
miller on average buys 0.8-1 times per year from each grower. However, the miller 
has to conduct thousands of these transactions each production cycle and thus 
prefers a highly standardized approach.
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Transaction uncertainty can derive from volatility caused by exogenous shocks or 
ambiguity caused by difficulty in observing the state of the environment (Carson 
et al., 2006). Ménard (2012a) identifies five potential sources of uncertainty 
mentioned in the literature: unstable or uncertain demand, technological change, 
variable quality and timing of delivery, risk of opportunism, and appropriability 
hazards caused by inadequate institutions. In sugar cane purchasing, ambiguity 
and volatility in raw product quality and timing of delivery are the most important 
sources of uncertainty. Demand is stable and given by the capacity of the sugar 
mill, which is expected to remain below full capacity even when all available land 
is producing optimally, which was not the case at the time of research (SASA, 
2014). Technological change in sugar cane sourcing is slow and unlikely to affect 
the nature of the transaction. Opportunism is low due to high physical asset 
specificity, explained in more detail below. Finally, appropriability hazards are 
limited to the distribution of generated value, which in the South African sugar 
cane sector is both highly regulated, as explained in the next section, and possible 
to define ex-ante.
The most important transaction uncertainty derives from variability in product 
quality and timing of delivery. The sugar mill operates for 8-9 months per year. 
During this period, it operates 24/7 and, given high fixed costs, is most profitable 
when running at full capacity. Keeping the mill at full capacity requires precise 
coordination, complicated by the fact that cane needs to be crushed within 72 
hours after burning to prevent quality loss. Low quality sugar cane, defined as cane 
with a high fibre content, can cause the mill to jam, creating hold-up problems 
along the entire supply chain. Low quality cane is also caused by inadequate 
field management. The quality of sugar cane is costly to assess before crushing. 
Hence, millers prefer to control the timing of burning, harvesting, and transport 
to reduce uncertainty.
Asset specificity is generally considered the most important transaction 
characteristic driving the choice of governance structure, where the specificity 
refers to “the degree to which an asset can be redeployed to alternative uses and 
by alternative users without sacrifice of productive value” (Williamson, 1991). The 
share of the productive value of an asset which is sacrificed when it is deployed 
outside of the intended transaction is its degree of specificity. Williamson (1991) 
mentions six types of (relationship-specific) asset specificity: site specificity, 
physical and human asset specificity, brand name capital, dedicated assets, and 
temporal specificity. Of these, site and physical asset specificity and dedicated 
assets are the most important in sugar cane purchasing, although the distinction 
between these categories is not clear-cut. The specificity originates from the 
high bulk-to-value ratio of sugar cane, which results in high transport costs. The 
maximum distance from which cane can profitably be sourced defines the extent 
of the catchment area. In our case study, this maximum distance was roughly 
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40 kilometres.3 Constructing a sugar mill requires substantial capital investment 
into specific assets. Changing activity or changing the location of the plant is 
prohibitively expensive. Similarly, albeit to a lesser extent, growers are locked into 
a relationship with a specific mill. The investment into sugar cane rootstock is 
effectively a sunk cost: once growers located within the catchment area decide 
to plant sugar cane they have to produce and deliver cane for several years to 
recuperate the value of the initial investment. 
Institutional environment
The sugar industry is heavily regulated and relatively protected compared to 
other South African agricultural sectors (Kirsten et al., 2009; OECD, 2006). 
Strong government intervention in most agricultural markets was ended with the 
Marketing of Agricultural Products Act 47 of 1996; however, an exception was 
made for the sugar industry (Kirsten et al., 2009). This policy was justified on the 
grounds of protectionism and subsidies in other sugar producing countries. The 
domestic sugar industry is regulated through the Sugar Act of 1978 and the Sugar 
Industry Agreement of 2000 (NAMC, 2013). Main features of the South African 
sugar policy are import tariffs on sugar imports from non-SACU (Southern 
African Customs Union) member countries, the pivotal role of the South African 
Sugar Association (SASA), and the establishment of the Recoverable Value (RV) 
price system which determines cane prices millers have to pay to growers (Dubb, 
2013; NAMC, 2013).
The domestic sugar price is protected by import tariffs from cheap imports of 
dumped and subsidized sugar and hence generally exceeds international prices. 
South African sugar companies are exempted from these tariffs and thus benefit 
from higher prices. Mills in SACU member countries that have surplus sugar 
production - which only applies to Swaziland - also benefit from these higher 
prices. The artificially higher price constitutes an indirect subsidy to the sector, 
which consequently enjoys relatively high Nominal Rates of Assistance4 (Kirsten 
et al., 2009).
The South African Sugar Association (SASA) is at the heart of the industry. The 
board of SASA is composed of representatives of millers (South African Sugar 
Miller’s Association) and growers (South African Cane Growers’ Association). It 
operates independently and free of government intervention. The chairman and 
vice-chairman are elected every two years and rotate between representatives 
of millers and growers (NAMC, 2013). The mandate of SASA includes control 
over both domestic and international marketing of South African sugar and thus 
also over exports of bulk raw sugar (NAMC, 2013).  It regulates the relationship 
between growers and millers by establishing the distribution of proceeds and 
setting and publishing the Recoverable Value (RV) prices for sugar cane. The 
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sucrose level required to establish the RV price is measured at all South African 
sugar mills by the Cane Testing Service, a SASA subsidiary (SASA, 2014). SASA 
also hosts the South African Sugar cane Research Institute (SASRI) and the 
Shukela Training Centre, which provides training to new sugar cane growers, 
established commercial and small-scale growers and farm workers (SASA, 2014). 
Finally, as the representative organisation of the sugar industry, it is responsible 
for information gathering and external communication on all industry affairs. 
Sugar cane prices received by growers are controlled by the SASA using the above-
mentioned RV price system, which is based on the sales of local sugar, exported 
sugar, and molasses. Of the proceeds remaining after deducting levies, growers 
receive 64% - a ratio which has not changed since 1994. This is the RV price. The 
actual price received by growers depends on the quality of the cane delivered to 
the sugar mill. Cane quality is determined by the sucrose, non-sucrose, and fibre 
content of each batch of cane, which is captured in the RV% (Wynne et al., 2009). 
This RV% is multiplied by the RV Price to determine the price to be paid to the 
grower (Canegrowers, 2013).5 Hence, the RV price received by growers is fixed by 
SASA, yet through the RV% quality incentives are maintained. 
The South African sugar industry has always had an oligopsonistic structure, with 
several large milling companies and thousands of large and small growers. As 
of 2013, there were six milling companies operating fourteen mills, producing 
up to 2.2 million tons of sugar per season (South African Sugar Industry, 2013). 
These millers sourced sugar cane from just under 24,000 registered sugar cane 
growers (SASA, 2014), which is only half of the number of growers registered in 
2000s (Dubb, 2013). A large majority of these registered growers are smallholder 
farmers, of whom only half sold sugar cane in the 2014 season. The cane they 
supplied represented about 8% of the total crop (SASA, 2014). The remaining 
1,413 registered growers are large-scale producers, of whom 323 are black 
emerging farmers and the rest, the large majority, white commercial famers. 
Together they account for 84% of the sugar cane produced. The milling estates 
supply the remaining 8% (SASA, 2014).
With the fall of the apartheid regime in 1994, the new ANC government under 
Nelson Mandela undertook an ambitious land reform policy, resting on three 
pillars: land restitution, redistribution, and tenure reform. Land restitution 
allows communities whose land was seized after 1913 to register claims to land 
ownership or receive financial compensation. Under land redistribution policies, 
estate land is acquired with financial assistance from the state and redistributed 
amongst previously disadvantaged groups. Tenure reform consists of legal changes 
to guarantee security of tenure (Ministry of Land Affairs, 1997).
Land reform has heavily affected the South African sugar industry, which 
obtains most sugar cane from regions with large areas of communal land, such 
as KwaZulu-Natal. Land reform initiatives have already resulted in the transfer of 
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70 627 hectares of land formerly owned by large-scale white growers and milling 
estates to black owners, equal to 21% of the total land area used for sugar cane 
(CANEGROWERS, 2013). In total, more than 50% of the freehold land under 
cane has been claimed within the land restitution programme. However, the pace 
at which claims are settled is painstakingly slow (NAMC, 2013). In recognition 
of this problem, in 2004 the industry established the Inkezo Land Company with 
the aim to ‘streamline transfers of ownership by identifying sellers and buyers, 
streamlining processes of land reform and promoting the sustainability of the 
new ventures through outsourced support service providers or partners’ (NAMC, 
2013; South African Sugar Industry, 2013). New landholders often acquire user 
rights to small plots of land held under communal land tenure systems.
Sourcing from small-scale growers is nothing new; Dubb (2013) describes 
a history of small-scale growers starting in the 1950s. However, with land 
reform an increasing share of land within the catchment area of sugar mills is 
being managed by such small-scale growers. Most lands on which small-scale 
producers grow sugar cane fall under traditional community areas, in which 
land use and ownership are regulated through a communal land tenure system. 
In addition, most instances of restituted and redistributed land are also farmed 
on a communal basis. Such land officially remains state land, but user rights are 
vested in community members. One major implication is that such communal 
land is not freely transferable. It cannot be bought or sold to members outside of 
the community and user rights can only be transferred within the community by 
inheritance or by permission from the traditional authorities concerned. It may 
also be held in Communal Property Associations, which manage land acquired by 
a community (Republic of South Africa, 1996). 
Three governance structures
The institutional context described above is important to understand the emergence 
of different governance structures between growers and the miller. Following 
Williamson (2000), the institutional environment, along with the embedded 
rules and customs, shapes institutional arrangements between transacting parties 
which align governance structures with transaction costs. 
The definition of the governance structure crucially depends on how the scope 
of the transaction is defined. Tongaat Hulett Sugar sources sugar cane from 
three different sources: own plantations, medium-scale growers, and small-scale 
growers. Distinct arrangements are used to govern these transactions. Defining 
the scope as sugar cane sourcing would consider the governance structure to be 
a plural form, defined as ‘those organisational arrangements in which, for a class 
of transactions dealing with the same activity and within the same institutional 
and competitive environment, a party uses simultaneously different modes of 
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governance or relies simultaneously on substantially different types of contracts’ 
(Ménard, 2012b). Limiting the scope to purchases from small-scale growers 
would still consider the governance structure to be plural, albeit at a different 
level, as three distinct arrangements are used to govern such purchases. In this 
paper, however, the three arrangements used to purchase sugar cane from small-
scale growers will be analysed separately to understand which factors explain the 
choice for each arrangement.
Sugar cane purchases from small-scale growers are governed by three distinct 
arrangements, which will be referred to as Market, Cooperative and Third-
party. These arrangements differ in who controls specific activities and assets. 
An overview is given in Table 2.1. In the Market arrangement, there are only 
two parties controlling the main activities and assets: the grower and the miller. 
Although intensive communication and coordination of activities is required, 
parties retain their autonomy. Growers control on-farm activities, from planting 
to maintenance and harvesting. The main assets in this process, land and the 
sugar cane rootstock, are also under the grower’s control. Transport of the sugar 
cane to the mill is organized by the miller, albeit executed by dedicated transport 
companies. 
The Cooperative arrangement involves an additional actor: the cooperative. 
Growers lease their land to the cooperative for ten years. In exchange, growers 
receive rental income directly and, through cooperative membership, a share of 
cooperative profits. Soil preparation and planting, as well as ratoon maintenance 
in the first year is coordinated by the miller and financed through a development 
grant from the provincial government. As soon as the sugar cane reaches canopy 
stage for the first time, around 6-7 months after planting, the ownership of 
the rootstock is transferred to the cooperative, which is responsible for ratoon 
maintenance for the remainder of the productive life of the rootstock. Harvesting 
is coordinated by the cooperative from the first year; transport is organized by the 
miller.
Table 2.1. Control of activities and asset ownership per governance arrangement
Activities Market Cooperative Third party
Soil preparation and planting grower miller third party
Ratoon maintenance grower cooperative third party
Harvesting grower cooperative third party
Transport miller miller miller
Assets
Land grower grower grower/coop.
Rootstock grower cooperative miller
Sugar mill miller miller miller
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In the third-party arrangement, growers sign a power of attorney giving the 
cooperative the right to sign land-lease agreements on their behalf with the 
miller. In this arrangement, the miller directly owns the rootstock. Land rental 
payments are made to the cooperative, which distributes these rents based on 
the amount of land each grower contributed to the cooperative. Soil preparation, 
planting, ratoon maintenance and harvesting - the entire production process - 
is coordinated by a third party under a management contract signed with the 
miller. The third party is an independent management company specialised in 
managing sugar cane plantations, with own equipment and staff. A large number 
of cooperative members work as full-time employees for this company, around 
6,000 at the time of writing. No additional sub-contracting is required; the third 
party independently manages the entire production process.
Since all three governance structures share the same institutional context, the RV 
price system is the same for all growers, independent of the governance structure. 
This does not mean that growers necessarily receive the same price, since this 
depends on the quality of cane delivered to the mill. In the case of the cooperative 
and third-party system growers depend not only on their own productivity, but 
also on that of other members, both for land rents and dividend income.
Choice of governance structure
Reasons to go hybrid
In the early literature on hybrid governance structures, they were identified 
through their differences and commonalities with markets and hierarchies 
(Rubin, 1978). Williamson (1991) refined this approach and showed hybrids 
could be considered an intermediate form between the extremes of markets and 
hierarchies. He explained their occurrence using the discriminating alignment 
hypothesis, which states governance structures align with exchange attributes to 
minimize transaction costs. A shortcoming of this approach is that it assumes the 
minimum-cost structure is always selected. In reality this is not always the case, as 
is evident from the existence of plural forms, where several governance structures 
governing identical transactions exist within the same company (Ménard, 2012b). 
In such a context the approach might still be valid to examine how the different 
governance structures affect transaction costs. That is the approach taken here. 
Ten years ago, all sourcing from small-scale sugar cane growers was conducted 
through the market arrangement described in the previous section. However, 
this approach was found to have some shortcomings. In the market arrangement, 
intensive coordination between company extension staff and individual growers 
regarding the timing of the harvest and subsequent transport to the mill was 
required to control the uncertainty stemming from the variable quality of the 
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sugar cane. Because of the small size of each transaction, these coordination 
costs were substantial. Due to population growth and the custom of dividing 
land holdings equally between children - many of whom subsequently built their 
houses on this land - the average size of land holdings fell sharply, as did the total 
amount of land available for sugar cane production. With smaller landholdings, 
transaction sizes started to fall, and with an increasing number of producers the 
number of transactions increased. Coordinating this increasing number of small 
transactions resulted in ever-increasing transaction costs.
Variable quality was not caused only by burn-to-harvest-to-crush delays. Sugar 
cane requires large quantities of inputs and careful maintenance in the months 
before reaching canopy stage in order to produce a high quality crop. Insufficient 
investment caused many small-scale cane growers to produce a crop of variable, 
often low quality sugar cane. Under the market arrangement, company extension 
staff conducted field visits to detect such quality shortfalls. These visits, however, 
did not resolve the core of the problem: financial constraints. Limited financial 
means also resulted in many growers being unable to afford replanting the 
rootstock at the end of its ten-year productive cycle. With assets under separate 
ownership, the miller was unable to resolve these financial constraints without 
creating appropriability hazard, and growers had insufficient assets to use as 
collateral to access financing in the open market. Although financial constraints 
by themselves might be unsatisfactory explanations for hybrid models - as 
mentioned by Rubin (1978) - they were an important additional factor driving 
towards more integrated governance structures. 
The high transaction costs under the market arrangement created clear incentives 
to move towards more integrated forms of governance; however, they do not 
explain why the optimal solution would not be complete vertical integration. In 
this case, the most important reason not to vertically integrate was institutional. 
As explained in Section 3, under current land laws communal land cannot be 
individually owned. With full integration out of the question, the required 
scale could only be reached by pooling resources, which implies parties should 
relinquish some control. Such a surrender of control will only happen when 
both parties have an incentive to do so (Ménard, 2012a): the value generated by 
bringing down transaction costs through resource pooling needs to be distributed 
in such a way (ex-ante rent allocation) that both parties are better off under the 
hybrid arrangement. The question then becomes: what specific form should such 
a hybrid arrangement take?
 
Choosing a specific hybrid form
To understand the choice for the specific form of hybrid arrangement chosen it is 
necessary to go beyond the drivers explaining why the transaction is suited to be 
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governed by a hybrid structure.6 Ménard (2004) distinguishes three dimensions 
of transactions giving hybrids their ‘personality’. The first is the monitoring 
mechanism designed to deal with uncertainty and contractual hazards stemming 
from mutual dependence. The second relates to the allocation and protection of 
rents created by the chosen arrangement. The third dimension concerns dispute 
resolution and contract enforcement. These dimensions will be used to describe 
both the cooperative and third-party arrangement, to show to what extent 
they explain the relative advantages and disadvantages of each arrangement. 
Although these dimensions do provide valuable insights into the workings of the 
arrangements, they are not sufficient by themselves to explain why the observed 
arrangements took their specific form. Hence, additional drivers, specific to the 
case study, will also be discussed.
The monitoring mechanism is the linchpin of both arrangements: it is the 
mechanism by which coordination costs - the size of which was the most important 
reason to switch from the market arrangement to hybrid arrangements - are 
controlled. Under both arrangements, more control at lower costs is attained by 
pooling land in production units, which increases transaction size. Coordination 
of harvesting takes place between representatives of these production units and 
company extension staff. In the cooperative arrangement, cooperative management 
is authorized to make decisions for all land contributed by its members. In the 
third-party arrangement, land is under direct control of the miller, who instructs 
the management company on desired time and quantity of harvesting. Grouping 
makes more intensive coordination feasible, effectively reducing the risk of quality 
losses resulting from to burn-to-harvest-to-crush delays. 
The increased scale of production made possible by pooling land formerly under 
separate ownership generated economies of scale in production and monitoring. 
Cooperatives hire contractors for ratoon maintenance and harvesting. Each 
contractor manages a minimum of 40 hectares, which is sufficient to allow 
contractors to profitably invest in specialised machinery - bringing down 
production costs. Each cooperative hires several contractors, which are monitored 
regularly by cooperative management and company extension staff. Hiring several 
contractors simultaneously creates market pressure on prices and quality and 
revolving one-year contracts keep contractors on their toes. However, this system 
required the creation of a large number of capable local contractors, which was 
time and resource consuming. Hence, in the third-party arrangement, a bilateral 
agreement was made with a single pre-existing large contractor, which was made 
responsible for managing all land governed by the third-party arrangement - 
several thousand hectares. As a result of this agreement, the contractor had to 
expand its operations substantially, investing heavily in dedicated assets.
The reduced transaction costs in both hybrid arrangements created value which 
had to be distributed between partners in an incentive-maximising way. Each 
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partner had to expect sufficient returns ex-ante to participate and have limited 
scope for ex-post opportunistic behaviour. One of the most important components 
of this rent allocation mechanism is the price, which in South Africa is controlled 
by the government. As mentioned above, growers receive a fixed price, the RV 
price, which is published monthly by the South African Sugar Association and 
depends on the quality of the delivered cane through the RV%. However, in the 
hybrid arrangements the line between miller and grower becomes blurred. In 
both hybrid arrangements, growers receive 10% of gross proceeds as land rental. 
In the cooperative agreement, they additionally receive dividends as cooperative 
shareholders. Contractors get hired based on a tender process. In the third-
party arrangement, the management company gets paid gross proceeds minus 
land rental and saving for re-planting. As the owner of the rootstock, the miller 
receives this re-planting saving. The influence of SASA and the government - 
albeit indirectly through the tariff system - on the reward system is substantial. 
By setting the price and pre-determining the distribution of proceeds between 
millers and growers, all parties have an incentive to produce high quality sugar 
cane, at least as long as the price is high enough to justify the required investment 
in inputs. Furthermore, this pre-determined distribution reduces the scope for 
post-contractual fighting over proceeds.
The mutual dependence between growers and millers inherent in the sugar cane 
supply base creates strong incentives for informal dispute resolution. Generally, 
both parties would lose from breaking the relationship and hence have an 
incentive to resolve disputes. However, there are still risks of opportunism. In the 
cooperative arrangement, this risk lies not as much in the relationship between the 
company and the cooperative, as in that between the cooperative management and 
its shareholders. Once elected, cooperative management has far more information 
over realized profits than individual members. To prevent opportunism, the 
company created a project office responsible for the financial management of the 
cooperatives. The project office pays land rent directly to the growers and retains 
earnings for next year’s ratoon maintenance and re-planting into a savings account 
managed by SASA. Contractors are paid directly out of this savings account upon 
a joint request from the contractor, cooperative management, and company 
extension staff. Only profits are paid to a bank account controlled by cooperative 
management. 
No such system is required for the third-party arrangement, because of the high 
commitment of transaction-specific assets. Although formally the miller could 
choose to dissolve the contract, it would be difficult to find another management 
company with the required scale and capabilities. At the same time, the 
management company has invested so heavily in transaction-specific machinery, 
it would incur substantial costs if the contract were terminated unexpectedly. The 
bilateral and balanced nature of this arrangement allows it to depend more on the 
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quality of the relationship than on formal structures of control.
Describing the cooperative and third-party arrangement using Ménard’s (2004) 
three dimensions is informative, in that it generates additional insights into the 
functioning of the arrangements and trade-offs faced that cannot be derived only 
from the transaction attributes used by Williamson (1991) to analyse hybrids. 
However, they do not by themselves explain why the chosen arrangements took 
the specific form they did. For example, an important additional factor important 
to understand the structure of the cooperative arrangement is the presence of a 
government subsidy. The KwaZulu-Natal provincial government, in an attempt to 
create employment, agreed to finance the re-planting of several thousand hectares 
of sugar cane on communal lands through a grant. With the rootstock financed 
through the grant, it was not necessary for the company to have direct control over 
the land in the same way as in the third-party arrangement, which allowed a more 
hands-off approach. On the other hand, it required the use of local contractors, 
which at the inception of the arrangement did not yet exist. 
Discussion
In this paper, transaction cost theory on hybrid governance modes was used to 
explain why the studied transaction was governed by the specific form of hybrid 
models observed. The discriminating alignment hypothesis of Williamson (1991), 
which states governance structures align with exchange attributes to minimize 
transaction costs, was used to understand why hybrid models had an advantage 
over the market. Subsequently, the three dimensions suggested by Ménard (2004) 
- monitoring mechanisms, rent allocation, and enforcement mechanisms - were 
used to delve deeper into the specific form taken by the observed hybrid models. 
Although these approaches did explain some characteristics of the studied 
arrangements, these theories were insufficiently precise to explain, let alone 
predict, the details of the different arrangements, their ‘personalities’. 
One area which deserves further attention is the limited focus on only those 
characteristics directly related to the transaction - frequency, uncertainty, and 
asset specificity. The studied governance structures could not be explained 
without taking interrelatedness in the production process into account. The move 
from the market arrangement towards hybrid arrangements was largely possible 
because of the value generated by economies of scale at production level. To 
realize these gains, investments were required which needed to be protected from 
appropriation risk. These factors were crucial considerations in the design of both 
hybrid arrangements. Williamson himself noted that focusing on transaction-
specific characteristics alone constituted a partial analysis, and full understanding 
of asset specificity would require taking production characteristics into account 
(Riordan and Williamson, 1985; Williamson, 1991). In the context of our case 
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study, such a partial analysis would indeed have resulted in imprecise conclusions.
Another area which should be studied further is the role of financial constraints of 
one or several parties to the agreement in hybrid governance structures. Although 
financial constraints might be an unsatisfactory explanation for hybrids when it is 
used as the only explanation (Rubin, 1978), it was found to be of great importance 
in the case studied in this paper. Financial constraints not only were an important 
incentive to go hybrid, they also affected the specific form taken by the hybrid 
arrangements. The unbalanced investment required to create sufficient value for 
all parties to be interested in cooperation required a higher level of control for the 
party committing the additional resources. 
The country-specific and local institutional environment were found to have an 
undeniable impact on the studied governance structures. The heavily regulated 
South-African sugar industry, with its fixed subsidized prices and representation 
structure limited the scope to incentivise small-scale producers through higher 
prices, but did offer the platform to facilitate saving for ratoon maintenance. 
Land reform forced millers to sell the land used for on-site sugar cane production 
and historical land ownership patterns caused this land to be transformed into 
the communal land holdings on which small-scale production currently takes 
place. In South Africa, employment generation is a responsibility of the local 
government, which therefore had the authority to become actively involved in 
encouraging participation of small-scale sugar cane producers in the agri-food 
value chain. It is unlikely the studied governance structures would have taken the 
specific form they have now without this particular institutional context.
An interesting facet of the case study which was not touched upon in the analysis 
so far is the reason for the coexistence of different arrangements to govern the same 
transaction. That is, the motivation to choose a plural form rather than a single 
optimal solution. Ménard (2012b) identified three factors as possible motivations: 
ambiguity surrounding the fitness of a mode of organisation to the transaction 
at stake, complexity of a transaction, and strategic behaviour. Of these factors, 
the initial ambiguity surrounding the fitness of a mode of organisation appears 
the most important determinant in the case studied here. Dissatisfaction with the 
market mode of organisation motivated development of the cooperative model. 
However, difficulties with finding qualified local contractors and consequent 
expensive training and supervision resulted in the conception of the third-party 
model, which avoided the need for local contractors. As these models were 
developed recently, time will tell whether they continue to exist in their current 
form, or whether governance converges to a single preferred mode. 
Conclusion
The objective of this paper was to see to what extent existing theory on hybrid 
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governance structure could explain the specific form taken by a set of inclusive 
business models in sugar cane sourcing in South Africa. Although some aspects were 
explained, it was not possible to offer a comprehensive explanation. Transaction 
characteristics, the institutional environment, and Ménard’s dimensions of hybrid 
arrangements were used to study three different arrangements governing the 
same transaction. Clearly, as the transaction characteristics and the institutional 
environment were identical for each arrangement, these factors alone were not 
sufficient to completely explain their ‘personality’. Although Ménard’s three 
dimensions did allow comparing and understanding these personalities, by 
themselves they were not specific enough to explain the finer details. 
At least two areas that require further attention were identified: production 
characteristics of the local value chain and financial constraints of transacting 
parties. Production characteristics affect the scope for value creation and control. 
In the case of sugar cane, it determined where economies of scale could be 
attained and the almost complete dependency on a single buyer, limiting potential 
side-selling risk. Financial constraints affect the scope of possible governance 
structures. Since the firm is responsible for making most of the investment, in 
exchange it requires a certain degree of control, directly shaping the specific form 
of the governance structure. 
The importance of the institutional environment was clearly demonstrated, 
highlighting in particular the importance of national and local regulations and 
institutions. In a way, the institutional environment is like a piece of glassware 
within which governance structures have to find their optimal form. It prevents 
some forms and enables others. At the same time, it is not inflexible. It changes 
its shapes over time, at least partly in direct consequence of what happens within. 
It is paramount to further develop theory, to make it more sensitive to the finer 
determinants of governance structures. The current lack of sensitivity of theory 
is particularly relevant in the context of dynamics. Governance structures are far 
from static, changing form and structure over time in response to internal and 
external pressures. Understanding coexistence, ‘personality’, and dynamics is a 
large and fruitful area open for exploration by future research.  
Such research is warranted by the potential relevance of inclusive business models 
for poverty alleviation and economic development. Policy makers and international 
development organisations are increasingly looking for opportunities to work 
together with business in reaching these objectives. However, it is far from clear in 
what way public resources could be most effectively leveraged in this context. This 
case study shows how important public involvement was both in sharing risk in 
the development of the cooperative model, as well as in shaping the ‘personality’ 
of this model through regulations. On the other hand, the requirement to work 
with local contractors might risk the longevity of the model by imposing high 
transaction costs. Without a deeper understanding of the factors determining the 
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presence and personality of inclusive hybrid models, such questions will remain 
unanswered.  
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Notes
1 Project of the University of Pretoria’s Post-Graduate School of Agriculture 
and Rural Development (UP-PGSARD), titled “Assessment of Inclusive 
Development Models in South African Agriculture, for the integration 
of smallholder farming and land reform projects in commercial value-
chains”.
2 After six months, sugar cane reaches ‘canopy stage’, at which point the 
foliage is so thick weeds no longer develop. There is also no more need 
for fertilizer applications.
3 Interview with C. Ingle, Procurement manager at THS Maidstone Mill.
4 The nominal rate of assistance (NRA) is defined as the percentage by 
which government policies have raised gross returns above what they 
would be without the government’s intervention. See for example 
Anderson (2009).
5 The average RV price of 2012/2013 was R3,197 which gives an average 
cane price (at average RV% of 13%) of R389 per ton (SASA, 2014), 
roughly equal to 45 USD per ton (exchange rate of December 2014).
6 This limitation of attributes differentiating hierarchies from markets to 
explain the properties of hybrids has also been noted by other authors 
(Powell, 1996; Hodgson, 2002).
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Chapter 3  
How firm investment and appropriability 
hazard shape governance structure
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Abstract
In this chapter, organisational economics is used to study a set of inclusive business 
models with diverse governance structures to identify common elements. Their 
particular operating context of weak public institutions and a stark financial 
imbalance between firm and farmer is taken as a starting point. The analysis is 
based on a set of ten case studies covering different agricultural products, both 
crops and livestock, from Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, and South 
Africa. These case studies were selected for their diversity, not to be representative, 
and were used to show how firm investment, asset specificity, and appropriability 
hazards affect the organisational form, in particular the safeguards contained in 
the governance structure.  Results suggest a close relationship. Contrary to the case 
where parties to a transaction are able to make their own investments, in inclusive 
business models asset specificity reduces appropriability hazard. Alternative 
markets create incentives for opportunistic behaviour by enabling side-selling 
of inputs and outputs. The consequent appropriability hazards cause firms to 
adopt more extensive – and thus costly – safeguards. Appropriability hazard is 
reduced when farmers make credible commitments to the agreement through co-
investments. Unfortunately, this option is not available for the poorest of the poor. 
Moreover, it seems unlikely that third-party financing may overcome this hurdle, 
as it does not address the main purpose of the co-investment: signalling farmer 
commitment. 
61
 How firm investment and appropriability hazard shape governance structure 
Introduction
Inclusive business models are defined as private sector for-profit initiatives which 
include the poor with the stated intention to improve their well-being through 
mechanisms going beyond arms-length market transactions (chapter 1). Their 
explicit intention to deliver public goods such as poverty alleviation or food 
security improvement has led to substantial donor interest and a large number of 
reported cases (Prieto-Carrón et al., 2006; Wach, 2012). Inclusive business models 
come in many shapes and sizes, ranging from developing products specifically 
aimed at poor consumers (Prahalad, 2009) or providing employment for poor 
women to sell nutrient-enhanced yoghurt to the poor (Karnani, 2007). In this 
paper, we focus on a subset of inclusive business models, namely those models 
including the rural poor as suppliers or employees in the primary production 
stage of agricultural value chains in developing countries. 
From a development perspective, this subset of inclusive business models offers 
tremendous promise to improve the well-being of the poor. In 2010, 60% of 
the rural population in developing countries was classified as poor and 34% as 
extremely poor (IFAD, 2010). Although academic publications on the governance 
structures of inclusive business models are practically non-existent, impact studies 
on the effect of market access, often in the form of inclusion mechanisms such 
as contract farming (Prowse, 2012) and plantation employment (Maertens and 
Swinnen, 2009), typically demonstrate positive effects on the well-being of those 
who are included. Therefore, if inclusive business models succeed in reaching the 
rural poor, the expectation is that this inclusion will positively affect their well-
being.
Although improving the well-being of farmers might be of interest to the firm, 
this is never the only motivation for firms to work with small farmers. The model 
must be commercially viable: “without a business case, there is no development 
case” (Sopov et al., 2014). We posit that value generation in inclusive business 
models originates from any of three factors: supply, quality, or corporate social 
responsibility. Supply refers to situations where small-scale farmers are the only 
potential suppliers, yet under prevailing market conditions they are excluded 
from the market. Quality refers to situations where firms require going beyond 
arms-length market transaction to ensure that quality standards are met. Finally, 
corporate social responsibility refers to situations where value is generated because 
of linking with small-scale farmers, in terms of price premiums or company brand 
image. 
If both farmer and firm stand to gain from doing business together, why are so 
many small-scale farmers still excluded? One of the problems is financial. Most 
small-scale farmers have insufficient financial resources or access to credit to 
make the investments required to profitably commercialise their production. One 
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way to overcome this issue is through having this investment made by the firm. In 
that case, the value creation required to make the relationship mutually beneficial 
relies on the extent to which the firm is willing to invest in the relationship, which 
in turn depends on the extent to which it can protect and appropriate the benefits 
from this investment. 
Traditional neoclassical economics cannot explain how such a transaction should 
be structured. New institutional theories of agency, property rights, incomplete 
contracting, and Williamson’s transaction cost economics offer a sharper 
theoretical lens by placing the analytical focus on the economic relationship 
itself. Agency theory focuses on how information asymmetry creates incentive 
incompatibility between parties, and how to design optimal reward systems to 
realign incentives when enforcement is costly (Fama, 1980). Such an agency 
problem only exist when the agent has decision rights which affect the principal’s 
utility. Property rights theory is concerned with how the allocation of property 
rights affects incentives (Coase, 1960). Incomplete contracting builds on property 
rights theory by prescribing optimal asset ownership based on residual control 
rights – the right to use an asset in a situation not prescribed by the contract 
between parties (Hart, 1995). 
Agency, property rights, and incomplete contract theory each focus on important 
aspects of the economic relationship, but only Williamson’s transaction cost 
theory (1996, 2002) places the analytical focus on the governance structure 
itself. In particular, it explains the form of the governance structure as a result of 
mitigating hazards and minimizing transaction costs. By making hazard mitigation 
an explicit objective of the governance structure, this approach effectively 
encompasses the central problem addressed by agency theory: information 
asymmetry. This focus on the governance structure is particularly relevant 
because of the institutional context in which inclusive business models operate. 
In many developing countries, justice systems are slow and inefficient or corrupt, 
making public enforcement prohibitively costly (Fafchamps, 2004; North, 1990). 
In such contexts, appropriation of returns on investment primarily relies on the 
private enforcement mechanisms embedded in the chosen governance structure 
and their ability to mitigate appropriability hazards. Since the success of inclusive 
business models hinges on their ability to overcome this crucial issue, the analysis 
in this paper will be based on organisational economics with a particular attention 
to the contribution of transaction cost theory.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 relies on literature on transaction 
costs and development studies to identify potential sources of appropriability 
hazards. In doing so, we show the particular role of asymmetric investments 
made by firms adopting inclusive business models. Section 3 presents the data, 
more precisely how case studies were selected and how and what information 
was collected. Section 4 introduces and discusses the results, showing how 
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appropriability hazards and firm investment are affected by the physical and 
institutional environment. Comparing the case studies, we show that investments 
are only made when hazards can be adequately controlled, with the level of 
required control depending on the level of investment. Section 5 concludes with 
some policy observations. 
Theory
Literature review
The complexity of including small-scale farmers in developing countries in 
globalized agricultural value chains has drawn ample attention in the field of 
agricultural economics, both in scientific and so-called ‘grey’ literature. A fast-
growing share of this literature is concerned with the impact of market access 
on the well-being of small-scale farmers, often focusing on specific interventions 
such as contract farming or certifications. In this chapter, the focus is not on 
assessing impact nor on determining which farmers are included or excluded 
by certain inclusive business models. The focus lies on the governance structure 
itself, on understanding what makes these models capable of sourcing from small-
scale farmers. Hence, most attention will be given to literature concerning the 
governance of the link between firms and small-scale farmers. 
Three approaches to investigate the firm-farmer relationship may be discerned: 
micro, macro, and meso. Micro approaches focus on the effect of transaction costs 
at the farm level. By accounting for transaction costs in farm-household models, 
it was shown that on-farm production decisions and hence household welfare was 
directly affected by transaction costs (de Janvry et al., 1991; de Janvry and Sadoulet, 
2006). Empirical work distinguished between fixed transaction costs – the costs 
of accessing the market – and variable transaction costs – per unit costs lowering 
farm-gate prices (Goetz, 1992; Key et al., 2000). These costs are household-specific 
and when sufficiently high might exclude households from certain markets – such 
as input, credit, or even output markets – altogether. Governance structures going 
beyond arms’-length transactions might be particularly attractive to smallholders 
when transaction costs are high (Key and Runsten, 1999). In some situations, the 
access to inputs or credit included in such beyond-market governance structures 
are more valuable to small-scale farmers than access to higher-value output 
markets (Abebe et al., 2013). 
Macro approaches focus on the functioning of entire markets or value chains. 
When public institutions are weak, particularly when justice systems are 
expensive and inefficient, second-best forms of market organisation occur, relying 
more heavily on social forms of theft control and contract enforcement (Bardhan, 
1989; Fafchamps, 2004). Value chain approaches focus on the transition from 
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local markets to higher value markets, with higher quality requirements. Such 
markets may include local supermarkets and agro-industry as well as export 
markets. In order to reach higher value markets – for example for fresh vegetable 
export – these value chains need to transition in order to maintain required 
quality standards (Ruben et al., 2007). Efficient value chain organisation depends 
on transaction costs, information asymmetry, and social and cultural elements 
(Grover and Malhotra, 2003; Omta et al., 2001). There is a trend towards more 
vertically integrated forms of value chains, mainly because of increased demand 
for quality and traceability (Gereffi et al., 2005; Gibbon, 2001). 
Meso approaches target the level between the market and the value chain as a 
whole and the individual farmer: the firm-farmer relationship itself. Contracts 
have received most attention, particularly in developed-country agriculture 
(Fraser, 2005; Knoeber, 1989; Paulson et al., 2010; Sykuta and Parcell, 2003). 
Especially in developed countries, the increasing demand for quality and 
traceability increases the use of contracts (Goodhue, 2011; Goodhue et al., 2010). 
For developing countries, research on contract structure is scarcer - the contract 
farming literature almost exclusively focuses on farm-level impact (see Oya (2012) 
and Prowse (2012) for recent reviews). However, the research that does exists 
(Ali and Kumar, 2015; Grosh, 1994) highlights an important difference between 
contract farming in developed and developing countries. In developed countries, 
investments are made by the party who stands to gain most from it. Firms provide 
specific inputs to exert control over the production process (Hueth et al., 1999). 
In developing countries, firms provide inputs because farmers lack the resources 
to purchase these inputs for themselves (Grosh, 1994; Key and Runsten, 1999).  
Although the literature on including small-scale farmers in developing 
countries in globalized agricultural value chains is substantial, both in size and 
in scope, a gap exist regarding the explanation of the specific form taken by the 
structure governing the economic relationship between firm and farmer. Micro 
approaches analyse costs and benefits mainly from the farmer’s point of view, 
macro approaches consider either the entire market or the value chain, and meso 
approaches are limited to contract specifications (Grosh, 1994) or the optimal 
degree of vertical integration (Key and Runsten, 1999). Explaining the governance 
structure of inclusive business models thus requires reliance on different strands 
in the economic literature on governance structures, whilst remaining mindful of 
differences originating from the specific context of developing world agriculture.
  
Theoretical framework
 “Unlike most economists, who are interested in the structure, functioning and 
implications of markets, organisational economists are interested in the structure, 
functioning and implications of firms” (Barney and Hesterly, 2006). Organisational 
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economics is not a single theory, but encompasses a broad cluster of theories. 
Two strands of theory are particularly relevant for developing the core idea of this 
paper: transaction cost and positive agency theory. A third strand, management 
control systems (MCSs), will be used to classify the safeguards or MCSs used to 
manage appropriation hazards. 
Transaction cost theory assumes that opportunistic agents engage in transactions 
in an environment of sufficient uncertainty or complexity to surpass bounded 
rationality (Simon, 1978). Bounded rationality implies incomplete contracting 
(Williamson, 1985). The risk of opportunistic behaviour reducing mutual 
benefits from the transaction is particularly large when transactions involve asset 
specificity (Joskow, 1988). Asset specificity is the difference between the value of 
the asset in the relationship over its value in its next best use, i.e. the relationship-
specific share of the value of the asset. Higher asset specificity increases the risk 
of opportunistic behaviour. As soon as one party has made an investment in 
highly specific assets, the other party has an incentive to re-negotiate the terms 
of the agreement (Hart, 1995). To mitigate such risks, transactions involving high 
asset specificity are more likely to be governed by more integrated governance 
structures, which offer more opportunities for control. Other factors identified by 
transaction costs theory which encourage more integrated forms of governance 
are high uncertainty and low transaction frequency (Williamson, 1989).
Where transaction cost theory emphasises the characteristics of the transaction, 
in particular asset specificity, agency theory emphasises the incentive and 
measurement problems of the individual (Mahoney, 1992). Such agency costs arise 
because of information asymmetry: the actions of one party cannot be perfectly 
observed by the other party, yet these actions matter to realize mutual gains. In 
farming, information assymmetry results from the uncertainty caused by Nature 
(Allen and Lueck, 2003). When yields are low, this might be attributed to lack 
of effort by the farmer, wrong use of inputs, or a random act of Nature. Agency 
theory focuses on how to structure a relationship to maximize mutual gains in 
the presence of such behavioural uncertainty. Two branches of agency theory 
can be distinguished: mathematical principal-agent models and positive agency 
theory (Jensen, 1998). Principal-agent models assume unbounded rationality and 
see the firm as a nexus of contracts, neglecting distinctive features of governance 
structures (Williamson, 1991), while positive agency theory acknowledges that 
the organisational form does matter (Fama, 1980; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Since the organisational form of inclusive business models is the focus of this 
chapter, positive agency theory rather than mathematical principal-agent theory 
was used. 
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The governance structure of inclusive business models
Inclusive business models go beyond arms-length market transactions. One of 
the most important motives for such more integrated governance structures is the 
failure of markets to satisfactorily handle transactions (Casson, 1984). Governance 
structures going beyond market transactions may take a variety of forms, ranging 
from hybrids to complete vertical integration (Williamson, 1991). Hybrids are 
“arrangements in which two or more partners pool strategic decision rights as well 
as some property rights, while simultaneously keeping distinct ownership over key 
assets, so that they require specific devices to coordinate their joint activities and 
arbitrate the allocation of payoffs” (Ménard, 2004). As such, they retain some of 
the incentives associated with the autonomy of actors operating through markets, 
“but provide added transaction-specific safeguards, compared with the market” 
(Williamson, 1996). Such safeguards are required to limit appropriability hazards 
originating from inter-dependence.
One of the key features which sets inclusive business models apart from most 
hybrid models described in the literature thus far is their over-reliance on 
investment by the most financially potent partner: the firm. In this case, which 
of the two partners should make a certain investment is no longer dictated solely 
by efficiency considerations. Rather, the limited financial resources at the farmer’s 
disposal require the firm to make most or all of the investment, even when the 
residual control rights over these investments de facto, if perhaps not de jure, end 
up in the hands of the farmer.1 In order to be willing to make such investments, 
the firm requires additional controls, which would not have been necessary if 
farmers would have been able to make the investment themselves. Importantly, 
as the partner making most of the investment, and usually the one initiating the 
relationship, the firm has the privilege of determining the terms of trade (Barrett 
et al., 2012), i.e. designing the governance structure. 
We hypothesize that the firm will design the governance structure in such a way 
that the benefits of making the investment exceed the cost of controlling it. This 
thesis is parallel to the finding of Crocker and Reynolds (1993), who argue that 
economically efficient contracts balance the ex-ante cost of contract design and 
negotiations with the ex-post costs of opportunism and enforcement. In the weak 
institutional environment in which inclusive business models operate, public 
enforcement is costly, making firms rely more heavily safeguards: the private 
enforcement mechanisms incorporated in the governance structure (Fafchamps, 
2004; North, 1990). The type and extent of safeguards are expected to depend on 
the type and size of firm investment and the appropriability hazard: the contracting 
hazards exposing firm investment to misappropriation. 
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Firm investment, asset specificity, and appropriability hazard
A distinction should be made between total firm investment and the share of this 
investment which is transaction-specific. When each partner to a transaction is 
able to make the investments over which it has residual control, asset specificity 
increases the risk of hold-up (Hart, 1995) or opportunistic behaviour (Joskow, 
1988; Riordan and Williamson, 1985). However, when the firm has to make an 
investment for the farmer, such that the farmer has de facto residual control rights 
over the investment, the degree of asset specificity actually reduces the risk that 
the farmer may use this investment outside of the relationship – where its value is 
lower. Absent sufficiently strong public institutions to allow cost-effective public 
enforcement of contractual obligations, the most credible threat a firm has to 
punish noncompliance is discontinuation of the relationship (Grosh, 1994). When 
the net present value of continuing the relationship exceeds the one-off benefit of 
non-compliance, a contract is said to be self-enforcing (Gow and Swinnen, 2001). 
The degree of asset specificity depends on the presence of alternative markets and 
on the redeployability of the investment in alternative uses (Williamson, 1996), 
which determines its opportunity cost. In the cases under review in this paper, 
firm investments are rarely relationship-specific. Rather, some might be product-
specific. In other words, the investments generate the highest return when used 
for the contracted product. However, when alternative buyers for the product 
become active on the local market, such product-specific investments no longer 
are relationship-specific, since farmers now have the opportunity to sell the same 
product to other firms – so-called side-selling or leakage (Fafchamps, 2004). 
The risk that farmers might one way or another misappropriate the investment 
made by the firm is what is referred to in this paper as appropriation hazard.2 
Per definition, farmers can only misappropriate the value share of the investment 
which is not relationship-specific, equal to the opportunity cost of the investment. 
If the misappropriation was easily observable, a firm might simply discontinue 
the relationship as soon as non-compliance took place. If that were possible, 
appropriability hazard would be a non-issue. In the real world, because the output 
uncertainty related to natural factors is inherent to agricultural production (Allen 
and Lueck, 2003), it is not possible for the firm to detect non-compliance from 
observing delivered output alone, creating measurement uncertainty (Alchian 
and Demsetz, 1972). Therefore, in order to encourage compliance and detect non-
compliance, firms rely on safeguards contained in the governance structure.
 
Safeguards
In Williamsonian transaction cost theory, safeguards have received relatively little 
attention, which might be due to the emphasis on transaction-cost minimization 
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rather than hazard or uncertainty mitigation (Sykuta and Parcell, 2003) or 
because of a focus on adaptability rather than control (Ménard, 2012; Williamson, 
1991, 2002). The categorization which does exist, by Williamson himself (1989), 
distinguishes three broad types: dispute resolution mechanisms, embedding 
transacting parties in a ‘trading network’, and realignment of incentives. Dispute 
resolution mechanisms relate to the acknowledgement that contracts are 
incomplete and that it is difficult and costly to have courts effectively arbitrate 
conflicts. In that case, there are important advantages in relying on alternative 
forums for dispute resolution, thus effectively complementing public by private 
enforcement (Williamson, 1985). Embedding transacting parties in a trading 
network involves re-equilibrating trading hazards, for example by switching the 
relationship from unilateral to bi- or multi-lateral exchange, by relying more 
on collective decision-making, or even by developing joint ownership, all of 
which facilitates the implementation of ‘hostages’ – with parties making credible 
commitments through relationship-specific investments (Williamson, 1983). Last, 
realigning incentives commonly involves penalties for non-compliance, which 
depends to a certain extent on public enforcement. When public enforcement is 
weak, the most important penalty for non-compliance is discontinuation of the 
relationship (Grosh, 1994). 
Measurement uncertainty makes it impossible for the firm to perfectly observe 
farmer compliance from output alone. Such a ‘fuzzy output’ situation is hardly 
unique to farming. In fact, systems to manage such situations are well-described 
for management within organisations (Austin, 2013; Ballwieser et al., 2012; 
Hoenen and Kostova, 2014). In the management accounting literature, these 
systems are referred to as Management Control Systems (MCSs), which are 
increasingly studied as a package, rather than individually (Malmi and Brown, 
2008), and are applied to management within and between organisations (Van 
der Meer-Kooistra and Scapens, 2008). Several different frameworks exist (Malmi 
and Brown, 2008; Merchant and Van der Stede, 2007; Ouchi, 1992; Simons, 2013), 
with different levels of detail and complexity. Without feigning completeness, 
in this paper a simpler classification will be used, which distinguishes output, 
behaviour, and social controls (Langfield-Smith, 2008). Output controls concern 
measuring and monitoring output through performance measures; behavioural 
controls concern rules and standardized operating procedures; social controls are 
informal and derived from shared norms, values, and beliefs. 
Which controls are most effective in governing the firm-farmer relationship 
depends on characteristics of the production process influencing the degree 
of measurement uncertainty. Two production characteristics are deemed to be 
particularly relevant: output separability and task programmability (Mahoney, 
1992; Sykuta and Parcell, 2003). Output separability is narrowly defined as the 
ability to infer an agent’s (unobservable) effort from observing output. When 
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output separability is high, incentive alignment is effectively attained by designing 
a reward system based on observable output. Task programmability concerns the 
relationship between observable inputs and management practices. In this case, 
effective incentive alignment is achieved by checking and rewarding specific 
practices, for example through protocols formalizing which steps should be taken 
to complete a specific process. 
Pricing is a particular type of output control, since in addition to affecting 
incentives it affects the distribution of value and risk between firm and farmer. 
Two general types of pricing exist. Prices paid to farmers can either be fixed 
in advance (fixed price) or determined ex-post  as a residual after subtracting 
processors’ costs from revenues (formula pricing) (Grosh, 1994). Fixed prices 
encourage participation by creating certainty for the farmers, but shift almost 
all the risk to the firm. When spot prices fall below contractually agreed prices, 
the firm runs the risk of large losses; when spot prices are above contract prices, 
farmers have an incentive to side-sell part or all of their harvest. Formula prices, 
by being based on the market price, do not carry such risks for the firm but shift 
the risk of market price fluctuations to the farmer. Discounts and premiums are 
additional output controls available to a firm to encourage incentive alignment.
 
Propositions
We summarize the review of the literature by deriving two central propositions 
that intend to encapsulate the core elements of our discussion above, that is: the 
relation between firm investment, asset specificity, appropriability hazard, and 
safeguards. We view inclusive business models as a particular subset of governance 
structures because of the imbalance in financial capacity between firm and farmer 
and their strong reliance on private enforcement due to the weak institutional 
environments in which they operate. Most investments are made by the firm 
but de facto controlled by the farmer, and the general-purpose nature of most of 
these investments, their ‘redeployability’, makes them vulnerable to appropriation 
hazards. Consequently, it is in the interest of the firm to make the transaction-
specific share of firm investment as large as possible. Thus:
Proposition 1 (level): The lower the asset specificity of the firm investment, the 
larger the appropriation hazard, and hence higher the reliance on safeguards. 
One of the most important factors determining whether an investment is 
relationship-specific or not is the presence of alternative markets. The possibility 
of side-selling, combined with asymmetric information between firm and farmer, 
create appropriability hazards. If appropriation hazard is large, the size of the 
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investment depends on the degree to which this hazard can be cost-effectively 
controlled.
Proposition 2 (type): The types of safeguards chosen are affected by output 
separability and task programmability. Ceteris paribus, the larger are output 
separability and task programmability, the better appropriation hazard may be 
controlled, and hence the larger the investment.
We now turn to our empirical sample in order to substantiate these two 
propositions.
Case studies
Ten case studies of inclusive business models in agricultural sourcing were selected 
over a variety of products and settings throughout the African continent. These 
case studies were selected not to be representative of the population of inclusive 
business models, but rather to demonstrate the variety within the population. 
Since the project constituted the first attempt to consider these models as a group, 
few a priori criteria existed. Therefore, a more explorative approach was chosen. 
Research and practitioner organisations in sub-Saharan Africa were contacted 
and asked to provide short descriptions of inclusive business models they were 
familiar with. It is based on these descriptions that our ten cases were selected 
with two main criteria: (1) that the cases were as diverse as possible regarding 
their governance structures; (2) that the cases included different products, 
including annual, perennial, (non-) perishable crops and livestock, with different 
end-markets, and in different parts of the continent. The countries, products, and 
a general description of these cases are summarized in Table 3.1.
To collect detailed information on the different governance structures and local 
situation, face-to-face interviews were held on location. Such an interview-
based method is particularly useful to generate insights into how and why 
questions (Pettigrew, 1990). Interviews were complemented with desk research 
for triangulation (Yin, 1994). Interview protocols were standardized to facilitate 
comparisons (Miles and Huberman, 1994). Using pre-developed questions also 
allowed maintaining a link between existing knowledge and inductive elements 
of the study (Pettigrew, 1990). Questions were built on the LINK methodology, 
which was developed to understand inclusive trading relationships between 
farmers, farmer organisations, and formal markets (Lundy et al., 2012; Vorley et 
al., 2009) and complemented by knowledge accumulated within the ‘international 
learning initiative on scaling inclusive agri-food markets’.3 Specifically, more 
detailed questions were added on barriers and enablers of model success and 
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ownership and financing of key assets.
Interview questions were subdivided into three main categories: (1) What is the 
current structure of the chain? (2) How is the current inclusivity of the chain? (3) 
How may inclusivity be enhanced further? Questions on the current structure 
focused on the chain organisation, key actors, and product, payment, services, 
and information flows. Questions on the current inclusivity identified drivers, 
development phases, provided support, the perceived value of this support, and 
success factors. Finally, questions on enhancing future inclusivity focused on the 
willingness to invest, areas for improvement, areas with potential, and policy 
support. The core set of specific questions were developed by the corresponding 
author, and adapted and complemented in the field by whoever was conducting 
the interviews, as the situation commanded.
Data collection started in October 2013 in South Africa by the corresponding 
author. The South African case studies were used to refine the core questions and 
establish the overall approach. Other case studies were conducted in the period 
from November 2013 to January 2014 by Yeray Saavedra and Henric Verjans of 
the Centre for Development Innovation in the Netherlands, Yared Sertse from 
the African Agribusiness Academy, and several local consultants. The approach 
was similar for all case studies. Contacts were initiated via emails explaining 
Table 3.1. Case studies
Country Product General description
Burundi sorghum
Sorghum, a local crop, is bought for beer production, 
through farmer associations, model farmers, and formal 
contracts.
Ethiopia passion fruit
Fruit processing plant with own plantation and the 
ambition to source 50% from smallholder cooperatives with 
shareholding.
Ethiopia teff, wheat, maize Seed production on own farm and from smallholders, with full-service provision. Formal contracts are signed.
Ethiopia sesame
Hulling and export company, ‘legally-binding’ contracts 
with smallholder cooperatives which receive pre-planting 
credit.
Kenya dairy Dairy business hubs bring farmer services and collection / bulking together. Services are deducted from milk payments.
Mozambique cassava Mobile cassava processing unit buys at fixed price, offers transport services, and sells to local beer company.
Mozambique fresh eggs Joint venture of rearing and selling company, providing services and inputs for fresh egg production to local farmers. 
Mozambique broiler chickens Chicken breeding, hatchery, feed-mill and slaughterhouse operation has local out-growers rearing the broiler chickens.
South Africa vines and wines Equity share scheme, where former employees became shareholders with board and management representation.
South Africa sugarcane Land is leased to farmer-owned cooperatives, which become production centres, using contractors for field management.
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the objective of the study. Initial interviews were held with representatives from 
the lead firm. During these initial interviews, other stakeholders were identified 
and subsequently contacted and interviewed. These stakeholders included 
intermediaries, farmers, entrepreneurs or employees, and where relevant, 
government representatives and employees of non-governmental organisations. 
After having interviewed the stakeholders, follow-up interviews were held with 
company management to clarify issues that came up. Additional contact by email 
and telephone was used to check details and obtain missing information. Even 
though the cases cover a variety of crops and countries, the same core problem 
was mentioned by all: “how to appropriate returns from the investments required 
to make the inclusive business model profitable”.
Results
In what follows, our two propositions were tested using the data collected on 
the ten case studies described in the data section. More precisely, we look at the 
different types of investments, safeguards, and price setting in order to illustrate 
the relations suggested by our theoretical discussion and the propositions we 
derived. We thereafter discuss these results and the inherent limits due to our 
small sample, which makes quantitative tests impossible at this stage. Although 
we stick to qualitative information, the collected data generates an insight into 
common drivers shared by this diverse set of cases.
 
Firm investment
Investment type and level in each of the case studies are shown in Table 3.2. 
Investment was subdivided in three categories: training, inputs, and long-term 
investments. Training investments usually take the form of agents regularly visiting 
farmers in order to share agronomic practices. Although training through farm 
visits is probably the most common, other forms of training exist. For example, 
training may take place through demonstration plots or group sessions, which 
can be interactive or classroom-style  (Waddington et al., 2013). More training 
is required when the product is a newly introduced crop, but additional training 
is often necessary in order for farmers to meet the quality standards required 
by the firm, which usually exceed local standards. Input investments depend 
on the product. Some agricultural products, like broiler chickens, are capital-
intensive, requiring significantly more transaction-specific inputs than crops like 
wheat or maize. Long-term investment requirements are also largely determined 
by the product. For example, sugarcane is a perennial product which requires 
investment in rootstock and can take several years before becoming productive; 
passion fruit requires trellises; animals require housing. Where input investments 
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are mostly general purpose, training investments are somewhat in the middle, 
and investments in physical assets are mostly product-specific.
In Table 3.2, the case studies have been ordered from low to high levels of total 
firm investment. On the low investment extreme, we find the Kenyan dairy hubs, 
which are producer-owned so that no specific firm investment is required. The 
governance over strategic decisions and with respect to property rights is in the 
hands of farmers, in a cooperative-like system. Because farmers effectively make 
investments in themselves and the overall level of investment is low, appropriation 
hazards are limited. At the other end of the spectrum, we find the case of high 
investment by a South African vine and wine producer. In this inclusive business 
model, action resides within the firm. In order to overcome incentive problems 
and to reduce transaction costs, existing employees of the company were given 
the opportunity to become shareholders, with representatives on the board of 
directors and the management board. The firm still exists as a single integrated 
entity, with hierarchical ordering; however, employees have a strong incentive 
to become shareholders, thus benefiting from gains in their productivity. In this 
co-managed governance structure, even though the level of investment is high, 
appropriation hazards are low, since there is little room for opportunism: all 
investment decisions are made jointly. In these two polar cases, we observe two 
modes of alignment: one with low investment and autonomous parties, and the 
other with high specific investments and almost completely integrated parties. In 
both cases, effective appropriation hazards are low.
 
Appropriability hazard
Between the polar cases of the almost arm’s-length purchasing of dairy in 
Table 3.2. Firm investment
Country Product Training Inputs
Physical 
assets
Total firm 
investment
Kenya dairy = = = n/a
Mozambique cassava low
Burundi sorghum + + medium
Ethiopia sesame + + medium
Ethiopia teff, wheat, maize + + medium
South Africa sugar cane + + ++ high
Ethiopia passion fruit ++ + + high
Mozambique fresh eggs ++ ++ = high
Mozambique broiler chickens ++ ++ = high
South Africa vines and wines = = = n/a
Note: + some investment, ++ large investment, = co-investment, n/a not applicable. 
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Kenya and the quasi-vertical integration of vines and wine in South Africa, 
appropriability hazards play a more important role. For these intermediate cases, 
property rights and related decision rights are separated, a defining characteristic 
of hybrids (Ménard, 2012). These are arrangements in which the firm and the 
farmers maintain separate ownership and control over those productive assets 
that are important for the transaction. In almost all cases, when investments are 
made, they are primarily borne by the firm but controlled by the farmer, which is 
the primary source of appropriation hazards and incentive problems. 
We show that appropriability hazard increases with the size of firm investment 
and decreases with the asset specificity of this investment. The specific levels 
for each of these three variables for the ten studied cases are presented in Table 
3.3. Low investment implies low appropriability hazard. When the size of the 
investment increases, asset specificity starts to matter. In the case of Burundian 
sorghum, Ethiopian sesame, and teff, wheat, and maize seeds, the asset specificity 
stems from the premium which farmers receive because a certain characteristic 
of the product is valued more by the firm than by alternative buyers. Burundian 
farmers receive seeds for a variety of sorghum which is particularly suitable for 
beer. This trait is not rewarded on the local market, where sorghum is sold for 
direct consumption. However, the yields for this variety are also higher, especially 
in combination with the included package of fertilizers and training, increasing 
the value of the next-best option for farmers and hence causing appropriability 
hazard. 
When no alternative buyers are present, all product-specific investment by the firm 
automatically becomes relationship-specific. Hence, asset specificity is high for 
South African sugar cane and Ethiopian passion fruit. This does not automatically 
imply that the full value of the investment becomes asset specific; the degree of 
asset specificity depends on the value of the investment in its next-best alternative 
Table 3.3. Asset specificity and appropriability hazard
Country Product
Other 
buyers
Total firm 
investment
Asset 
specificity
Appropr. 
hazard
Kenya dairy n/a low low
Mozambique cassava low low low
Burundi sorghum medium medium medium
Ethiopia sesame medium medium medium
Ethiopia teff, wheat, maize medium medium medium
South Africa sugar cane no high high low
Ethiopia passion fruit no high high low
Mozambique fresh eggs high low high
Mozambique broiler chickens high low high
South Africa vines and wines n/a n/a high n/a
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use. The sugar cane rootstock and training provided in South Africa are purely 
product-specific; only some of the variable inputs such as herbicides and fertilizer 
have value for other products, or may even be sold directly to third parties. In 
the Ethiopian passion fruit case, trellises and young plants are product-specific 
and, because of the absence of alternative buyers, relationship-specific. Variable 
inputs specific to passion fruit growing have less value outside the relationship 
than in the sugar cane case, since all passion fruit growers in the region supply to 
the same firm, whereas in South Africa several sugar cane mills are active, each 
with their own catchment area. In both cases, even though total firm investment is 
substantial, the absence of alternative buyers makes a large share of this investment 
relationship-specific, resulting in low appropriability hazard.
Mozambique has active and fast-growing local markets for fresh eggs and broiler 
chickens, making it easy for farmers to connect with alternative buyers. Moreover, 
firm investment is substantial, including chicken coops, feeders, chicken feed, 
veterinary services, day-old chicks, and intensive training. Because of the presence 
of alternative buyers, only a small share of these investments may be considered 
relationship-specific: asset specificity is low. The combination of high investment 
and low asset specificity creates substantial appropriability hazard. Firms should 
only be willing to run such risks if cost-effective safeguards are available to 
mitigate these hazards.
 
Safeguards
The various safeguards used to mitigate appropriation hazards in the inclusive 
business cases that we investigated are shown in Table 3.4. As already pointed out 
in section 2, Williamson (1989) proposed a distinction between three categories 
of safeguards: dispute resolution mechanisms, embedding the transaction in 
a ‘trading network’, and realignment of incentives. When this latter category is 
interpreted as including not only punishment for non-compliance but also the 
control systems used to detect non-compliance and encourage compliance, it 
becomes useful to sub-divide it. To do so, we based ourselves on the definitions 
used by Langfield-Smith (2008), who distinguished output, behavioural, and 
social controls. 
For all ten case studies, the Williamsonian safeguards, with incentive alignment 
subdivided into output, behaviour, and social controls, are shown in Table 3.4. 
Formal dispute resolution mechanisms were not observed in any of the cases we 
reviewed; however, in several cases there were designated bodies responsible for 
information sharing which were also involved in the decision-making process. 
For example, in the Ethiopian passion fruit case NGO staff, farmers, and company 
staff regularly convened during group training sessions and weekly sales of passion 
fruit ensure frequent interactions between company staff and farmers. In South 
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Table 3.4. Safeguards
Case
Dispute 
resolution
Embedded 
transaction
Output 
control
Behaviour 
control
Social 
control
Kenya,  
dairy DM
farmer 
investment market - Yes
Mozambique, 
cassava fixed -
Burundi, 
sorghum fixed low yes
Ethiopia, 
sesame IS
market + 
premium medium yes
Ethiopia, 
seeds IS market medium *
SA,  
sugar cane IS market medium yes
Ethiopia, 
passion fruit IS
market or 
minimum high
Mozambique, 
fresh eggs IS
farmer 
investment performance high
Mozambique, 
broilers IS
farmer 
investment performance high
SA, vines  
and wines DM
farmer 
investment internal high
Note: IS information sharing, DM decision making, * no association, but owner of the seed business is an active member of 
the local community
African sugar cane, extension workers and cooperative management had weekly 
meetings and jointly planned harvesting schedules and maintenance activities 
by contractors. In Kenyan dairy and in South African vines and wine decision 
making was completely integrated between firm and farmers, in both cases 
because farmers or employees had property and hence decision-making rights. 
Interpreted in the traditional sense, all inclusive business models were embedded 
transactions. The farmer is selling to the firm, and the firm is investing in the 
farmer. Given that firm investment is the standard, only the cases in which 
farmers are required to co-invest in the relationship are highlighted in Table 3.4. 
The function of these farmer investments was identical to the ‘hostages’ identified 
by Williamson (1983): to signal credible commitment. It was observed only in the 
integrated Kenyan dairy hubs, the South African vine and wine business, and the 
Mozambican fresh eggs and broilers. In the Mozambican cases, co-investment 
was considered a required proof of commitment, providing important safeguards 
against appropriation hazards. Building chicken coops according to standards set 
by the firm may be a significant investment for farmers, but mainly in terms of 
labour commitment, something which farmers could afford. 
Incentive alignment was used by all inclusive business models, with most models 
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using a combination of output, behaviour and social controls. Although strictly 
speaking it is only a form of output control when it is used to incentivize effort, 
pricing was a relevant instrument for all cases except for the vertically integrated 
South African vine and wine case. Pricing was more diverse than the fixed or 
formula pricing suggested by Grosh (1994). Fixed pricing was used only for 
Mozambican cassava and Burundian sorghum. Formula pricing, although 
generally not in the form of a sales price minus cost formula but rather based 
on going market prices, was far more common. In Ethiopian sesame it was 
complemented by quality premiums and in Ethiopian passion fruit with minimum 
prices, both measures reducing the risk of side-selling. Performance pricing is 
only observed for the Mozambican fresh eggs and broiler cases. In these cases, 
substantial firm investment is directed towards medicine, feed, and litter, which 
are used up in the production process. These costs are recovered from the payment 
the company makes to the farmers at the end of the production cycle, just like 
in formula pricing. However, to encourage proper use of these inputs, growers 
receive better prices the closer their output is to the ‘optimal performance curve’, 
the maximum attainable productivity. Such a pricing scheme was feasible because 
of the high output separability in fresh egg and broiler production. The relatively 
controlled environment reduces uncertainty caused by random acts of Nature.
The most frequently used behaviour control was monitoring (column 4), although 
it differed in intensity between the case studies. Monitoring and training is usually 
conducted by the same person, making it impossible to clearly distinguish the 
two (Bellemare, 2010). However, regardless of the reason for the visit to the farm, 
it offers an opportunity to detect non-compliance. Monitoring is most intensive 
for labour intensive products. In Ethiopian passion fruits, company staff visits a 
farm at least weekly, and Mozambican fresh eggs and broiler farmers are visited 
daily. Although such monitoring is clearly an attempt to directly observe effort on 
behalf of the farmer, it is not clear whether this is necessarily related to the degree 
of task programmability, since protocols and checklists were only observed for 
those products which had high levels monitoring, not for the other products. 
Finally, social controls (column 5) were observed infrequently. In four cases 
farmers are organized in mutual liability cooperatives. Since farmers have a 
financial stake in the success of the cooperative, such types of organisation offer an 
incentive for social control. Non-compliant members are likely to be punished at 
the cooperative rather than firm level. In the Ethiopian seed case, the firm owner 
is a very active member of the community. Although not strictly a form of social 
control, this might increase the perceived cost of non-compliance for farmers by 
adding a personal dimension. 
To sum up, one of the most important factors determining whether an investment 
is relationship-specific or not is the presence of alternative markets. The possibility 
of side-selling, combined with asymmetric information between firm and farmer, 
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creates appropriability hazards. If appropriation hazard is large, the size of the 
investment depends on the degree to which this hazard can be cost-effectively 
controlled. The type of safeguards used to control the hazard appear to depend 
at least to some extent on production characteristics. In particular, higher output 
separability appears to lead to more intensive reliance on output controls. 
Discussion
The results suggest a relatively close relationship between firm investment, asset 
specificity, appropriability hazard, and safeguards. Per definition, there exists 
a direct relationship between the asset specificity of firm investment and the 
appropriation hazard. High asset specificity, ceteris paribus, reduces appropriability 
hazard. In line with proposition 1, reliance on safeguards was highest for the two 
inclusive business models with low asset specificity and high appropriation hazard 
– fresh eggs and broilers in Mozambique. The reverse however, was not true. 
When asset specificity was high and appropriability hazard low, as in the case of 
Ethiopian passion fruit and South African sugar cane, there was still a substantial 
reliance on safeguards. Independent of the asset specificity and appropriability 
hazard, safeguards appear to increase with the size of firm investment. 
Comparing the types of safeguards with the production characteristics of output 
separability and task programmability provides some support for proposition 2. 
In particular, the relatively high output separability in the fresh eggs and broiler 
cases appears to be a factor in the reliance of the firm on performance pricing 
to align incentives. Such a clear relationship does not appear to exist between 
task programmability and behaviour controls, in particular monitoring. However, 
the intensity of monitoring does increase with the value of production. Products 
like passion fruit and animals might be more sensitive to quality or food safety 
concerns and hence justify more intense control. This corresponds with findings 
in a case study on several contract farming arrangements of tomato in the United 
States of America4 (Hueth et al., 1999; Wolf et al., 2001). 
Based on the results in the tables, an additional observation may be made regarding 
the relationship between the presence of alternative markets and firm investment. 
When alternative markets are present, firm investment is generally low. The 
presence of alternative markets increases appropriability hazards by creating 
opportunities for side-selling, and hence cause firms to avoid making substantial 
investments. Without alternative markets – when firms enjoy monopsony power, 
appropriability hazards fall substantially and investments increase accordingly. 
Firms are only willing to invest substantially in a lively market when these 
investments offer sufficient returns to warrant the intensive monitoring required 
to control appropriability hazard. 
In addition to monitoring, firms operating under these conditions invest a lot of 
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time in farmer selection, use output controls, and require farmers to co-invest in 
production facilities, thus combining the different tools of governance that we 
have identified. Pushing the reasoning further, we would argue that high returns 
are a determinant factor because the safeguards needed to reduce appropriation 
hazards are very costly, particularly due to the context of weak institutions that 
cannot provide adequate enforcement mechanisms.
We are aware, of course, that the correlations we have established are based on a 
very limited sample, notwithstanding the efforts we made to select a diverse set 
of inclusive business cases based on the products they cover and the institutional 
environment in which they operate. In order to switch from a qualitative analysis 
to quantitative tests, a much more extensive set of cases is needed. This is an 
important objective, but collecting extensive information in that perspective 
requires major research investment, particularly given contexts that provide little 
institutional support and poor data. Nevertheless, we are convinced that our cases 
already deliver important lessons regarding the difficulties that inclusive business 
models raise.
Conclusion
Inclusive business models are rapidly becoming more numerous, due to their dual 
focus on business profitability and poverty reduction, which makes them attractive 
to business and development organisations alike. Organisational economics allows 
gaining deeper insight into their function and form. In this study, two theory-
derived propositions were tested with evidence from ten case studies of inclusive 
business models in sourcing different agricultural products in environments with 
weak public enforcement. Results indicate a positive relationship between firm 
investment and safeguards: more investment implies more safeguards, apparently 
independent of the degree of asset specificity. The specific types of safeguards 
chosen appear to correspond with production characteristics. Output separability 
and task programmability facilitate control. When alternative markets are present, 
firm investment is limited for products with which farmers are already familiar. 
For high-value products with a local market, safeguards are high and farmer co-
investment is required. 
In a report to the FAO, DaSilva (2005) concluded that inclusive contract farming 
is equitable only when alternative markets are available. Paradoxically, our results 
suggest that the firm investment required for the inclusive business model to 
be developed in the first place is most likely when alternative markets are not 
available. This finding can be explained by the combination of asymmetric 
financial capacity between firm and farmer, appropriability hazards, and the 
context of weak public enforcement. In this context, investment relies heavily on 
the firm, and accompanying appropriability hazards have to be mitigated through 
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the governance structure. Broadly speaking, firms have two options for mitigation: 
incentive-aligning safeguards or demanding co-investment by the farmer. 
Incentive-aligning safeguards are costly, and only applied when the product is 
sufficiently high value, or alternative markets are absent. Co-investment is a 
useful complementary safeguard, but requires the farmer to have the resources 
to invest in the first place. The poorest farmers are unlikely to be able to meet 
this requirement, and thus risk being excluded. Moreover, this problem is hard 
to overcome by third-party financing, as it is not the investment per se but the 
commitment it signals that matters.
The ideal would be to develop more efficient public enforcement mechanisms, 
such as well-defined property rights, contract law, and efficient courts. However, 
building adequate institutions is a long-term and uncertain process. In the short 
term, the success of inclusive business models depends on the ability of parties to 
develop cost-effective governance structures with mutually acceptable safeguard 
mechanisms. There might be an important role to play by the public sector, but 
this is unlikely to be the direct financing of (part of) the investment, as the real 
problem is not lack of resources, but lack of ability to credibly signal commitment. 
Rather, the most important role for the public sector will most likely lie in the 
effective dissemination of information on best practices.
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Notes
1 Another way of putting this is saying that inefficiencies in the credit 
market – farmers are unable to obtain credit even when the investment 
is profitable – spill over into the product market (Bardhan, 1981). The 
difference with interlocked contracts, as described by Mujawamariya 
and D’Haese (2012) among others, is the intensive reliance on formal 
safeguards contained in the governance structure.
2 This definition of appropriability hazard is different from the one 
employed in the organisational economics literature, where it is taken 
to refer to “contracting hazards exposing intellectual property to 
expropriation” (Mayer and Salomon, 2006; Oxley, 1997).
3 This initiative is a long-term applied research, innovation and exchange 
program helping businesses, governments, and NGOs to share best 
practices (www.seasofchange.net).
4 Written out completely to avoid confusion with America, the continent, 
or the United States of Mexico.
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Abstract
In the wake of the Millennium Development Goals, indicators have become an 
increasingly important tool to evaluate development projects. One of the most 
popular indicators to measure food security is the Household Dietary Diversity 
Score (HDDS). Previous research has established a link between dietary diversity 
and food security, however, the HDDS in the form developed by the FANTA 
project – 12 food groups, 24-hour recall – has never been evaluated. In this 
chapter, the construct validity of the HDDS is verified. A Rasch model was used 
to test the extent to which the HDDS meets the criteria required for interval 
scale measurement, using data from over 1,000 farm households in Colombia 
and Ecuador. Different dietary patterns between Colombia and Ecuador and two 
cultural groups within Ecuador required data to be split into three subgroups. For 
each subgroup the food groups meeting the criteria and their difficulty ranking 
were different. Refined indices containing only those food groups meeting 
the criteria contained seven items in Colombia, ten for Kichwa households in 
Ecuador, and nine for migrant households. These results imply that the indicator 
in its current form does not meet all criteria. Even when the indicator is split into 
refined indicators for culturally homogenous subgroups within a small region, the 
components of the indicator do not form a reliable way of measuring the latent 
variable: household food security.
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Introduction
While the definition of food security formed at the 1996 world food summit 
(FAO, 1996) is widely adopted, disagreement remains on the indicators that 
assess, quantify and qualify food security and on how to operationalize these 
indicators at national, household or individual level (Jones et al., 2013; Leroy et 
al., 2015; Pinstrup-Andersen, 2009; Webb et al., 2006). Food security is measured 
in different ways. For example, anthropometric measures are used to monitor 
growth of children under five (Pinstrup-Andersen, 2009). Recalls of food 
consumed in the past 24hours or over a longer reference period are recorded to 
measure intake of macro- and micronutrients (Kennedy et al., 2010). And data on 
food expenditure is used to define food poverty lines (Rose and Charlton, 2002). 
While experience-based responses such as the Household Food Insecurity Access 
Score (HFIAS) elicit perceived consequences of not having enough food (Jones et 
al., 2013). Research institutions and development organisations alike apply such 
indicators to identify food insecure households or analyse effects of interventions 
on food security (Jones et al., 2013).
The Household Dietary Diversity Score (HDDS) is a frequently used indicator of 
food security. It was developed as a quick-to-implement and easy-to-use survey-
based indicator to measure the impact on household food access of programs 
with improvements in food security as their core objective (Swindale and Bilinsky, 
2006). The second version of the accompanying guide mentions that “An increase 
in the average number of different food groups consumed provides a quantifiable 
measure of improved household food access. In general, any increase in household 
dietary diversity reflects an improvement in the household’s diet” ((Swindale and 
Bilinsky, 2006), p6). This suggests that the HDDS might be used as a household-
level indicator of food security – indeed, it is frequently used as such (Leroy et 
al., 2015). However, the validity of the HDDS has never been verified, making it 
impossible to substantiate claims that it is a useful indicator of food security. The 
objective of this paper is to fill this glaring gap. 
Rasch models were used to verify the construct validity of the HDDS. These 
models were specifically developed to test whether an additive scale consisting 
of several items measuring a single underlying construct meets the criteria 
required for interval scale measurement (Rasch, 1960). This approach differs 
from most other statistical techniques in that it starts from a mathematical model 
which meets the required criteria and tests the extent to which the data fits the 
model. When the data does not fit the model, it is not the model but the data 
which is considered wrong. By assessing the deviations of the HDDS from the 
criteria, specific shortcomings of the indicator can be highlighted. In effect, Rasch 
analysis provides the lens through which we look at the internal functioning of 
the indicator. Applying this methodology to analyse the construct validity of the 
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HDDS is the main contribution of this paper to the literature.
Household Dietary Diversity Scores
Dietary diversity refers to the variety of foods consumed by individuals or 
households (Jones et al., 2013; Ruel, 2003). An indicator of dietary diversity is 
a particularly interesting way to measure food security, because it is simple to 
implement, can be administered at household and individual level, and is a useful 
outcome in itself (Hoddinott and Yohannes, 2002). There is a shortage of validity 
studies of survey-based dietary diversity indicators, especially regarding the way 
questions are posed and how these are handled and interpreted (Leroy et al., 2015; 
Ruel, 2003). Particularly pressing issues are the responsiveness of food security 
indicators to improved food security, their discriminatory power in distinguishing 
food secure from food insecure households, and their validity across different 
cultural settings. 
When measured at an individual level, dietary diversity scores are generally 
found to be a good proxy for micronutrient adequacy (Arimond and Ruel, 2004; 
Arimond et al., 2010; Hatloy et al., 1999; Kennedy et al., 2007; Moursi et al., 2008; 
Steyn et al., 2006). Dietary diversity might not only be linked to dietary quality, 
but also imply dietary quantity. According to Bennett’s Law, as people become 
wealthier they switch from starch-dominated diets to more varied diets including 
vegetables, fruit, dairy products, and meat (Bennett, 1941). Although calorie 
intake might not increase above a certain level of wealth, Jensen and Miller (2010) 
suggest people quickly shift to improving the taste of their food bundle when 
their incomes increase. Their findings are in line with classic theories of demand 
(Maslow, 1943). In other words, households with sufficiently diverse diets can be 
assumed to at least consume enough food not to be hungry. Studies confirm a 
positive relationship between household dietary diversity and household food 
security (Faber et al., 2009; Heady and Ecker, 2013; Hoddinott and Yohannes, 
2002; Kennedy et al., 2010). However, these studies were based on indicators 
differing in regard to their inclusion of individual foods versus food groups, 
number of food groups, weights, and recall period, making it hard to establish a 
definitive link. In fact, some authors even question what it is that is being measured 
by these indicators (Heady and Ecker, 2013; Ruel, 2003). In economic terms, if 
HDDS increases with increased food security, one should expect all food groups 
to increase with food consumption levels. With increasing food consumption and 
income, the HDDS should increase. Hence, HDDS will not be able to account for 
Giffen goods which have positive price elasticities.
In particular, only two research papers are named on which the conclusion that 
“an increase in dietary diversity is associated with socio-economic status and 
household food security” is based (FAO, 2012). In one of these papers, Hatloy et al. 
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(1999), in a case study in a southern county of Mali, indeed find such an association 
for socio-economic status. For nutritional status, the association was only found 
in urban areas. Furthermore, their index for dietary diversity is based on ten food 
groups, not the suggested twelve. Perhaps the most extensive work on this topic is 
by Hoddinott and Yohannes (2002), who study the relationship between dietary 
diversity and a range of food security measures using datasets covering both rural 
and urban households from 10 poor- or middle-income countries. The authors 
find a robust positive relationship – independent of whether individual foods or 
food groups are used to measure dietary diversity – which holds over urban and 
rural areas, seasons, and recall period. However, in neither of these studies is the 
HDDS indicator used in the form promoted in the guidelines. 
Dietary diversity is measured by counting the number of foods or food groups 
consumed over a certain reference period. These groups can be simply counted or 
a weight can be attached to them based on their nutritional value. Some indicators 
also take into account the frequency at which the foods were consumed, or specify 
a minimum portion size required for a food to be counted in the index (see Ruel 
(2003) and Leroy et al. (2015) for a review of different indicators). Of the food-
group indicators, the HDDS analysed in this paper is probably the most widely 
used by development organisations. It was developed by the Food and Nutrition 
Technical Assistance (FANTA) and actively promoted by USAID. Moreover, this 
index is the basis for the recent FAO “Guidelines on measuring household and 
individual dietary diversity” (FAO, 2012). 
The HDDS was developed to measure household food access and designed to 
be an easy-to-use and quick-to-implement index, making it ideal for impact 
evaluations of development programs (Swindale and Bilinsky, 2006). It measures 
dietary diversity by counting the number of food groups that were consumed 
by the household over the last 24 hours. The indicator consists of twelve food 
groups: cereals; roots and tubers; vegetables; fruits; meat, poultry, and offal; eggs; 
fish and seafood; pulses, legumes, and nuts; dairy products; oils and fats; sugar 
and honey; and miscellaneous, such as condiments. These twelve food groups are 
based on the groups used to construct the FAO’s food balance sheets (Swindale 
and Ohri-Vachaspati, 2005). The value of the HDDS equals the number of food 
groups consumed in the last 24 hours. A higher score should reflect higher dietary 
diversity and hence better household food access (Swindale and Bilinsky, 2006).
This study is the first to evaluate the validity of the HDDS in the form promoted 
in the FANTA guidelines. We limit ourselves in scope to evaluating the construct 
validity of the indicator, i.e. whether the different food groups contribute to a 
single underlying construct in such a way that the overall score on the indicator 
can be interpreted as an interval scale measure at household level. We do not 
analyse whether the scale indeed measures household food access but follow the 
indicator guidelines in assuming that it does. In other words, we do not study 
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what is measured by the HDDS, but verify how it measures. 
Data
The construct validity of the HDDS was tested using data obtained from the 
baseline from a cross-border agricultural development project in Colombia and 
Ecuador. Basing our study on such ‘real’ data, rather than data collected primarily 
for research purposes, makes the results of our study more realistic. The HDDS 
was tested the way it is used in reality, not the way it should be used according 
to the guidelines.1 These countries are culturally close and economically similar. 
Both countries are considered upper-middle income countries according to the 
World Bank classification, yet have high inequality and poverty rates. Data was 
collected in the Ecuadorian Amazon basin and the southern mountain range in 
Colombia, which are among the poorest parts of the countries. In the Amazon 
basin 59.7% of the population lives below the national poverty line (INEC, 2006); 
in Colombia’s southern Andes, 50.6% of the population lives below the national 
poverty line (DANE, 2011).
Interviews were conducted in April and May 2012 by trained local enumerators 
using a structured questionnaire developed by the Centro International de 
Agricultura Tropical (CIAT), a CGIAR centre based in Cali, Colombia. Based on 
this questionnaire, a detailed protocol was developed which was used to train the 
enumerators during a two-week training course including field trials. Interviews 
were conducted with pen and paper. Raw data was cleaned and operationalized 
by the corresponding author, in cooperation with Martha Del Rio and Alexander 
Buritica Casanova from CIAT.
All interviewed households were small-scale farmers, depending on agricultural 
production for most of their income. Respondents were either the head of the 
household or the person most closely related to the head of the household, like 
a spouse. Since the data was collected for the baseline of a development project, 
the households needed to be representative for both project beneficiaries and 
control group households. In Ecuador, the number of surveys required to ensure 
representativeness of the control group was calculated based on the number 
of inhabitants per canton, which were obtained from the national institutes of 
statistics (INEC). Sampling of project beneficiaries was also done by stratification 
at cantonal level. In Colombia, the required size of the control group was 
calculated based on member lists of the national federation of coffee producers 
(FEDECAFE). Stratification was done at municipal level, which corresponds to 
the cantonal level in Ecuador, i.e. the administrative level below province (which 
are called departments in Colombia). Project beneficiaries were also selected for 
interview based on stratification at municipal level. In total, 510 households were 
interviewed in Colombia, and 514 in Ecuador. After removing observations for 
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non-response, the full dataset contained 509 Colombian and 506 Ecuadorian 
households. 
Interviews were conducted according to a detailed standardized protocol; 
enumerators received two weeks of training including field trials before starting 
data collection. Data was collected on family composition, including ethnicity 
of household members2, and income. A complete list of the definitions of the 
variables used is provided in Appendix B. Agricultural production destined for 
own consumption was valued at farm-gate prices. The used HDDS surveys were 
made more specific for each country by adding commonly consumed foods to the 
specification of the food groups (appendix C). For example, food group 1, cereals, 
was specified for the Ecuador survey as ‘In the last 24 hours, did you consume any 
kind of cereal like rice, maize, or wheat, or any product made from cereals, such 
as bread, cookies, humitas, etc?’3. For Colombia, this question was specified as ‘In 
the last 24 hours, did you consume any kind of cereal like rice, maize, or wheat, 
or any product made from cereals, such as bread, arepas, envueltos de choclo, 
noodles, puff pastries, toast, cakes, or any other food made from millet, sorghum, 
maize, rice, wheat, barley, oats, etc.?’4 
Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 4.1. For the analysis, the data from 
Ecuador had to be split into two cultural groups, Kichwa and migrant households, 
as will be explained in the results section. For legibility, these groups are 
represented separately in the table. The first row in the table shows the months of 
adequate household food provisioning (MAHFP), another FANTA food security 
indicator. It asks for each month (recall) whether the household had insufficient 
food. Results are comparable between the three groups: households did not have 
sufficient food for two months of the year. Family sizes differed between the three 
groups, mostly caused by differences in the number of children, reflected by 
higher dependency ratios for the Kichwa and Immigrant households in Ecuador 
Table 4.1. Descriptive statistics
Colombia Ecuador
Kichwa Migrants
MAHFP 2.00 1.99 1.96
Family size 4.12 6.26 4.84
Dependency 0.40 1.27 0.70
Income (USD)* 5939 1331 2196
(7612) (1699) (2040)
HDDS 8.06 5.26 6.80
(1.52) (1.88) (1.80)
n 509 209 297
Note: mean and (standard deviation) of selected variables. *values for Colombia converted from Colombian Pesos using 
exchange rate of 31 May 2012
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compared to households in Colombia. Incomes also differed starkly between the 
groups. Household incomes in Colombia averaged almost 6000 USD, compared 
to 2200 USD for migrants and a mere 1300 USD for Kichwa households. Dietary 
diversity, as measured by the HDDS, also differed between the groups. Colombian 
households scored highest, consuming on average 8 out of the 12 groups; Kichwa 
households scored the lowest, consuming less than half of the food groups; migrant 
households were in between these two groups, consuming almost 7 groups. 
In other words, based on the MAHFP one might conclude that food security is 
comparable between the three groups, something which is not borne out by the 
HDDS. Without information on the true food security status of households, a 
‘gold standard’, it is impossible to determine which of these two indicators is closer 
to the truth. It might even be that each indicator measures a completely different 
aspect of food security, or that the indicators do not measure food security at 
all. Before being able to draw conclusions on how well the HDDS measures food 
security, it should be established that the components of the indicator, the twelve 
food groups, behave in such a way that they can be logically added up into a single 
total score. This first step – the internal functioning of the indicator - is the subject 
of this study. We lack the ‘gold standard’ food security data required to take the 
second step – establishing whether the total score actually says something about 
food security. Thus, that the HDDS measures food access is assumed, not tested. 
Methodology
Rasch models were developed by Rasch (1960) to measure an individual’s level of 
a latent trait. The models assume that the probability of an individual’s response to 
a question depends only on item difficulty and individual ability. In this study, the 
latent trait is assumed to be household food access, as suggested the developers 
of the HDDS (Swindale and Bilinsky, 2006). The food groups making up the 
indicator are the items. Rasch models do not depend on a priori assumptions 
about item difficulty. Rather, item difficulty is an outcome of the analysis. Rasch 
models are most frequently applied in education and psychology, but commonly 
used in other human sciences (Bond and Fox, 2001), and increasingly applied to 
medical research (Smith et al., 2008).
Rasch models have been used to study food security indicators before. They have 
been applied to test experience-based indicators, such as the core food security 
module (CFSM) developed by the US Department of Agriculture (Derrickson 
et al., 2000; Opsomer et al., 2003), Latin American Household Food Security 
Measurement Scale (ELCSA) (Toledo Vianna et al., 2012), Household Food 
Insecurity Access Scale (HFIAS) (Deitchler et al., 2010), and most recently, the 
Arab Family Food Security Scale (Sahyoun et al., 2014). Rasch models allow 
evaluating whether items are equally difficult in different cultural settings because 
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estimated item parameters are not sample specific (Casillas et al., 2006; Salzberger 
et al., 1999).
Rash analysis assumes hierarchical ordering of items. In the context of the 
HDDS, this implies that households consuming the most difficult item – i.e. 
the food group eaten only by those households with high food access - should 
also consume easier items. Although there is an extensive literature on dietary 
patterns which concludes that households shift to more expensive foods when 
their income increases (Thorne-Lyman et al., 2010), implying some hierarchy 
between foods, it is not clear to which extent this hierarchy is accurately captured 
by the food groups as defined in the HDDS. The hierarchical ordering of items is 
essential for the applicability of Rasch modelling, but cannot be tested directly. 
Not meeting this key assumption has several consequences, which are explained 
in the discussion section.
Two other conditions an indicator of food access should meet in order to be a 
valid and reliable proxy of the latent trait, household food access, could be tested 
directly by using Rasch analysis. First, the indicator needs to be robust to cultural 
differences. Hence, conditional on the latent trait, item difficulty should be 
consistent between countries, cultures, and food habits. Second, the probability 
of an affirmative  response to an item (food group) needs to be stable over the 
latent trait, such that each food group contributes positively and significantly to 
the overall score on the indicator. These conditions are necessary for the indicator 
to reliably distinguish households with high food access from households with 
low food access and to allow cross-cultural and intertemporal comparison of 
households based on the HDDS.
Its most simple form, the 1PL Rasch model (equation 1), is based on the assumption 
that the probability of an affirmative answer to item i (e.g. consumption of a food 
group) by person p is determined by the difference between the person’s ability 
θp (e.g. its food access status) and the difficulty of the item, βi. In other words, the 
higher a person’s food access status and the less ‘difficult’ a particular food group 
is, the more likely it is that this person is consuming that particular food group. 
Formally, the 1PL model is specified as follows: 
(1)
This formula states that the log odds of the probability of an affirmative response 
of person p to item i is a linear function of the ability of person p (θp) and the 
difficulty of question i (βi).
A poor item fit might indicate that the item does not measure the same latent 
trait as the other items, but it might also indicate that the item is not as strongly 
correlated with the latent trait as the other items. A simple 1PL Rasch model 
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assumes all food items are equally informative of a household’s ability. The more 
flexible parameterization of the 2PL model allows testing the correlation of item i 
with the latent trait, by adding an interaction term, αi:
(2)
The additional parameter, αi, determines the discriminatory power of the items, 
i.e. it measures the extent to which an item helps to distinguish high from low 
performers. The larger is αi, the more a small increase in θ increases the probability 
of an affirmative response to item i.
For interval scale measurement, each item should contribute positively to the latent 
trait, such that food access status increases with the consumption of each food 
group. In terms of the model, this implies αi>0. If αi is not significantly different 
from zero, the probability of an affirmative response is no longer a function 
of θ. This implies that an individual with a highly diversified diet could not be 
distinguished from a household with a less diversified diet. More worrying are 
items (food groups) with a negative αi. Such items showed an inverse relationship 
with the latent trait, implying that the probability of consuming food group i 
decreased with increasing food access. As the HDDS score equals the number of 
consumed food groups, food groups with an inverse relation with dietary diversity 
will bias HDDS downwards. Clearly, such items should not be included in a valid 
indicator.
A necessary pre-condition for any scale is that item response (food group 
consumption) should only depend on ability, not on any other individual- 
or household-specific characteristic. This pre-condition was checked using 
Differential Item Functioning (DIF) tests, which allows testing whether 
individuals with the same latent trait but different consumption preferences 
respond differently to items (Pallant and Tennant, 2007; Tennant and Conaghan, 
2007). Consumption preferences are likely to differ between cultures and regions. 
For example, fish consumption might be common in coastal areas, but is linked to 
a highly diversified diet in rural areas. To verify this condition, prior knowledge 
of dietary patterns in the region was required. 
For each subgroup of households in the sample, a refined indicator was 
constructed based on the relationship between individual items and overall score 
on the indicator. In a first step, food groups consumed by nearly all or none of 
the households were removed. Such items did not add value in distinguishing 
households with high food access from households with low food access. 
Furthermore, items with less than ten observations per binary choice alternative 
might cause estimates to become unstable (Linacre, 2002) and hence were 
removed. Second, the relationship of the remaining items with the total score on 
the indicator was visually verified with Item Response Functions (IRFs). Well-
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functioning items should have a significant positive relationship with the overall 
score, indicating households consuming the food group had a higher probability 
of having higher food access. Badly functioning items were removed from the 
refined indicator. Item fit was further examined using item characteristic curves 
(ICCs), which show expected and observed probabilities for each item in a single 
graph (Bond and Fox, 2001).
The resulting refined indicators were tested for robustness and local independence. 
Robustness was checked by removing observations with low person-fit and 
verifying whether the ranking of items differed between the reduced sample 
and the full sample. Local independence requires that items are independent of 
one another, conditional on the value of the latent trait and was tested for by the 
significance of the correlation between response pairs (Ponocny, 2001; Tennant and 
Conaghan, 2007). All equations were estimated using Rasch analyses performed 
using R version 2.12.1, with packages irtoys and eRm (Mair and Hatzinger, 2007; 
Partchev et al., 2009). 
Results
Consumption patterns of Colombian and Ecuadorian households were 
completely different, as is evident from Table 4.2 on page 98 and Table 4.3 on 
page 101. Hence, separate Rasch analyses were performed for each country. 
Differential Item Functioning showed the existence of distinct dietary patterns 
for Kichwa and immigrant households in Ecuador, requiring separate analyses 
for these two subgroups. Such a difference was not found in the Colombian 
sample. Therefore, three distinct analyses had to be performed, as shown in Figure 
4.1. The consequently large amount of analyses performed implies that not all 
Figure 4.1. Structure of the results section
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results could be reported in the main text; additional output is presented in the 
appendix.5 In the next section (5.1), results of the analysis for Colombia will be 
discussed, followed by those for the DIF analysis in Ecuador (5.2) and the HDDS 
verifications for Kichwa (5.3) and migrant households (5.4).
 
Colombia
Food groups consumed by nearly all or very few households reduce the variation 
of the HDDS indicator and hence its efficiency. In the Colombian sample, this 
lack of variation was cause for concern: 99% of households consumed the food 
groups 1 (cereals), 2 (roots and tubers), 11 (sugar/honey) and 12 (other) during 
the 24 hours before the survey (Table 4.2). The nearly uniform consumption of 
these food groups meant they did not add explanatory power in differentiation 
between households with high and low food access. Therefore, their removal did 
not make the overall indicator less precise but was necessary to ensure stability of 
the estimates of the model (Linacre, 2002).
The relationship between individual items and the overall score was evaluated 
with Item Response Functions (IRFs) of an estimated 2PL Rasch model (Figure 
4.2). IRFs showed the probability of an affirmative response for each item as a 
function of the latent trait, household food access. The higher was food access (on 
the horizontal axis), the higher should be the probability of consuming the food 
group(on the vertical axis). The numbers on the different curves correspond to 
the items (food groups) provided in Table 4.2. All food groups appeared to behave 
as expected: all curves show an upward slope. 
Table 4.2. Food group consumption by Colombian households
# Food group By % of households
1 Cereals 99
2 Roots and tubers 99
3 Vegetables 49
4 Fruits 50
5 Meat 67
6 Eggs 66
7 Fish 6
8 Legumes 62
9 Milk/dairy 23
10 Oils/fat 86
11 Sugar/honey 99
12 Other 99
Note: food groups that were excluded from further analysis are underlined.
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If two items had similar discriminatory power, α, but differed with respect 
to their difficulty, β, the curve of the most difficult item (higher β) would be 
plotted towards to the right-hand side of the figure. For instance, food group 3 
(vegetables) and 7 (fish) had similar discriminatory power (α equalled 1.006 and 
0.858 respectively), but vegetables (β = 0.07) was a considerably easier item than 
fish (β = 3.55). Hence, the IRFs of fish and vegetables were almost parallel, but the 
curve of vegetables was located to the left of the curve of fish.
The α’s determine the slope of the IRFs: items with high discriminatory power 
have steeper slopes. For instance, food group 5 (meat) and food group 8 (legumes) 
had similar β’s, but the slope of the IRF of meat was steeper than the slope of the 
IRF of legumes, because the latter had a smaller α. In other words, the food group 
meat had more power in differentiating between households with high and low 
food access.
The IRF of food group 6 (eggs) was rather flat, which indicated the probability of 
consuming eggs might be independent of the latent trait. A test confirmed that 
the discriminatory power of food group 6 was not significantly different from zero 
(p=0.22), so the item was removed from the refined scale. Eggs might not explain 
household food access because they are an important component of the daily diet 
in Colombia, independent of the socio-economic status of the household (Dufour 
et al., 1997). Most households might eat eggs frequently but not daily. In our 
sample, eggs were consumed by two-thirds of the interviewed households (Table 
4.2). All seven remaining food groups had a positive and significant relationship 
with the latent trait, and were therefore included in the refined scale. 
Item fit was verified by visual inspection of the Item Characteristic Curves (ICCs) 
for each of the seven remaining items. ICCs are similar to IRFs and show the 
Figure 4.2. Item response functions (IRFs) Colombia
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probability of consuming the food group (vertical axis) as a function of the 
household’s food access (horizontal axis). ICCs also show the predicted probability 
of an affirmative response with its 95% confidence interval represented by vertical 
lines and the actual observed probability of an affirmative response represented 
by a dot. Item fit is high when predicted probabilities are close to expected 
probabilities. For example, for the food group meat (Figure 4.3), predicted 
probabilities corresponded well to actual observations. Results for other food 
groups were similar.
Results of the robustness check supported the model. Although removing the 6% 
of observations with low person-fit (p<0.02) did affect the size of the coefficients, 
it did not affect their difficulty rankings vis-à-vis one another. Local independence 
held. The nonparametric RM model test showed inter-item correlations between 
two out of 21 item-pairs, or roughly 10%. Based on the null hypothesis of 
independence this is no cause for serious concern. Further testing to find the 
source of dependencies based on principal component analysis resulted in a 
maximum eigenvalue of <1.3, with remaining eigenvalues slowly decreasing in 
size. Eigenvalues below 1.5 are generally considered to confirm local independence 
(Kahler and Strong, 2006).
 
Ecuador: Differential Item Functioning
The Amazon basin where the Ecuadorian data was collected had two ethnic 
groups with distinct dietary patterns. Originally the region was inhabited by the 
indigenous tribe of the Kichwa, but since the oil boom of the 1970s large groups of 
mestizo migrants have settled in the region and currently make up almost half the 
Figure 4.3. Item characteristics curve (ICC) of food group 5 (meat)
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population (Lobao and Brown, 1998; Witt et al., 1999). A glance at the summary 
statistics for food groups consumption shows marked differences in diet between 
these groups (Table 4.3). Milk and dairy products were, for instance, consumed by 
only 7% of Kichwa households, while 27% of migrant households reported having 
consumed this food group in the previous day. This suggested that the pooling the 
data from Ecuador might cause validity problems.
A formal test confirmed the occurrence of Differential Item Functioning 
(Appendix F) between the ethnic groups (P<0.001), implying that a single index 
for the Ecuadorian case did not meet condition 3 of cultural robustness. When the 
items showing the strongest DIF were removed one by one until they no longer 
showed any DIF (P=0.352), only five food groups were left in the final model: 1, 3, 
8, 9 and 11. Such a small number of groups is not very meaningful, as the resulting 
indicator can take only five values and is probably relatively insensitive to changes 
in food access. By not pooling the data, valuable within-group information on 
specific diets was preserved. Hence, the subsequent analysis was performed 
separately for each of the two cultural groups.6 
 
Kichwa households
None of the food groups was consumed by so few or so many households to 
require removal from the indicator. The least frequently consumed food group, 
milk, was consumed by 15 households (Table 4.3). Item Response Functions for 
all food groups based on the 2PL model are shown in Figure 4.4. In order for 
Table 4.3. Food group consumption by Ecuadorian households
 Food group
% of Kichwa HHs 
(n=209)
% of migrant HHs 
(n=297)
1 Cereals 80 95
2 Roots and tubers 87 81
3 Vegetables 15 37
4 Fruits 26 40
5 Meat 52 66
6 Eggs 46 50
7 Fish 49 29
8 Legumes 18 56
9 Milk/dairy 7 27
10 Oils/fat 40 38
11 Sugar/honey 52 77
12 Other 54 86
Note: HHs = households
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a food group to usefully contribute to the additive HDDS, the likelihood of its 
consumption needed to increase with an increase in the latent trait, reflected by a 
positive and significant slope. Food groups 2 (roots and tubers) and 7 (fish) both 
appeared to violate this condition. 
The IRF of food group 2, roots and tubers, was a flat line. The item had low 
discriminatory power (α = 0.04) and extremely low item difficulty (β = -48.01). The 
food group was consumed by 87% of Kichwa households, but their consumption 
was practically independent of their food access situation, meaning the group 
added no explanatory power to the overall indicator. It is likely that this food group 
was consumed by all households on a regular but not daily basis and therefore its 
consumption had no power in explaining household food access.
The negative slope on food group 7 (fish) indicated the likelihood of consuming 
fish decreased with increasing food access. The predicted likelihood of consuming 
fish decreased from 80% for households with little dietary diversity to less than 
20% for households with a highly diversified diet. Previous research found fish 
to be an important part of the diet in Kichwa communities and consequently its 
consumption was common, although more so in rural communities than in towns 
(Webb et al., 2004). No sources were found mentioning an inverse relationship 
between income and fish consumption, although a possible explanation for the 
observed effect could be a development project of the provincial government of 
Napo which donated fish ponds to indigenous households in the region. Such a 
project was mentioned by respondents in a second survey round conducted in 
summer 2013.7 If only food insecure households were eligible for this programme, 
it would explain the observed inverse relationship of fish consumption with 
overall dietary diversity. 
Figure 4.4. Item response functions Ecuador, Kichwa households
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Removing observations with low person-fit to verify robustness resulted in 
dropping 6% of observations. Differences between the full and reduced sample 
were negligible. Ranking was unaffected, and coefficient size hardly changed. 
Local independence tests based on inter-item correlation showed 6 out of 45 
tested pairs, or 13%, showed significant correlation (p<0.05). Further analysis of 
the source of the variation indicated sampling variation rather than structural 
variation. The highest eigenvalue was 1.58; other eigenvalues were only slightly 
lower.
Migrant households
No food groups required removal from the refined indicator for migrant 
households because of too high or too low consumption frequency (Table 4.3 
on page 101). The most frequently consumed food group was cereals, which 
was consumed by 95% of the population. Only 15 households did not report its 
consumption. Because this exceeded the critical threshold of ten observations per 
dichotomous choice alternative (Linacre, 2002), the food group was not removed. 
Food groups 5 (meat) and 8 (legumes) appeared to have negative slopes (Figure 
4.5), warranting their exclusion. Inspection of the coefficients of the 2PL model 
indeed showed that the slope of food groups 5 and 8 was negative (α = -0.11 and α 
= -0.16, respectively) and testing revealed that these slopes were not significantly 
different from zero at the 5% confidence level.  These food groups were removed 
from the refined indicator. 
Upon inspection of the ICC curves for migrant households, food group 7 (fish) 
was found to have low item fit. Many more households than predicted consumed 
fish at the lower tail of the distribution, meaning its consumption did not increase 
Figure 4.5. Item response functions Ecuador, migrant households
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considerably with higher levels of food access (Figure 4.6). The Chi-squared 
test for item fit confirmed this conjecture; the null of good item fit was rejected 
(p=0.013). Therefore, food group 7 was removed from the refined scale. Re-testing 
showed the remaining items to have good fit.
The resulting scale was checked for robustness by removing the 5% of observations 
with low person-fit (p<0.02). This removal had a minimal effect on coefficient 
sizes and did not affect their ranking. Local independence did offer some cause 
for concern. Out of 36 item pairs tested for inter-item correlations, six were 
found to be significant (17%). Further testing of the source of the variation gave a 
maximum eigenvalue of 1.52. In other words, the observed local dependence was 
likely caused by sampling variation. 
 
Cronbach’s alpha
Cronbach’s alpha is a widely used estimate of the internal consistency of the 
reliability of test scores. It is a function of the number of items in a test, the average 
covariance between items, and the variance of the total score. Alpha will increase if 
the covariance between items increases. Since this covariance is maximised when 
all items measure the same construct, the statistic is widely believed to indicate 
the degree to which a set of items measures the same latent variable. The statistic 
can take values between 0 and 1. As a rule of thumb, values above 0.9 indicate 
excellent internal consistency, values below 0.5 indicate unacceptable internal 
consistency (George and Mallery, 2003). Table 4.4 shows the results for some of 
the HDDS indicators used in this paper.
For none of the tested HDDS indicators the Cronbach’s alpha exceeded 0.5, the 
Figure 4.6. Item characteristics curve of food group 7 (fish) for migrant households
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minimum value for an indicator not to be considered inadequate. Removing food 
groups from the indicator did increase Cronbach’s alpha: values for the refined 
indicator for each of the three groups exceeded values for the unrefined indicators. 
Although the alphas did increase, the improvement was insufficient to push them 
over the 0.5 threshold. 
Discussion
In this paper the household dietary diversity score (HDDS) developed by the 
Food and Nutrition Technical Assistance (FANTA) project was analysed using 
Rasch models. In particular, it was verified whether the indicator met the criteria 
required for interval scale measurement. Meeting these criteria would imply the 
HDDS can be used as a household level indicator of food access. Such validity at 
household level is relevant for both development and research organisations, as 
it would allow attribution of project impact to specific outcomes. Rasch models 
allow differentiation between the discriminatory power and difficulty of items, 
revealing the relative importance of individual food groups in differentiating 
between levels of food access. In our data, this importance differed markedly 
between countries and between groups within Ecuador. Therefore, in its current 
form the HDDS did not meet the criteria.
For most application of Rasch modelling, the assumption of hierarchical ordering 
of the items is essential. In our application, this would imply that the food groups 
can be ranked ex-ante based on their difficulty. It also implies that a household 
that consumes the most difficult item should have consumed the other, easier, 
items. For dietary diversity, such a strict hierarchical ordering is difficult to 
establish, as it depends on locally prevailing market conditions (availability, price) 
and cultural preferences. Yet, in poor and food insecure regions, it is reasonable 
to assume that more food secure households consume more and less accessible 
food groups. It is hard to believe that households switch completely from one diet 
Table 4.4. Cronbach’s alpha statistics for selected Household Dietary Diversity Score groups
Country Sample
Cronbach's 
alpha
Confidence interval
5% 95%
Ecuador Full sample, n=515, items=12 0.42 0.33 0.50
Kichwa, n=209, item=12 0.38 0.24 0.51
Kichwa, n=209, item=10 0.49 0.37 0.67
Migrants, n=297, items=12 0.30 0.18 0.43
Migrants, n=297, items=9 0.44 0.33 0.55
Colombia Full sample, n=509, items=12 0.35 0.26 0.44
Full sample, n=509, items=7 0.39 0.29 0.48
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to another or no longer consume certain food groups as they grow richer. In this 
sense, a hierarchical ordering of food groups is likely. On the other hand, changing 
dietary patterns may not completely be captured by the HDDS. For instance, food 
secure and food insecure households may both eat meat, but more food secure 
households may switch from chicken to beef. The HDDS is insensitive to such 
changes. A second argument supporting the applicability of Rasch analysis is 
the main conclusion - that some food groups are not correlated with the overall 
HDDS score or with the consumption of other food groups – could be reproduced 
using ‘simple’ descriptive and comparative statistics.8 Therefore, even if the key 
assumption of hierarchical ordering was not met, robustness checks using similar 
statistics yield similar results. Importantly, in this paper Rasch analysis was not 
used to calibrate the indicator, which would require precise estimates of item 
parameters and hence would be more sensitive to the consequences of invalidating 
the assumption. 
Assuming hierarchical ordering of the food groups, Rasch models can be used to 
test two conditions which a valid indicator of food access should meet: (i) cross-
cultural validity and (ii) an increasing probability of an affirmative answer with 
increasing food access. The pooled data, combining data from Colombia and 
Ecuador, did not meet the condition of cross-cultural validity. More worryingly, 
even within the sample of Ecuadorian households, significant differences in 
dietary patters between Kichwa and migrant households were detected. Data 
had to be split into three different groups – Colombian, Kichwa, and migrant 
households – which were analysed separately. For each of these groups, items 
(food groups) not meeting the second condition were removed from the scale 
until a ‘refined’ HDDS was found that did meet all conditions. An overview of the 
three resulting scales is given in Table 4.5. It contains for each food group either 
the reason it was omitted from the scale or its difficulty ranking in the overall 
scale. The most difficult food groups were most likely to be eaten by households 
with the highest food access score.
There are large differences between the three refined indicators in the number of 
food groups they contain and in the difficulty ranking of these food groups. In 
the Colombian data, seven food groups made up the refined indicator: vegetables, 
fruits, meat, fish, legumes, diary, and oils. These results correspond well with 
the literature as the refined index mainly contains foods with high nutritional 
values such as fruits, vegetables, and animal source products. The results for 
the Ecuadorian subgroups were less convincing. For Kichwa households, the 
food groups roots and tubers, and fish were excluded from the final index and 
for migrant households the groups meat, fish, and legumes did not meet the 
conditions. Especially the non-inclusion of meat and fish in the overall index for 
both groups is cause for concern, as animal source foods are of crucial importance 
for macro and micro nutrient intake in developing countries (Murphy and Allen, 
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2003). Moreover, as there appears to be a direct link between consumption of 
animal source foods and dietary diversity (Brown et al. (2002), as cited in Ruel 
(2003)), the exclusion calls into question what the HDDS really measures.9 When 
items are Giffen goods, such that their consumption decreases when their relative 
price falls, such as might be the case for fish in Ecuador, the imposed additive 
relationship between item consumption and food security no longer holds. 
There were substantial differences in the importance of each food group in the 
overall index between countries and even within a country. This holds even 
though two culturally similar neighbouring countries were studied. In its current 
form, the HDDS has no cross-cultural validity, a problem previously mentioned 
but not tested by Ruel (2003). DIF-analysis showed that the indicator is not even 
necessarily valid within a country, as in Ecuador dietary patterns differed between 
groups with a different cultural background. This lack of cross-cultural validity is 
problematic as it prevents direct interpretation of the value of the overall indicator. 
Before interpreting this value, it is essential to have a thorough understanding of 
local dietary patterns, even when a survey or project concerns only a small area 
within a single country. Clearly, requiring extensive knowledge before being able 
to interpret a simple, easy-to-use indicator limits its usefulness for deployment in 
the rapid assessments required by development projects.
A potential cause of the limited accuracy of the HDDS at household level might 
be its focus on only the foods consumed in the last 24 hours before the survey 
Table 4.5. Reason for removal and difficulty ranking of food groups for refined indicators
Food group
Colombia 
(n=509)
Kichwa 
(n=209)
migrants 
(n=297)
1 Cereals targeting 1 1
2 Roots and tubers targeting α = 0 2
3 Vegetables 5 10 8
4 Fruits 4 9 7
5 Meat 3 3 α = 0
6 Eggs α = 0 5 5
7 Fish 7 α < 0 low item fit
8 Legumes 2 8 α = 0
9 Milk/dairy 6 7 9
10 Oils/fat 1 6 6
11 Sugar/honey targeting 4 4
12 Other targeting 2 3
Note: numbers in columns indicate food group difficulty ranking (1 indicates the easiest food group); targeting indicates the 
food group was excluded because 99% of households consumed it; α = 0 indicates the food group does not explain food access; 
α < 0 indicates the food group has a negative relationship with food access, such that its consumption is associated with lower 
food access; low item fit indicates a significant difference between expected and predicted responses.
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(Swindale and Ohri-Vachaspati, 2005). In that case, a straightforward way to 
overcome this inaccuracy is to increase the recall period. In a study using a 15 
day recall period for dietary diversity, Drewnowski et al. (1997) noted diversity 
increased steeply over the first three days of recall, after which further increases 
became small. In other words, 24h recall might significantly underestimate true 
diversity when measuring dietary diversity at an individual or household level. 
Specifically, it might reduce the inaccuracy stemming from food groups that are 
eaten frequently, but not daily. 
Other factors which might increase the construct validity of the indicator are re-
defining the included food groups, adding weights, consumption frequency, and 
establishing minimum portion sizes. Food groups could be re-defined based on 
nutritional values, as is already being suggested specifically for iron deficiency 
(FAO, 2012) and is common in studies in the field of nutrition (Ruel, 2003). Weights 
could be added to account for the distinct nutritional value of food groups, as is 
already done by the Food Consumption Score used by the World Food Programme 
(WFP, 2008). The frequency of consumption might also be considered, which 
is particularly important in the presence of habit formation. Then, households 
might prefer those foods consumed as a child even when alternative food baskets 
become affordable (Atkin, 2013). Finally, minimum portion sizes should be 
considered. Ruel (2003) gives an example from Ghana, where fish consumption 
appeared high until it was found out fish meal was added in small amounts to 
porridge, obviously limiting its nutritional contribution. Different indicators take 
one or several of these factors into account, but knowledge of the contribution of 
each factor to the overall accuracy of the indicator is lacking. Further research is 
needed to specify and quantify the trade-offs involved.
Conclusion
The HDDS was developed as an easy-to-use and quick-to-implement survey-
based assessment tool to allow measuring the impact on household food access of 
programs with improvements in food security as their core objective. Although 
its accompanying guidelines suggest that an “increase in household dietary 
diversity reflects an improvement in the household’s diet”, our results show the 
indicator should be cautiously interpreted. The HDDS does not allow comparing 
food access between different countries. Moreover, even in a small region within 
a single country, the indicator should not be used without sufficient knowledge 
of local dietary patterns. When dietary patterns differ between groups within a 
region, scores should not be aggregated for the region as a whole. Even within these 
relatively homogenous groups, there is a limited fit between included food groups 
and the underlying latent trait, such that the components of the indicator do not 
form a reliable way of measuring the variable of interest: food access. 
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Several problems were encountered with regard to the food groups making 
up the indicator. The gravest problem encountered was the inclusion of a food 
group with a negative relationship with the latent trait (Giffinity), implying that 
households were more likely to consume the food group when they had lower 
food access. Such items should never be included in an additive scale. In each of 
the three groups studied, there was at least one item which had no relationship 
with the latent trait, reducing the indicator’s accuracy. Such items cause incorrect 
classification of households into food security states. Both problems might be 
avoided by re-defining the included food groups, adding weights, consumption 
frequency, and establishing minimum portion sizes. Until these issues are 
satisfactorily resolved, the HDDS should not be used as an indicator of the food 
access status of individual households.
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Appendix A: Timing of the survey
The guidelines of the HDDS prescribe that in order for the indicator to “accurately 
capture changes in HDDS over time, data should be collected during the period 
of greatest food shortages (such as immediately prior to the harvest)” (Swindale 
and Bilinsky, 2006). The figures below show the share of households reporting to 
have insufficient food on a monthly basis, for each of the three groups. The survey 
Figure 4.7. Seasonality in food insecurity for Colombian households
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was conducted in April-May. These months are among the most food secure 
for Colombian households (Figure 4.7) and relatively food insecure for Kichwa 
(Figure 4.8) and migrant households (Figure 4.9). It is interesting to note that it 
appears that for Colombian households the most food secure months are directly 
prior to the coffee harvest, which runs from May to August. 
Figure 4.8. Seasonality in food insecurity for Kichwa households
Figure 4.9. Seasonality in food insecurity for migrant households
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Appendix B: list of variables
MAHFP
Months of Adequate Household Food Provisioning, an indicator developed by 
FANTA which asks for each of the lasts 12 months whether the household had 
sufficient food. The value of the indicator is the number of months the household 
indicated not to have had sufficient food.
Ethnicity
The ethnic group the household head felt most closely related to. All interviewed 
households were ethnically homogenous. In Ecuador, the question was framed as 
a semi-closed multiple choice item with the following options (translated from 
Spanish): indigenous (if yes, which group), African-Ecuadorian, Mestizo, Mulato, 
White, Other (if yes, which), or No Response. All indigenous households were 
Kichwa, the original inhabitants of the zone. All migrant households were mestizo. 
Family Size
The sum of the number of adults and children living in the same house and sharing 
the same food. 
Dependency ratio
The number of children in the household divided by the number of adults in the 
household. 
Household income
The sum of income from self-employment (agriculture, coffee, non-agriculture), 
wage (agriculture, non-agriculture), and income obtained from public and private 
transfers. Data were obtained using recall for the twelve individual months 
preceding the interview date. Reported incomes are the sum over these twelve 
months.
HDDS
The Household Dietary Diversity Score, developed by the FANTA project (Bilinsky 
and Swindale, 2010), consists of the twelve food groups shown in Appendix C. 
Respondents are asked which of these food groups they consumed in the past 24 
hours, and their total score is the sum of their affirmative responses. 
112
Strange bedfellows? Big business meets small farmer  Wytse Vellema
Appendix C: HDDS surveys
The used HDDS surveys were made more specific for each country by adding 
commonly consumed foods to the specification of the food groups.
Table 4.6. HDDS used in Colombia
26. Índice de diversidad dietética en el hogar (HDDS)
Ahora quisiera preguntarle sobre los tipos de alimentos que usted o cualquiera de los miembros 
de su familia comieron durante el día de ayer y en la noche.
LEA LA LISTA DE ALIMENTOS. SELECCIONE LA OPCIÓN “SÍ” DE LA CASILLA SI ALGÚN 
MIEMBRO DEL HOGAR CONSUMIÓ EL ALIMENTO NOMBRADO;
SELECCIONE LA OPCIÓN “NO” EN LA CASILLA SI NINGÚN MIEMBRO DEL HOGAR 
CONSUMIÓ EL ALIMENTO.
PREGUNTAS
CATEGORÍAS DE
CLASIFICACIÓN
A. CEREALES
1. Sí 0. No 
¿Algún cereal como el arroz, el maíz o el trigo, o algún producto elaborado 
con estos granos, como el pan, arepas, envueltos de choclo, fideos de trigo, 
hojaldres, tostadas, pasteles, o cualquier otro alimento hecho de mijo, 
sorgo, maíz, arroz, trigo, cebada, avena, etc.?
B. RAÍCES, TUBÉRCULOS y PLÁTANOS
1. Sí 0. No ¿Papas, batata, yuca, arracacha, plátano, o cualquier otro alimento 
proveniente de raíces, tubérculos o plátanos?
C. VERDURAS
1. Sí 0. No ¿Verduras?
D. FRUTAS
1. Sí 0. No ¿Frutas?
E. CARNE, POLLO, DESPOJOS
1. Sí 0. No 
¿Carne de vaca, de cerdo, de cordero, de cabra, de conejo, de caza silvestre, 
cuy, pavo, pollo, pato u otras aves, hígado, riñón, corazón u otras carnes 
de órganos? 
F. HUEVOS
1. Sí 0. No ¿Huevos?
G. PESCADO Y MARISCOS
1. Sí 0. No ¿Pescado o mariscos frescos o secos?
H. LEGUMBRES/LEGUMINOSAS/FRUTOS SECOS
1. Sí 0. No ¿Alimentos a base de frijoles, arvejas, lentejas o frutos secos?
I. LECHE Y PRODUCTOS LÁCTEOS
1. Sí 0. No ¿Queso, yogurt, leche u otros productos lácteos?
J. ACEITES/GRASAS
1. Sí 0. No ¿Alimentos a base de aceite, grasa o mantequilla?
K. ÁZUCAR/MIEL
1. Sí 0. No ¿Azúcar, miel o panela?
L. ALIMENTOS DIVERSOS
1. Sí 0. No ¿Otros alimentos, como condimentos, café, té?
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Table 4.7. HDDS used in Ecuador
26. Índice de diversidad dietética en el hogar (HDDS)
Ahora quisiera preguntarle sobre los tipos de alimentos que usted o cualquiera de los miembros 
de su familia comieron durante el día de ayer y en la noche.
LEA LA LISTA DE ALIMENTOS. SELECCIONE LA OPCIÓN “SÍ” DE LA CASILLA SI ALGÚN 
MIEMBRO DEL HOGAR CONSUMIÓ EL ALIMENTO NOMBRADO;
SELECCIONE LA OPCIÓN “NO” EN LA CASILLA SI NINGÚN MIEMBRO DEL HOGAR 
CONSUMIÓ EL ALIMENTO.
PREGUNTAS
CATEGORÍAS DE
CLASIFICACIÓN
A. CEREALES
1. Sí 0. No ¿Algún cereal como el arroz, el maíz o el trigo, o algún producto elaborado 
con estos granos, como el pan, la galleta, la humita, etc.?
B. RAÍCES, TUBÉRCULOS y PLÁTANOS
1. Sí 0. No ¿Papas, camote, yuca, mandioca o cualquier otro alimento proveniente de 
raíces o tubérculos?
C. VERDURAS
1. Sí 0. No ¿Verduras?
D. FRUTAS
1. Sí 0. No ¿Frutas?
E. CARNE, POLLO, DESPOJOS
1. Sí 0. No ¿Carne de vaca, de cerdo, de cordero, de cabra, de conejo, de caza silvestre, 
pollo, pato u otras aves, hígado, riñón, corazón u otras carnes de órganos?
F. HUEVOS
1. Sí 0. No ¿Huevos?
G. PESCADO Y MARISCOS
1. Sí 0. No ¿Pescado o mariscos frescos o secos?
H. LEGUMBRES/LEGUMINOSAS/FRUTOS SECOS
1. Sí 0. No ¿Alimentos a base de frijoles, arvejas, lentejas o frutos secos?
I. LECHE Y PRODUCTOS LÁCTEOS
1. Sí 0. No ¿Queso, yogurt, leche u otros productos lácteos?
J. ACEITES/GRASAS
1. Sí 0. No ¿Alimentos a base de aceite, grasa o mantequilla?
K. ÁZUCAR/MIEL
1. Sí 0. No ¿Azúcar o miel?
L. ALIMENTOS DIVERSOS
1. Sí 0. No ¿Otros alimentos, como condimentos, café, té?
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Appendix D: output tables of 2PL models
Table 4.8. 2PL model Colombia including eggs
Food group alpha beta se alpha se beta
t-values 
alpha
Vegetables 1.005 0.069 0.25 0.108 4.023
Fruits 1.128 -0.007 0.287 0.099 3.937
Meat 0.538 -1.368 0.185 0.455 2.91
Eggs 0.11 -5.901 0.146 7.829 0.754
Fish 0.858 3.552 0.306 1.045 2.806
Legumes 0.316 -1.651 0.148 0.794 2.139
Milk/dairy 1.192 1.292 0.331 0.257 3.601
Oils/fat 0.564 -3.48 0.225 1.259 2.509
Table 4.9. 2 PL model Kichwa including roots/tubers and fish
Food group alpha beta se alpha se beta
t-values 
alpha
Cereals 1.281 -1.424 0.433 0.343 2.955
Roots and tubers -0.022 84.830 0.293 1102.814 -0.077
Vegetables 0.197 8.949 0.286 12.821 0.689
Fruits 0.229 4.662 0.215 4.325 1.067
Meat 0.502 -0.141 0.215 0.297 2.337
Eggs 0.511 0.339 0.213 0.314 2.395
Fish -0.406 -0.073 0.204 0.356 -1.995
Legumes 0.447 3.507 0.262 1.947 1.703
Milk/dairy 1.073 2.808 0.481 0.956 2.229
Oils/fat 1.066 0.485 0.297 0.186 3.594
Sugar/honey 2.410 -0.048 1.062 0.107 2.268
Other 0.809 -0.229 0.253 0.204 3.197
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Table 4.10. 2 PL model migrants including meat and legumes
Food group alpha beta se alpha se beta
t-values 
alpha
Cereals 0.397 -7.390 0.348 6.211 1.140
Roots and tubers 0.376 -3.938 0.221 2.218 1.704
Vegetables 0.953 0.645 0.277 0.201 3.444
Fruits 0.825 0.580 0.243 0.211 3.392
Meat -0.106 6.107 0.176 10.097 -0.605
Eggs 0.198 0.034 0.166 0.591 1.193
Fish 0.321 2.812 0.192 1.658 1.670
Legumes -0.155 1.534 0.164 1.774 -0.945
Milk/dairy 0.429 2.465 0.201 1.112 2.137
Oils/fat 1.453 0.481 0.467 0.142 3.111
Sugar/honey 1.903 -0.999 0.629 0.183 3.026
Other 1.040 -2.037 0.321 0.484 3.243
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Appendix E: In- and out-fit statistics
Table 4.12. In- and outfit statistics Kichwa (final model)
Food group 1 PL Infit Outfit
Cereals -2.238 0.874 0.758
Vegetables 1.294 0.994 1.068
Fruits 0.550 0.994 1.048
Meat -0.695 1.066 1.120
Eggs -0.435 1.037 1.007
Legumes 1.035 0.965 0.919
Milk/diary 2.141 0.808 0.584
Oils/fat -0.150 0.913 0.911
Sugar/honey -0.695 0.814 0.746
Other -0.805 0.963 0.960
Table 4.13. In- and outfit statistics migrants (final model)
Food group 1 PL Infit Outfit
Cereals 2.625 0.795 0.747
Roots and tubers 1.150 1.021 0.949
Vegetables -0.989 0.953 0.910
Fruits -0.880 0.950 0.960
Eggs -0.428 1.122 1.158
Fish -1.388 1.049 1.187
Milk/diary -1.533 1.031 1.090
Oils/fat -0.974 0.763 0.689
Sugar/honey 0.910 0.756 0.682
Other 1.507 0.825 0.839
Table 4.11. In- and outfit statistics Colombia (final model)
Food group 1 PL In-fit Out-fit
Vegetables -0.123 0.885 0.823
Fruits -0.193 0.882 0.841
Meat -0.950 0.981 0.968
Fish 3.001 0.799 1.040
Legumes -0.752 1.044 1.058
Milk/diary 1.199 0.811 0.727
Oils/fat -2.182 0.871 0.829
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Appendix F: Differential item functioning, Ecuador
Table 4.14. 1PL model with interaction between item and household groups (DIF)
Food group Beta se Beta t-value p-value
group (0=migrant HH; 1=Kichwa HH) 0.734 0.160 4.577 0.000
HDDS 1 0.748 0.302 2.475 0.013
HDDS 2 2.235 0.330 6.769 0.000
HDDS 3 -2.462 0.309 -7.981 0.000
HDDS 4 -1.440 0.253 -5.690 0.000
HDDS 5 -0.235 0.224 -1.045 0.296
HDDS 6 -0.252 0.224 -1.127 0.260
HDDS 7 0.412 0.225 1.830 0.067
HDDS 8 -2.493 0.286 -8.729 0.000
HDDS 9 -3.442 0.421 -8.170 0.000
HDDS 10 -0.402 0.228 -1.759 0.079
HDDS 11 -0.535 0.227 -2.359 0.018
HDDS 12 -0.667 0.232 -2.871 0.004
Group 1 (kichwa) *HDDS2 -0.977 0.205 -4.763 0.000
Group 1 (kichwa) *HDDS3 -0.095 0.197 -0.482 0.630
Group 1 (kichwa) *HDDS4 -0.401 0.188 -2.132 0.033
Group 1 (kichwa) *HDDS5 -0.429 0.184 -2.325 0.020
Group 1 (kichwa) *HDDS6 -0.653 0.183 -3.558 0.000
Group 1 (kichwa) *HDDS7 -1.180 0.185 -6.365 0.000
Group 1 (kichwa) *HDDS8 0.180 0.193 0.934 0.350
Group 1 (kichwa) *HDDS9 0.057 0.221 0.258 0.797
Group 1 (kichwa) *HDDS10 -0.777 0.185 -4.207 0.000
Group 1 (kichwa) *HDDS11 -0.131 0.187 -0.700 0.484
Group 1 (kichwa) *HDDS12 0.105 0.193 0.546 0.585
Table 4.15. ANOVA test for DIF
Df AIC BIC Log. lik Deviance Chisq Df Pr(>Chisq)
model1PL_gr 14 7067 7161 -3520 7039
model1PL_gr_int 25 6892 7060 -3421 6842 197 11 <2e-16
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Appendix G: Model tests comparing 2PL with 1PL
Refitting the final models with a 1PL model (Table 4.16, Table 4.17, and Table 
4.18), shows that the 1PL models fits the data only slightly less accurately than the 
2PL models (e.g. the BIC criteria favors 1PL over 2PL models, while AIC and LR 
test prefer 2PL models).
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Notes
1 See Appendix A for a discussion on the recommendations for survey 
timing included in the HDDS guidelines.
2 All interviewed households were ethnically homogeneous.
3 En las últimas 24 horas, comía algún cereal como el arroz, el maíz o 
el trigo, o algún producto elaborado con estos granos, como el pan, la 
galleta, la humita, etc.?
4 En las últimas 24 horas, comía algún cereal como el arroz, el maíz o el 
trigo, o algún producto elaborado con estos granos, como el pan, arepas, 
envueltos de choclo, fideos de trigo, hojaldres, tostadas, pasteles, o 
cualquier otro alimento hecho de mijo, sorgo, maíz, arroz, trigo, cebada, 
avena, etc.?
5 Specifically, tables containing parameter estimates of the 2PL models 
are shown in appendix D and in- and out-fit statistics in appendix E.
6 These samples could be considered on the small side for 2PL Rasch 
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analysis, which might lead to biased estimates (De Ayala, 2009). 
However, they are not problematically small for the purpose of this 
paper, since we do not rely on precise estimates of alphas and betas 
to draw our conclusions. Furthermore, model tests show only small 
differences with 1PL models, for which a sample size of 100 is already 
considered informative (appendix G).
7 We were not able to identify the project. Respondents were most likely 
referring to the “Piscicultura Sostenible para la Amazonía” project 
executed by the Centro Lianas (www.centrolianas.org).
8 Results available from the authors upon request.
9 In this paper, we assumed HDDS measures household food access, 
following the stated intention of its developers (Swindale and Bilinsky, 
2006). Evidence supporting this claim is limited, warranting further 
research.
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Abstract
Farm certification is rapidly becoming a sine qua non for access to specialty 
coffee markets. At the centre of these changes are smallholder coffee producers, 
responsible for 80% of global coffee production. Although rural households are 
known to depend on more than agricultural production alone, the literature on 
specialty coffee and certification has rather narrowly focused on coffee income 
and production. In this study, broader impacts on livelihood strategies are 
explicitly taken into account. Household income was decomposed into categories 
corresponding to specific income-generating activities and coffee income was 
broken down into price, yield and area effects. Results show that coffee certification 
encourages farmers to specialize in coffee production, increasing coffee income 
but not total household income, at least not in the short run. The time and effort 
required to attain the higher coffee income offered by certified production means 
farmers have to give up other activities. This substitution effect reduces out the 
effect on total income, which might suggest the additional labour effort required 
for certified coffee production reduces time spent on other activities, reducing 
income from these sources.   
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Introduction
Specialty coffee is considered to include all coffees that are differentiated, which 
means they are able to earn a premium (ICO et al., 2000; Ponte, 2002). Daviron 
and Ponte (2005) distinguish three types of differentiation: based on in-person 
service, material, or symbolic attributes. Only differentiation by material and 
symbolic attributes affect producers, as in-person service value can only be 
created at the point of consumption through interaction between provider and 
consumer and among consumers. Material attributes in the case of coffee relate to 
its intrinsic quality, whereas symbolic attributes are created through indications of 
geographical origin or sustainability labels. This latter group - coffee differentiated 
based on any kind of certification or label - is often referred to as sustainable 
coffee (Kolk, 2013; Raynolds, 2009). 
Differentiation of coffee based on symbolic attributes started in the late 1970s 
and 1980s, when civil society movements started challenging the image of 
coffee as a tropical commodity by starting to sell fair trade and organic coffees 
out of alternative trade shops. To maintain differentiation and allow entry into 
mainstream markets, their ideals on social and environmental issues were 
formalized into labels and corresponding certifications (Raynolds, 2000). This 
formalization process coincided with increased popular consumption of coffee 
beverages differentiated by preparation method and often distributed through 
dedicated sales outlets, the so-called ‘Latte revolution’ (Ponte, 2002). More 
recently, single origin coffees are entering the market, often sold through specialty 
coffee houses. 
Few statistics are available on the market share of specialty coffee, but those that 
do exist indicate its share is large and growing rapidly. In 2012, specialty coffee 
represented 37% of sales by volume and 50% by value in the United States (SCAA, 
2012). Globally, sustainable coffee sales in terms of volume increased by 433% in 
the period 2004-09 (Potts et al., 2010). At current growth rates, sustainable coffee 
is expected to grow to 20-25% of the market by 2015 (ITC, 2011). This trend is 
likely to accelerate with the increasing participation of big retailers (Daviron and 
Vagneron, 2011; Elder et al., 2014). 
Worldwide an estimated 26 million people are employed by the coffee sector, 
many of whom are smallholder farmers depending primarily on coffee to make 
a living (ICC, 2010; UNCTAD, 2003). The emergent pervasiveness of sustainable 
coffee has led to numerous studies comparing certified with non-certified chains 
and comparing different certifications in terms of (farm-gate) price, yield, profits, 
or production costs (Barham and Weber, 2012; Valkila, 2009; Weber, 2011) or 
analysing the impact of certification on outcome indicators other than income, 
such as education (Méndez et al., 2010; Ruben and Fort, 2012; Ruben et al., 2009) 
and vulnerability (Bacon, 2005; Bacon et al., 2014). These studies are characterized 
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by their focus on coffee production and income, and their analytical dependence 
on mean comparison, often enriched with qualitative evidence.
Although the relationship between certifications and coffee income is of interest in 
itself, most coffee producers cannot survive from coffee production alone (Bacon 
et al., 2008; Forero Álvarez and Furio, 2010). Rural households across the world 
depend on a broad set of income-generating activities to sustain their livelihoods 
(Davis et al., 2010; Ellis, 1998, 2000; Reardon et al., 2001). This importance of 
income apart from coffee production is corroborated by Barham et al. (2011), who 
show that even relatively specialised coffee farmers selling into specialty coffee 
markets obtain higher returns from diversification into labour markets. Recent 
work conducted in Nicaragua shows limited investment in capital for coffee 
production, especially among small-scale producers with diversified livelihoods 
(Donovan and Poole, 2014). If access to specialty markets allows producers to 
diversify into lucrative income-generating activities outside of coffee production, 
a focus on its relationship with coffee income alone will underestimate its impact. 
In this paper we will take a first step towards measuring the relationship between 
access to specialty markets and livelihood strategies, based on a group of small-
scale coffee producers in the south of Colombia that is strongly affected by changes 
in the coffee market. To show the extent of income diversification into activities 
beyond coffee production, current income portfolios of these coffee producers 
will be discussed in some detail. Subsequently, based on factors derived from 
the livelihood literature, barriers and opportunities driving observed income 
diversification strategies of coffee producers are identified, focusing on the 
effect of farm certification. Overall income effects and impact pathways are also 
considered. In the implications section, our findings are placed in the broader 
context of agricultural development and poverty alleviation and implications for 
policy makers are discussed. 
Background
Coffee in Colombia
Coffee is grown throughout the hilly and mountainous areas of Colombia by over 
563,000 mostly small-scale coffee producers. Colombia is one of the largest coffee 
producers in the world and uniquely positioned to benefit from the increasing 
demand for specialty coffee. In 2012, the year of our study, it ranked as the fourth 
largest overall producer and the second largest in Arabica coffee (ITC, 2012). For 
Colombian milds, the highest value category defined by the international coffee 
organisation (ICO), it is the largest producer. The high quality of Colombian 
coffee can be attributed to its high agroecological diversity, its location close to 
the equator, and the consistent institutional support for coffee farmers. 
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The Colombian Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD) has 
several active programs on agricultural extension and income support of coffee 
producers. Agricultural extension consists of credit support and training in 
agronomy and farm management. There is a dedicated policy to help producers take 
the steps required to have their coffee qualified as specialty, to capture associated 
price premiums.1 The income support program was re-branded Protección al 
Ingreso Cafetero (PIC) after strikes of coffee producers during the price slump 
in early 2013. When the domestic coffee price, as published daily by the national 
federation of coffee producers (FNC), is below the minimum price specified in the 
program at the moment of sale, producers are eligible for a fixed subsidy pay-out 
per kilo of coffee sold. All these support programs are implemented by the FNC, 
a semi-governmental organisation founded in 1927 which represents all coffee 
producers.2 FNC buying offices are densely scattered throughout Colombia’s 
coffee regions, providing a guaranteed market for all coffee offered for sale.
The department of Nariño, in the southwest of Colombia, is particularly well-
suited for growth of high quality specialty coffee. Although only 3% of Colombia’s 
coffee is produced here, it has the potential to produce coffee of exceptional quality 
because of its unique agro-ecological conditions, allowing coffee to be grown at 
extreme altitudes (Oberthür et al., 2011). In the 2010 Colombian Cup of Excellence 
competition, producers from this department claimed the first six spots and eight 
of the top ten3. Nariño is one of the fastest growing coffee regions in Colombia, 
with hectares planted equalling or surpassing those in the traditional Colombian 
coffee lands around Medellin (Rueda and Lambin, 2013). There are over 30,000 
coffee producers in the region (FNC, 2010), most of whom are poor smallholders 
producing coffee for the commodity market (Garcia, 2003).
 
Access to specialty markets
When considering the group of specialty coffees differentiated based on 
sustainability labels, a distinction can be made between third-party labels and 
private labels. Third party labels such as Fair Trade, Organic, Bird Friendly and 
Rainforest Alliance are mostly mission-driven (Raynolds et al., 2007). They are also 
considered more legitimate (Gereffi et al., 2001). Private labels such as Starbucks’ 
C.A.F.E. practices and Nestlé’s Nespresso AAA certification are primarily aimed 
at ensuring a minimum quality of their coffee supply (Elder et al., 2014). The line 
between mission-driven and quality-driven standards is blurring4 (Kolk, 2013; 
Raynolds et al., 2007; Raynolds, 2009), which results in a corresponding blurring 
of the distinction between coffee differentiated based on symbolic and material 
attributes. Companies are increasingly using labels to manage quality (Elder et 
al., 2014). The future of labels appears to be in increasing material quality. Price 
premiums unrelated to intrinsic quality are expected to dissipate as labels become 
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mainstream (de Janvry et al., 2010). Coffee certifications are now so common 
that they are becoming an entry requirement for access to upscale differentiated 
markets (Daviron and Vagneron, 2011; Elder et al., 2014; Raynolds, 2009). 
On the producer level, it is important to distinguish between farm certification 
and certified sales. Not all coffee produced at certified farms receives a premium 
price, meaning far more certified coffee is produced than sold (Kolk, 2013). This 
situation is also prevalent in the field in Colombia (Table 5.1). Just over half of 
the interviewed households held farm certification. Having farm certification by 
no means guaranteed receiving price premiums: only 57% of certified farmers 
sold any coffee into certified marketing channels, and even fewer farmers (37%) 
sold all their coffee into specialty markets. Which and how many farmers are 
able to sell coffee into certified channels in any given year depends on demand, 
global supply of certified coffee, and quality, factors which are only partially under 
farmer control. Although having farm certification was no guarantee for certified 
sales (evidenced by the large number of certified farms which could not or only 
to some extent sell in certified markets), it certainly served as a prerequisite for 
access: only 3 farmers without farm certification (1%) were able to sell coffee into 
specialty markets. 
Although participation into certification schemes is voluntary in principle, in 
practice it is often the buyers who select farmers. This was certainly the case for the 
most prevalent certifications in our study region, C.A.F.E. Practices and Nespresso 
AAA.5 Starbucks started with C.A.F.E. Practices in 2004 (Starbucks, 2004, 2014) 
and told all their suppliers preference would be given to those involved in the 
program. Within a year 25% of suppliers had signed up (Alvarez et al., 2010). 
Empresas de Nariño, the local Starbucks supplier, was among the first to sign up, 
starting verification of farmers in 2004. The Nespresso AAA certification was 
developed in 2003 and started cooperating with the FNC in 2005. Nespresso buys 
all its Colombian coffee through the FNC. The local chapters in the departments 
of Nariño and Cauca were the first to sign up (Alvarez et al., 2010). Adoption was 
fast: the number of participating farmers in the departments increased from 500 
in 2006 to 28,000 in 2013 (Nespresso, 2014).
The rapid growth in demand for specialty coffee has led buyers to rapidly increase 
the number of certified farmers. In Nariño, this has led buyers to go into more 
Table 5.1. Certified sales versus certified production
Certified sales Certified production No certification
None 113 43% 244 99%
Some 52 20% 1 0%
Only 98 37% 2 1%
Total 263 100% 247 100%
131
 The effect of specialty coffee certification on household livelihood strategies 
remote coffee producing areas in search of more farmers, a process made possible 
by the successful reduction in guerrilla activity in the region (Ávila et al., 2014; 
Vargas and Caruso, 2014). At the start of 2012, when interviews were conducted, 
the various guerrilla groups active in Nariño had been pushed back to remote 
rural areas. 
This pattern is clearly visible in the prevalence of certified farms (Figure 5.1 and 
Table 5.2). In the northern municipalities of La Unión and Taminango, almost 
Figure 5.1. Location of certified and non-certified farms
Table 5.2. Farm certification and size by municipality
Municipality % certified Farm (ha) Coffee (ha)
La Union 98% 2.4 0.7
Taminango 99% 2.5 0.7
La Florida 53% 1.5 0.7
El Tambo 26% 2.5 0.4
Buesaco 33% 3.1 0.5
Chachagui 24% 2.5 0.5
Linares 5% 1.6 0.6
Samaniego 25% 1.2 0.9
Average 52% 2.0 0.6
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all farms have been certified, whereas in the southern municipalities of Linares 
and Samaniego less than a quarter of farms hold certification. Certification rates 
in the central region are between these extremes. However, there is no clear 
observed pattern in farm size or specialization in coffee production between 
regions. Differences in certification rates between regions are not explained by 
easily observable farm characteristics. Rather, they appear to be driven primarily 
by the region in which farms are located. 
Data
The department of Nariño can be divided into three distinct geological zones: the 
pacific coast, the Andes, and the Amazon basin. The Andean zone is the most 
densely populated – this is where coffee is grown (De la Hoz, 2007). In eight of the 
municipalities with the highest concentration of coffee production – La Union, 
Taminango, La Florida, El Tambo, Chachaguï, Buesaco, Linares, Samaniego - 
interviews were held with a total of 510 coffee-producing households in April-May 
20126 (Figure 5.2). Out of 510 interviewees, 165 were female (32%) and 345 male 
(68%). These producers were selected through stratified random sampling from a 
list of coffee producers made available by the FNC, with stratification based on the 
number of coffee producers per municipality. In Colombia, every coffee producer 
is eligible for membership of the FNC. Although registration is not mandatory, 
practically all producers are members, as all governmental benefits including 
purchasing guarantees, minimum prices, income support and subsidized inputs 
and credit are distributed through the FNC. Most interviews were held with the 
head of the household. When the head of the household was not available, his or 
her closest relative was interviewed.
Interviews were conducted by trained local enumerators using a structured 
questionnaire developed by the Centro International de Agricultura Tropical 
(CIAT), a CGIAR centre based in Cali, Colombia. Based on this questionnaire, 
a detailed protocol was developed which was used to train the enumerators 
during a two-week training course including field trials. Surveys contained 
questions on household composition, farm characteristics, household income, 
and access to financial services. For each household member, age, years of 
education, and main occupation were recorded. Collected information on farm 
characteristics included land ownership and usage, as well as production, prices, 
income from farm sales and home consumption. Emphasis was placed on coffee 
production and commercialization. Raw data was cleaned and operationalized 
by the corresponding author, in cooperation with Martha Del Rio and Alexander 
Buritica Casanova from CIAT. Upon processing the information, production for 
home consumption was valued at farm gate prices and added to on-farm income. 
Income from other sources, including labour income, pensions, transfers, and 
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subsidies was recorded, and cross-verified with the stated occupation of household 
members. The final part of the survey concerned access to and use of financial 
services.
Interviews were conducted at the farm house, which allowed enumerators to 
register the GPS coordinates of each homestead. These coordinates were used to 
create the variable distance to nearest city. Distances from households to cities 
with over 10,000 inhabitants were calculated using cost distance algorithms, 
taking into account land cover, elevation, and the transportation network with 
assigned velocities (Elvidge et al., 1997; Small, 2004). 
Income diversification
Rural households obtain income from a wide variety of sources: diversification 
is the norm (Davis et al., 2010; Ellis, 1998). In this regard, coffee producers in 
Nariño are no exception. Table 5.3 shows their income distribution over different 
sources, grouped into income from self-employment, wages, and transfers. 
Self-employment included income from farming, split into income from coffee 
production and farm income from other crops and animals, and income from 
self-employment outside of the agricultural sector. Wage income was grouped 
into agricultural and non-agricultural income, where agricultural income was 
primarily obtained from manual labour, often paid per day (‘jornaleros’). Non-
agricultural wage income included formal jobs for government or the private sector 
as well as informal jobs such as driving a bus. Transfer income was subdivided 
based on whether it derived from government (public) or private sources. The 
most important source of public transfers in our sample were pensions.
The first column in the table shows the relative importance of each income 
source for the sample as a whole. Coffee was by far the largest source of income 
Figure 5.2. Study area: the Department of Nariño, Colombia
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in the sample (46%), which was not surprising given that our sample consisted of 
households identifying themselves as coffee producers (‘caficultores’). What was 
surprising was the high share of agricultural versus non-agricultural income: a 
total of 77% of all income was derived from agriculture, most of it generated at the 
own farm. These figures indicate a relatively high dependency on farming income. 
Earlier studies on rural Colombia found off-farm income to contribute far more 
substantially. Deininger and Olinto (2001) found farm profits to contribute only 
56% to total income, while the contribution of agricultural and non-agricultural 
wages (30%) and nonfarm enterprise profits  and non-earned income (12.5%) were 
higher. Echeverri (1999) found off-farm income to contribute as much as 50%. 
Because both studies were based on a representative sample of rural households 
in Colombia, the relative importance of on-farm income in our sample might be 
typical for coffee producers, typical for Nariño, or typical for coffee producers in 
Nariño. 
Not all households obtained income from all sources, nor did they obtain equal 
amounts from each source. The distribution of income per income source over 
households is shown by Gini coefficients (column 3). High Gini coefficients 
indicate the concentration of income from the respective source among a small 
part of the population. Almost all households obtained on-farm income from 
either coffee7 or other agricultural production (column 2), but this income was 
distributed unevenly across the population. In contrast, only half of interviewed 
households received income from agricultural wage income, but this income 
was distributed far more evenly. The main explanation for this difference was the 
low remuneration of agricultural wage labour, evidenced by its small correlation 
Table 5.3. Income distribution between and within income sources
Income source
% of 
total 
income Use % GINI Corr
 Avg.  
Income 
Share
SD of 
Avg. Inc. 
Share Var %
Self-employed
Agriculture 20 95 0.61 0.40 28 0.24 0.12
Coffee 46 92 0.62 0.80 44 0.29 0.51
Non-Agriculture 4 11 0.52 0.40 27 0.15 0.06
Wage
Agriculture 11 51 0.44 0.30 34 0.22 0.05
Non-Agriculture 12 19 0.55 0.70 36 0.23 0.23
Transfer
Public 5 47 0.64 0.27 12 0.16 0.05
Private 0 1 0.43 -0.05 38 0.31 0.00
Total income 100 100 0.54 1.00 100 1.00
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with income (column 4). This does not mean it was not an important source 
of income; those households engaging in off-farm agricultural wage labour on 
average received 34% of their income from the activity (column 5). However, non-
agricultural wage labour was far more attractive. Although it contributed a similar 
share to total income for those active in it, 36% on average, its high correlation 
with total income shows how much better off these households were. The better 
remuneration of non-agricultural compared to agricultural wage labour is 
commonly encountered in the literature (Lanjouw and Shariff, 2002; Reardon, 
1997; Reardon et al., 2001). 
The final column shows total income variation originating from each source. 
Coffee is by far the biggest contributor to total income variation, due to the large 
share of coffee income in total income and its unequal distribution between 
households. The second biggest share of total income variation is explained by 
non-agricultural wage labour. Although only 19% of households engage in this 
activity, it explains 23% of total income variation. 
The differences in income-earning portfolios between income strata is presented 
in Table 5.4, which shows the average income share of different income-earning 
activities per income quintile. Farmers with higher incomes obtain a larger share 
of their income from coffee production, with the share increasing from 33.0% for 
the lowest income quintile to 52.1% for the highest income quintile. The share of 
farming income remains stable over income groups; the increasing importance 
of coffee comes at the cost of crop and livestock income. This stable dependency 
on farming is not typical. Generally, the contribution of farming falls with 
income (Reardon et al., 2001). Dependency on the agricultural sector is higher 
for the first quintiles, but slowly falls with income. Agricultural wages contribute 
a particularly large share of income for the second (26.1%) and third (22.1%) 
quintile. The dependency of low income households on agricultural wages might 
be an indication of push diversification, born of necessity rather than preference 
(Barrett et al., 2001; Ellis, 2000). Employment outside of the agricultural sector 
is far more important for higher income groups. Although it contributes only 
Table 5.4. Income by source and quintile
Income 
quintile
Self-employed Wage Transfer
Agri Coffee Non-agri Agri Non-agri Public Private
I 35.4 33.0 0.0 19.1 1.6 9.4 1.6
II 27.1 32.6 3.3 26.1 4.0 6.4 0.5
III 26.5 39.2 2.9 22.1 4.6 4.1 0.5
IV 23.4 45.1 3.9 12.9 11.5 3.2 0.0
V 18.3 52.1 4.6 6.3 13.0 5.7 0.0
Total 26.1 40.4 2.9 17.3 6.9 5.8 0.5
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1.6% to total income in the first quintile, it contributes 13.0% for the fifth quintile. 
Such increasing importance of non-agricultural wages for higher income groups 
is also common in other parts of the world (Barrett et al., 2001; Davis et al., 2010). 
The shares of income obtained from self-employment outside of agricultural 
production and private transfers is low and do not differ much across income 
groups. Public transfers are more important for lower income groups. 
Econometric approach
To assess whether and how having access to specialty markets influenced 
household diversification strategies, a distinction was made between the effect 
on the decision to undertake a certain activity and the effect on the amount of 
income derived from each activity. Both the participation decision and the 
income decision depend directly on the return to labour in each activity. Labour 
will be allocated to those activities with the highest return, taking into account 
decreasing returns to labour in each activity. Imperfect markets create differences 
between the market wage and shadow wage. The size of this difference depends on 
household-specific transaction costs and household asset endowments (de Janvry 
et al., 1991; de Janvry and Sadoulet, 2006; Dercon and Krishnan, 1996; Sadoulet et 
al., 1998). In order to accurately estimate the effect of access to specialty markets, 
factors influencing the shadow wage were controlled for. The estimated regression 
of the participation decision had the following form: 
(1)
Where dij is a binary variable indicating that household i participated in activity 
j. Activities were defined as belonging to one of five groups: on-farm agricultural 
production other than coffee, on-farm coffee production, self-employment 
outside of agriculture, and wage income from agricultural and non-agricultural 
activities. The estimated regression for the amount of income obtained from each 
activity was similar, differing only in its dependent variable:
(2)
Where yij is the amount of income obtained by household i from activity j. The 
main variable of interest in both equations is Ci, which is a binary variable equal 
to one for households with farm certification, which equalled access to specialty 
markets in the study region. The certification is a prerequisite for access, but not 
a guarantee: of those households with certification – access – almost half did not 
have any certified sales (Table 1). Xi and Zi are vectors of control variables known 
to influence the labour allocation decision through affecting the shadow wage. 
The vector Xi included important assets of rural households: land and labour8, 
their relative size - measured by the land/labour ratio - and level of education. 
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To measure the importance of credit constraints, the amount of transfer income 
was included. The variable Zi contains the distance to the nearest city to control 
for market access costs (Lanjouw et al., 2001). Details of variable construction 
and descriptive statistics are provided in Appendix B. Finally, αj is an activity-
specific intercept and εij a cross-equation error term with a multivariate normal 
distribution, allowing error terms to correlate between activities. 
The estimate for farm certification, our variable of interest, reflects the difference in 
income diversification of two households with the same observed characteristics 
in Xi and Zi, but with one of those households having farm certification. This 
is not necessarily identical to a household’s expected income diversification 
when it is selected to participate in certification and accepts. In the first case, the 
unobservable factors – which reside in the error term - affecting the diversification 
choice are not assumed to be the same between the two households, while in the 
causal interpretation the unobservables are kept unchanged. In other words, in 
the latter case the ceteris paribus condition includes the unobservables.
This difference in interpretation exists if a relevant variable, which is correlated 
with the included regressors, is omitted from the model. In other words, if there 
are factors which influence the likelihood of a household having farm certification 
which are not captured by the variables currently included in the model. In that 
case, a causal interpretation of the farm certification variable requires a different 
estimation method. A possible solution is an instrumental variable approach. An 
instrument is a variable that is correlated with the endogenous regressor (relevant) 
but can be assumed to be uncorrelated with the model’s error term (valid).
Instrument relevance can be tested directly. It requires that the partial correlation 
between the instrument and farm certification is non-zero, i.e. that the instrument 
is significant in the instrumental equation. Instrument validity cannot be tested, 
making the logic explaining the independence of the instrument with the model’s 
error term all the more important. 
Under the assumption that the instrument is valid, the endogeneity of certification 
can be tested by comparing the regular and the instrumental variable estimators 
for beta (Hausman, 1978). This was done for both the probit and tobit equations 
using the same auxiliary regression, often referred to as the Durbin – Wu – 
Hausman test (Verbeek, 2012). The auxiliary regression was estimated explaining 
farm certification by all the regressors from equation (1) and (2), Xi and Zi, as well 
as the instruments:
(3)
The saved residuals from this regression, ûi, were added to the models of interest, 
giving equations of the following form:
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(4)
(5)
If ωj = 0, Ci is exogenous. This was formally tested with standard t-tests on ωj in 
regressions (4) and (5). 
Equation 1 was estimated with the multivariate probit model developed by 
Cappellari and Jenkins (2003), using the Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane (GHK) 
smooth recursive conditioning simulator (Börsch-Supan and Hajivassiliou, 
1993; Keane, 1994). This model is considered an improvement over econometric 
models previously used to explain participation decisions, which analysed only 
one activity at the time. Estimating the equations as a system is more efficient 
when error terms are correlated. For the same reason, equations 2, 4, and 5 
were estimated using a Stata package developed by Roodman (2009) based on 
the same GHK simulator. Tobit models were used when the dependent variable 
was income, which is continuous, but zero for a substantial part of the range, as 
is the case for households not obtaining any income from a particular income 
source (Amemiya, 1984; Tobin, 1958). Robust standard errors were used for all 
estimations.
Instruments
If there is evidence that farm certification was determined by factors which 
were not included – an omitted variable problem – in the vector of control 
variables, a two-stage instrumental variable approach would be required for 
causal interpretations of its effect on income diversification. However, such an 
approach only outperforms simpler one-stage estimations when used instruments 
are relevant and valid (Wooldridge, 2010). Instrument validity is particularly 
hard to establish, as it requires a variable – ideally several – which affected farm 
certification but had no independent effect on income diversification. 
The historical pattern of farm certification following security improvements as 
the army pushed back extra-legal armed groups, was described in section 2.2. 
Unfortunately, no reliable security data was available at a small enough scale to 
be used as an instrument. Moreover, no data was collected on the year in which 
farmers received certification, which made it impossible to demonstrate the 
relationship quantitatively. There was the further concern that guerrilla activity 
might have a direct effect on income diversification - by increasing the cost of 
accessing the market and hence encouraging households to become more self-
reliant – making the instrument invalid. 
In addition to the pattern of certification following security, the high quality of 
coffee in the region has led coffee buyers to provide their exporters with strong 
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incentives to certify all supplying farmers. As described in section 2.2,  it is traders 
who select farmers, not farmers who independently decide that certification might 
be a good way to obtain higher returns. Exporters selling to Starbucks, the largest 
buyer in the region, receive financial incentives based on the share of supplying 
farmers which are certified as well as the threat to be excluded from the supply 
chain if their effort was considered to fall short (Alvarez et al., 2010; Starbucks, 
2014). This pressure to certify is not unique to Starbucks and expected to intensify 
(Elder et al., 2014; Kolk, 2013). Although farmers are certified as rapidly as possible, 
this does not mean the share of certified farmers in a region goes from zero to one 
hundred overnight. Which factors might make farmers more likely to be selected 
for certification while not affecting income diversification directly? More accurate 
modelling of this farmer selection process would require trader-level data. In this 
study, only farm-level data was available, requiring identification of a different 
type of variables which might affect the selection process independently of the 
diversification decision. 
Two sets of variables were identified which might meet the validity criterion. 
Regional dummies at the municipal level - whose relation with certification and 
farm size is shown in Table 5.2, and three variables indicative of the degree of social 
integration of a household. First, the number of years the household had been 
living in the village. Second, whether or not the households had been displaced 
by violence. Third, whether the head of the household considered him- or herself 
native to the community. The hypothesis was that the better a household’s social 
integration, the more likely they were to be selected by traders for certification, 
because of increased visibility, familiarity, and trust. 
Results and discussion
Instrument relevance and endogeneity tests
Instrument relevance was tested with standard t-tests on the instruments in the 
first-stage equation, reported in Table 5.5. Columns 1 and 2 show first-stage 
equations of the multivariate probit and tobit models; columns 3 and 4 show 
results of the auxiliary regression (equation 3). Results show that of the social 
integration dummies, only the residency years variable was significant. It had 
the expected sign: the longer households had been living in the village, the more 
likely they were to hold farm certification. The municipality dummies were 
jointly significant. Results show households in La Union and Taminango were 
significantly more likely, and households in Linares significantly less likely to hold 
farm certification. Control variables, with the exception of household size, added 
little explanatory power.
The insignificant instruments were removed from the auxiliary regression in 
140
Strange bedfellows? Big business meets small farmer  Wytse Vellema
column 4, since they failed to meet the relevance criterion. The regional dummies 
were jointly significant. The saved residuals from this regression were included 
in the equations 4 and 5, whose output is presented in Table 5.6. Under the 
assumption that the instruments are valid - not correlated with the error terms 
in the diversification equations – standard t-tests on the coefficients on û show 
whether farm certification is exogenous. Results indicate that this is not the case 
for only one of the dependent variables in the multivariate tobit regression: coffee 
income. It may be considered exogenous for all dependents in the multivariate 
probit model, and for the other dependents in the multivariate tobit model. 
Table 5.5. Instrument relevance: certification status
Equation: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Instruments
Residency years 0.014*** 0.009** 0.014*** 0.014***
(3.49) (2.17)   (3.32) (3.30)   
Displaced dummy 0.081 0.090   0.135             
(0.15) (0.15)   (0.20)             
Native dummy -0.085 0.036   -0.038             
(-0.16) (0.06)   (-0.06)             
Municipality dummies
Chachagui -0.440 -0.320   -0.590 -0.606   
(-0.95) (-0.78)   (-1.35) (-1.40)   
El Tambo -0.297 -0.231   -0.270 -0.290   
(-0.77) (-0.59)   (-0.64) (-0.69)   
La Florida 0.484 0.493   0.480 0.466   
(1.32) (1.37)   (1.24) (1.21)   
La Union 2.761*** 3.697*** 2.691*** 2.658***
(6.06) (6.78)   (5.25) (5.23)   
Linares -0.946* -0.726   -1.145** -1.152** 
(-1.95) (-1.55)   (-2.30) (-2.32)   
Samaniego -0.032 0.141   -0.107 -0.078   
(-0.07) (0.34)   (-0.24) (-0.18)   
Taminango 2.781*** 2.493*** 2.657*** 2.640***
(5.11) (4.63)   (4.52) (4.51)   
Constant -1.429** -1.338*  -1.368 -1.362***
(-2.03) (-1.69)   (-1.62) (-2.69)   
Control variables yes yes yes yes
Method mv-probit mv-tobit probit probit
Note: n = 495. Dependent variable is farm certification. Baseline municipality is Buesaco. T-statistics are shown in brackets. 
Stars denote significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent level.
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These results support the narrative of farm certification described in section 2.2, 
which suggests that the rapid pace at which farmers are being certified in the 
wake of security improvements, leaves little space for farmers to self-select into 
certification or for exporters to be overly selective. However, given the relative 
weakness of the instruments and their strenuous validity, these test-results should 
be interpreted with some care. On the other hand, if these results were wrong, 
the same weakness of the instruments would make correcting the apparent 
endogeneity equally problematic. Assuming the test results are valid, there is 
no evidence for endogeneity in the probit regressions and some evidence for 
endogeneity in the tobit regressions. Keeping in mind the pitfalls, for the probit 
models only the non-instrumented output will be presented and discussed; for the 
tobit models both the regular, non-instrumented, and the instrumented (second-
stage) output will be presented. 
 
Participation decision
Various model specification tests were performed to determine the estimation 
method, check for necessary variable transformations and heteroskedasticity. 
The reported Chi-square test rejects a series of independent probit regressions 
in favour of the multivariate probit model used, supporting the assertion that 
activity choices are made jointly rather than separately. The estimated correlation 
coefficients of the residuals presented in Table 5.7 show that this is due to the 
relationship between coffee production (equation 2) and wage labour (equation 
4 and 5).
Further model checks indicated potential non-linearity in the variables land/
labour ratio and land holdings. An expanded model including squared terms 
Table 5.6. Durbin - Wu - Hausman endogeneity tests
Self-employed Wage
Agri Coffee Non-agri Agri Non-agri
Multivariate probit
û -0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.3
(-0.40) (0.21) (0.73) (0.48) (1.05)
Other variables yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes***
Multivariate tobit
û -1202.3   8666.5*** 1676.2   -164.2   4405.7   
(-1.59)   (5.78)   (0.59)   (-0.24)   (1.31)   
Other variables yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes***
Note: Excerpt from regression output. Only relevant variables are shown.
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of both variables was rejected in favour of a model containing only the squared 
term of land holdings; only results of the final model are shown. Comparisons 
of regular with robust standard errors showed little difference between the two. 
Robust standard errors are reported. 
Table 5.8 shows the factors driving participation in five different categories of 
income-earning activities: on-farm agricultural production other than coffee, 
coffee production, self-employment outside of agriculture, and wage labour in and 
outside of the agricultural sector. Coffee producers with farm certification were 
more likely to currently receive income from coffee or other on-farm agricultural 
production. Although the size and significance of the coefficient is largest for 
obtaining coffee income, this effect should be interpreted with caution: smaller 
coffee producers are less able to spread renovations - resulting in zero coffee 
production for at least two years on renovated plots - over time, and therefore are 
more likely to report zero coffee income. 
Households with more education were more likely to participate in non-
agricultural activities, either through self-employment or wage labour. Education 
reduced the likelihood of participation in agricultural wage labour and had no 
effect on the participation decision into coffee or other on-farm agricultural 
production. This clearly showed the importance of education in overcoming 
barriers to entry into higher return activities and reducing the need to engage in 
the lowest return activity, agricultural wage labour. 
The variables land/labour ratio, land holdings, and land holdings square were 
mean-centered, such that the coefficient on land holdings measures the effect 
of a one-hectare increase for a family with average land and labour holdings 
(Wooldridge, 2006). Such a family has a little over 2 hectares of land and an adult 
equivalent household size of 3.3. At these values, an additional hectare of land 
decreases participation in agricultural wage labour, signals push diversification 
(Barrett et al., 2001; Ellis, 2000). Households with land holdings too small to 
generate sufficient income have to work on other farms, even if obtained wages 
Table 5.7. Estimated correlation coefficients of the residuals
Equation: (2) (3) (4) (5)
(1) -0.055 -0.086 -0.055 0.083
 (-1.19)   (-0.87)   (-0.79)   (1.37)
(2)  0.051 -0.120*  0.127** 
  (0.77) (-1.93)   (2.28)
(3)   0.128 0.107
   (1.63) (1.07)
(4)    -0.025
    (-0.36)   
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are low.
Household size was positively related to engagement in agricultural production 
and agricultural wage labour. All households in our sample owned land, such 
that it is likely that excess labour which could not find off-farm agricultural 
employment was absorbed into on-farm agricultural production (Sadoulet et al., 
1998). The importance of household size in explaining participation in on- and off-
farm agricultural activities might indicate a shortage of better rewarded income-
earning opportunities, including a shortage of opportunities in agricultural wage 
labour.
Households living further away from cities are more likely to be active in 
agriculture, both on- and off-farm, evidenced by the significant coefficient on 
distance to city. Such households are also less likely to own their own business in 
sectors other than agriculture. However, the distance a households lives from a 
city does not affect the likelihood it participates in non-agricultural wage labour, 
which is counter to findings of Lanjouw et al. (2001) for Tanzania and Smith et 
Table 5.8. Participation in specific income-earning activities
Self-employed Wage
Agri Coffee Non-agri Agri Non-agri
Farm certification 0.602*** 1.292*** -0.063   -0.181   0.158   
(2.60)   (5.04)   (-0.41)   (-1.46)   (1.14)   
Education 0.013   0.021   0.062*** -0.064*** 0.091***
(0.43)   (0.86)   (2.75)   (-3.48)   (4.28)   
Land-labour ratio -0.003*  0.010*  -0.000   -0.001   0.007** 
(-1.81)   (1.77)   (-0.19)   (-0.76)   (2.31)   
Land holdings 0.174   0.071   0.032   -0.127*** 0.036   
(1.54)   (1.10)   (0.62)   (-3.04)   (0.75)   
Land holdings sq -0.013** -0.007   -0.003   0.007** 0.002   
(-2.00)   (-1.62)   (-1.02)   (2.21)   (0.69)   
HH size (AE) 0.158** -0.055   -0.012   0.357*** 0.049   
(2.16)   (-0.98)   (-0.23)   (7.09)   (1.02)   
Distance to city 0.211*** 0.071   -0.072   0.141*** -0.055   
(2.90)   (1.41)   (-1.49)   (3.93)   (-1.27)   
Transfer income 0.000   0.000   -0.000   -0.000** -0.000   
(1.16)   (1.46)   (-0.60)   (-2.28)   (-0.76)   
Constant 0.271   0.762*** -1.587*** -0.537*** -1.915***
(0.83)   (2.83)   (-5.86)   (-2.79)   (-7.65)   
Use % (Table 1) 95% 92% 11% 51% 19%
Note: Multivariate probit model. n = 495. T-statistics are shown in brackets. Stars denote significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent 
level.
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al. (2001) for Uganda, who found a negative relationship. It appears that travel 
distance did not deter those who were offered the opportunity to accept non-
agricultural employment. 
Households receiving transfer income were less likely to participate in agricultural 
wage labour, strengthening the image that it is an income source of last resort.
Overall, model results corroborate findings from elsewhere in the livelihood 
literature, which supported the model specification. All variables added 
explanatory power, shown by their significance for at least one category of the 
dependent variable. Model results were strongest for agricultural wage labour, 
which was in large part due to the equal distribution of this activity between 
households: 51% of households engaged in this activity. The model was far less 
powerful for activities with more unbalanced participation rates, as shown by the 
Use % shown in the bottom row of Table 8, simply because there was less variance 
to explain. 
Generated income
Using the amount of income generated by each activity instead of just the binary 
participation decision gave the model more explanatory power particularly 
for those income sources which were used by nearly all households, like coffee 
production. Model specification tests suggested possible non-linearities in the 
variables land holdings and distance to cities. Likelihood ratio tests suggested 
the superiority of the model containing only the squared term of land holdings, 
which was confirmed by Akaike and Bayesian Information Criteria. Thus, the 
final multivariate Tobit model (Table 5.9) contained the same variables as the 
multivariate probit model presented in the previous section.
Having farm certification was related negatively to income obtained from 
agriculture, positively to coffee income. It had the largest effect on coffee income, 
which it increased by over 6 million Colombian Pesos (COP), roughly equivalent 
to USD 3,500. This effect was substantial, given that average household income 
was 11 million COP, and supportive of earlier findings (Méndez et al., 2010; 
Ruben and Fort, 2012; Valkila, 2009). However, this was only the effect on income 
from coffee. Having farm certification reduced income from on-farm agricultural 
production labour, likely indicating re-allocation of resources away from this 
activity. Such re-allocation of labour is driven by substitution and income effects. As 
total household labour is fixed, increased returns to one activity cause households 
to substitute labour away from other activities. Households are most likely to 
substitute labour away from activities with low return or which are considered less 
‘satisfying’ (Chayanov, 1966). Income effects lead to an increased consumption of 
leisure, reducing overall hours worked. The negative impact on income from on-
farm agricultural production showed that substitution effects dominated income 
effects. Coffee income appeared to increase not only through higher prices and 
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yields in coffee production, but also through increased allocation of land and 
labour to its production, reducing the income from sources competing for these 
resources. This relationship was tested more formally in section 5.4 below.
Education increased income from coffee and non-agricultural activities; it was 
related negatively to income from agricultural wage labour. Its contribution to 
income was particularly large in activities outside of agriculture. The negative effect 
of education on agricultural wage labour is most likely due to the substitution of 
labour away from this activity. As education is measured by the number of years 
of education of the most educated household member, this negative relationship 
implied that households with more highly educated family members relied less on 
agricultural wage labour, an effect likely strengthened by the perceived low social 
status associated with the activity. 
Asset endowments - land/labour ratio, land holdings, household size - all had 
the expected effects. Land holdings increased agricultural income and coffee 
income but reduced income from agricultural wage labour. Households with 
more labour earned more from agricultural wage labour. Travel distance to the 
Table 5.9. Income obtained from specific income-earning activities
Self-employed Wage
Agri Coffee Non-agri Agri Non-agri
Farm certification -1072.9*** 6260.9*** -470.5   -261.5   1104.5   
(-2.84)   (8.00)   (-0.33)   (-0.77)   (0.65)   
Education 38.9   417.5*** 709.3*** -128.4** 1471.5***
(0.72)   (3.76)   (3.54)   (-2.53)   (5.79)   
Land-labour ratio -2.4   8.8   6.3   -4.5   21.8   
(-0.42)   (0.75)   (0.35)   (-0.61)   (1.17)   
Land holdings 1082.1*** 2254.9*** 328.2   -239.2*  802.1   
(8.23)   (8.34)   (0.67)   (-1.90)   (1.46)   
Land holdings sq -45.4*** -133.1*** -26.1   15.9*  4.7   
(-4.54)   (-6.43)   (-0.56)   (1.73)   (0.12)   
HH size (AE) -48.1   -185.8   -121.7   1125.5*** 623.8   
(-0.36)   (-0.68)   (-0.25)   (9.36)   (1.11)   
Distance to city -296.2*** -670.1*** -602.8   187.4*  -555.4   
(-2.73)   (-2.99)   (-1.44)   (1.94)   (-1.15)   
Transfer income 0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   -0.0   
(1.24)   (0.66)   (0.01)   (0.66)   (-0.54)   
Constant 1162.3*  -3722.0*** -15833.2*** -2706.5*** -27161.4***
(1.90)   (-2.96)   (-5.40)   (-4.74)   (-7.39)   
Note: Multivariate tobit model with incomes (‘000 COP) as dependent variables. model. n = 495. T-statistics are shown in 
brackets. Stars denote significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent level.
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nearest city reduced agricultural and coffee income, although the latter effect was 
not significant. Distance reduced the profitability of agricultural production by 
increasing transport costs. Transfer incomes had no effect on incomes from other 
sources.
Coefficients on variables other than farm certification are comparable between 
the one-stage and the two-stage models. Comparing the results of the multivariate 
tobit models with those of the probit model in section 5.2 shows a stark increase 
in the number of significant variables, particularly in the equations on income 
from agricultural and coffee production. The signs on the explanatory variables 
are as expected and in line with the literature. 
To alleviate concerns about endogeneity of the farm certification variable, a two-
stage multivariate tobit model was run (Table 5.10). The most substantial change 
with the one-stage model, shown in Table 5.9, is a large increase in the contribution 
of farm certification to coffee income, which increased from 6 million COP in the 
one-stage model to 10 million COP in the two-stage model. This is a tremendous 
increase, given that average total household income in the sample was 11 million 
Table 5.10. Income obtained from specific income-earning activities (instrumented)
Self-employed Wage
Agri Coffee Non-agri Agri Non-agri
Farm certification -1435.1*** 10384.0*** 580.5   -503.0   1886.2   
(-3.18)   (11.43)   (0.33)   (-0.96)   (0.88)   
Education 40.7   400.1*** 705.4*** -127.8** 1464.7***
(0.75)   (3.52)   (3.52)   (-2.52)   (5.77)   
Land-labour ratio -2.5   9.5   6.6   -4.6   21.9   
(-0.43)   (0.79)   (0.36)   (-0.62)   (1.17)   
Land holdings 1105.4*** 1981.0*** 269.4   -220.0*  749.3   
(8.34)   (7.12)   (0.54)   (-1.71)   (1.35)   
Land holdings sq -46.5*** -119.8*** -23.1   15.0   7.1   
(-4.63)   (-5.66)   (-0.50)   (1.62)   (0.18)   
HH size (AE) -42.1   -251.6   -148.2   1128.7*** 606.5   
(-0.32)   (-0.90)   (-0.30)   (9.38)   (1.08)   
Distance to city -306.9*** -544.0** -552.5   180.6*  -533.8   
(-2.82)   (-2.37)   (-1.31)   (1.86)   (-1.10)   
Transfer income 0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   -0.0   
(1.21)   (0.81)   (0.03)   (0.62)   (-0.52)   
Constant 1296.7** -5251.9*** -16259.8*** -2614.1*** -27375.1***
(2.10)   (-4.04)   (-5.42)   (-4.43)   (-7.32)   
Note: Two-stage multivariate tobit model with incomes (‘000 COP) as dependent variables. model. n = 495. T-statistics are 
shown in brackets. Stars denote significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent level.
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COP. Some caution is warranted in interpreting these values. The reliability of 
the two-stage model hinges on the quality of the instruments. Although the 
instruments were tested for relevance (Table 5.6), no such tests exist for validity. 
If there is an endogeneity problem and instruments had effects on income other 
than through farm certification, making them invalid, the coefficients in both the 
one-stage and two-stage model are biased (Hahn and Hausman, 2005). If there is 
no endogeneity problem, the one-stage model outperforms the two-stage model 
(Wooldridge, 2010).
 
Total income effects and impact pathways
Results from the multivariate probit and tobit models indicated farm certification 
changed the composition of income, increasing coffee income at the cost of other 
sources of income. However, from these results it was not clear whether overall 
income increased or decreased as a result of farm certification. That is the topic of 
Table 5.11. Total income effects and income pathways
Total 
income
Coffee 
income Price Yield
Land under 
coffee
Farm certification 0.37*** 2.09*** 1.48*** 1.26*** 0.51***
(4.68) (10.19) (6.79) (7.17) (8.74)   
Education 0.06*** 0.08*** 0.03 0.05** 0.01   
(5.54) (2.90) (1.00) (2.50) (1.56)   
Land-labour ratio 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00   
(0.91) (1.19) (0.90) (1.11) (1.24)   
Land holdings 0.26*** 0.37*** 0.10* 0.07 0.27***
(9.25) (5.98) (1.68) (1.39) (10.65)   
Land holdings sq -0.01*** -0.02*** -0.01 -0.01* -0.01***
(-6.59) (-4.27) (-1.61) (-1.72) (-6.26)   
HH size (AE) 0.06** -0.12* -0.08 -0.08 -0.02   
(2.01) (-1.68) (-1.07) (-1.35) (-1.26)   
Distance to city -0.11*** -0.02 0.11** -0.03 -0.03   
(-5.03) (-0.43) (2.06) (-0.68) (-1.57)   
Transfer income 7.63*** 5.20*** 7.00*** 4.75*** -1.05***
(62.02) (15.53) (19.80) (16.63) (-10.67)   
Constant 1296.7** -5251.9*** -16259.8*** -2614.1*** -27375.1***
(2.10)   (-4.04)   (-5.42)   (-4.43)   (-7.32)   
Adj. R-sq 0.329 0.256 0.094 0.116 0.407   
Note: n = 495. Dependent variables in logs. T-statistics are shown in brackets. Stars denote significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent 
level.
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this section. In addition, potential pathways causing the increased coffee income 
were investigated following the approach applied by Jones and Gibbon (2011) 
but breaking down their productivity variable into separate variables for yield 
and land. This approach was implemented by separately regressing price, yield, 
and land on the full set of explanatory variables. By taking logs, results could 
be interpreted additively.9 All regressions were run using Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) with robust standard errors.
Results are shown in Table 5.11. Farm certification increased overall income with 
37%. It increased coffee income far more substantially, more than tripling income 
from this source. Price, yield, and increasing the share of land planted with coffee 
all contribute to this income increase. Farm certification had a 1.48, 1.26 and 
0.51 log point effect on price, yield, and land under coffee, giving a combined 
effect of 3.25, exceeding the aggregate estimate of its effect on coffee income, 2.09. 
Price differentials were the most important cause of income differentials between 
certified and non-certified farmers, accounting for almost half of the income 
effect. Yield and increased use of land for coffee production accounted for 39% 
and 16% of the income increase.
 
Implications
Specialty coffee is rapidly growing in importance and its impact on smallholder 
coffee producers is tangible. Of the coffee producers interviewed in Nariño, over 
half had access to these specialty markets through farm certification. Although 
coffee was their most important income-generating activity, on average it 
contributed less than fifty per cent to household income. For poorer households, 
the income contribution of coffee was even less. These figures show the importance 
of considering the portfolio of income-generating activities when analysing 
the impact of access to specialty coffee markets, rather than focusing on coffee 
income alone. To analyse this impact, multivariate estimation techniques were 
employed, which explicitly allow activity choices to be taken jointly, rather than 
independently. Specification tests confirmed the validity of this approach. 
Results showed a large and significant effect of access to specialty markets 
on the agricultural activities coffee producers engage in as well as the amount 
of income derived from them. This relationship between activities indicates 
competition for household resources between coffee production and other 
activities. Farm certification increased coffee income at the expense of on-farm 
agricultural production. No evidence was found of farm certification encouraging 
diversification into activities other than coffee production, as did for example 
Barham and Weber (2012). Disaggregating the income effect shows it resulted 
from a combination of higher prices, higher yields, and increases in land area 
dedicated to coffee. 
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Increased allocation of household resources to coffee production resulting 
from farm certification indicates increasing farm-level specialisation. Such 
specialisation at producer level fits the established pattern of agricultural 
development and economic growth (Timmer, 1998), a pattern which also appears 
to hold for agricultural export-led growth like coffee production (Sanjuán-López 
and Dawson, 2010). Farm-level specialisation allows for the development of more 
effective market institutions, bringing down costs and increasing profitability 
within the local value chain. A factor found to constrain further specialisation 
is access to land. Current land holdings are insufficient to survive from coffee 
production alone (Forero Álvarez and Furio, 2010). However, there are few 
opportunities to buy additional land due to rigidities in the land market. In order 
for the land required for expansion to become available, opportunities need to 
be generated in off-farm activities, particularly in non-agricultural wage labour 
(Winters et al., 2010).
A factor strongly affecting participation in and income from non-agricultural 
activities is education. Education’s positive effect on incomes from almost all 
sources might be explained by it improving access to information (Pingali et al., 
2005). Furthermore, it has a positive effect by reducing dependency on agricultural 
wage labour, the least remunerated income-generating activity. 
An increased dependency on coffee production is not without risks. Coffee prices 
are nefariously volatile since the International Coffee Agreement was dissolved 
(Daviron and Ponte, 2005), negatively affecting especially farmers and small-
scale traders (Gilbert, 1996). This was made painfully clear by the severity of the 
so-called coffee crisis (Daviron and Ponte, 2005; ICO, 2003). Coffee, especially 
coffee arabica, is highly susceptible to contagious disease, the most well-known 
of which is coffee leaf rust (CLR) (McCook, 2006), which struck Colombia and 
Central America in the growing season of 2008-11 with disastrous consequences 
(Cristancho et al., 2012; ICO, 2013). Combating the disease requires chemicals 
which smallholders can ill afford, as money is needed for food (Morris et al., 2013). 
Moreover, CLR often kills coffee plants, requiring re-planting. New plants are 
frequently financed with borrowed money and take three to five years to become 
productive, creating financial shortfalls lasting many years. Smallholder farmers 
specialised in and thus heavily dependent on coffee production are unlikely to 
overcome such shocks without access to adequate insurance and credit facilities.
Certifications have become an integral part of agricultural value chains and their 
importance is likely to increase in the foreseeable future. The big question for 
policy makers is how certifications can help to attain rural development objectives. 
Potential positive impacts of certification include increased value creation at 
farm level and, through specialisation, to regional value chain development with 
associated employment generation. Because there are fixed costs to certification, 
there is a benefit, however small, to scale. To enable farm sizes to grow, it must 
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be possible to acquire land, which is currently problematic at least partly due to 
difficulties in obtaining land titles. Moreover, for farmers to convert existing land 
holdings into coffee production, financing is required, which would also benefit 
from registered land titles. Credit is important to mitigate risks associated with 
increased specialization, as are insurance and education. Credit and insurance 
allow farmers to cope with the risks inherent in increased dependence on coffee 
production, and credit and education allow households to access higher return 
activities. In order for certification to truly contribute to rural development, a 
narrow focus on coffee-related activities alone is unlikely to realize sustainable 
growth. 
Conclusion
The trend towards on-farm certification as a pre-condition for access into specialty 
coffee markets is having a profound impact on the livelihoods of smallholder 
coffee producers. We showed that in the study region, there is a significant 
relationship between farm certification and the participation in and income 
from several agricultural and non-agricultural income-generating activities. To 
test this relationship, we used recently developed econometric models which 
consider these decisions to be taken jointly, rather than independently. Model 
tests corroborated this approach, confirming that activity choices should not 
be considered in separation, as was common in earlier research on livelihood 
activities.
Smallholder coffee producers were found to depend on far more than coffee 
production alone, on average obtaining less than half their income from coffee. 
This demonstrates the importance of going beyond prices and yields when 
analysing the effect of access to specialty markets. Farm certification was found to 
have a significant relationship with the type of activities households engaged in as 
well as the amount of income that was derived from them. Certified households 
allocated more resources to coffee production, reducing their engagement in other 
agricultural production. Consequently, coffee income increased by more than five 
times as much as total income. Further specialisation in coffee production was 
limited by small land holdings, while low education levels were identified as the 
most important barriers to diversification into non-agricultural activities.
Results of the present study show higher dependency on coffee for coffee 
producers with access to specialty markets through farm-level certification. 
Our focus in this paper was access to specialty markets, without considering 
the relationship between certification and actual sales on the specialty market, 
an area which warrants further investigation, especially given the trend towards 
over-certification. Another area requiring further study is the long-term effect of 
increased dependency on coffee production. Events such as the 2001-03 coffee 
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price crisis and the 2008-11 coffee leaf rust epidemic show the risk of overly 
relying on coffee, especially for small-scale producers with little or no financial 
buffer. The question to what extent the more relational nature of specialty coffee 
value chains protects producers against such risks remains open.
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Appendix A: Power calculations
Sample size was calculated using the following formula:
where values were chosen based on the information in Table 5.12. The beneficiary 
population size is given by all beneficiaries in 
the development project; the population size of 
the control group is based on the total number 
of coffee farmers in the study region based on 
information from the provincial departments 
of agriculture. In total, 228 beneficiaries and 
282 control group farmers were selected for 
interviewing. According to our calculations, 
the control group farmers by themselves would 
have been sufficient to be representative of coffee 
farmers in each study region. The intervention 
group farmers should be considered additional 
observations. Comparisons between both 
groups to check for sufficient randomization 
of the attribution of the project showed no 
observable differences between beneficiaries 
and control group farmers.
Table 5.12. Assumptions power 
calculation
Beneficiaries
Confidence level 0.95
Expected proportion (p) 0.5
Relative precision 0.05
Absolute precision 0.069
Zα at 95% confidence 1.96
Population size (N) 1597
Control
Confidence level 0.95
Expected proportion (p) 0.5
Relative precision 0.05
Absolute precision 0.065
Zα at 95% confidence 1.96
Population size (N) 11217
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Appendix B: List of used variables
Income
Divided into income from self-employment (agriculture, coffee, non-agriculture) 
and wage (agriculture, non-agriculture). Data was obtained using recall for the 
twelve individual months preceding the interview date. Reported incomes are the 
sum over these twelve months.
Farm certification
Dummy variable equal to one when the producer held any farm-level certification 
providing access to higher value markets such as Nespresso or Starbucks. 
Education
The number of years of education of the household member with most years of 
education.
Land / labour ratio
Total land holdings divided by family size in adult equivalents (see below).
Land holdings
The total number of hectares the producer has access to through ownership, rental 
or use rights, including fallow land.
Table 5.13. Descriptive statistics
Variable name Unit n mean SD
Farm certification dummy 510 0.52 0.50
Education years 510 8.00 3.75
Land-labour ratio ratio 510 4.00 32.32
Land holdings hectares 510 2.05 2.43
Land holdings sq hectares 510 5.88 31.51
HH size (AE) adult equivalents 510 3.29 1.50
Distance to city cost-distance 495 2.03 1.71
Transfer income COP 510 602805 2511772
Coffee price COP 510 6359 2481
Coffee yield kg/hectare 509 686 745
Land under coffee hectares 510 0.98 0.86
Note: Note: COP = Colombian Peso. 1,798.94 COP = 1 USD (31 May 2012)..
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Land holdings squared
The square of land holdings.
HH size (AE)
Household size measured in adult equivalents following the method of Deere and 
de Janvry (1981), giving weights of one to family members aged 17-59, and lower 
weights to other family members. 
Distance to city
Measured as cost-distance to nearest city of at least 10.000 inhabitants. Cost 
distance functions took into account road quality and elevation parameters.
Transfer income
Yearly income obtained from public and private transfers.
Coffee price
The price farmers receive per kilogram of coffee.
Coffee yield
The per hectare yield of coffee, measured as total coffee production divided by the 
land area planted with coffee.
Land under coffee
The land area planted with coffee. 
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Notes
1 More information on the website of MARD www.minagricultura.gov.
co.
2 More information on the homepage: www.federaciondecafeteros.org.
3 See www.cupofexcellence.org for results of all competitions.
4  The stated interest of companies using farm-level certification in the 
well-being of the farmers they include, makes such certification a classic 
example of an inclusive business model.
5  Organic, Fair Trade, and Rainforest Alliance certification were also 
present in the region, but none of the interviewed farmers with one 
of these certifications did not also have either C.A.F.E Practices or 
Nespresso AAA certification, or both. Of the certified farmers, 65% held 
only a single certification, 29% held two, and 6% three.
6 The data used for this analysis was collected within the framework of 
the Borderlands Project, implemented by Catholic Relief Services (CRS) 
(http://coffeelands.crs.org). Power calculations used to determine 
sample size are presented in appendix A.
7  Coffee plants start bearing fruit only in their third year. Hence, some 
producers with recently renovated plantations did not report coffee 
income at the time of the interview.
8  Labour was measured in adult equivalents, using the method of Deere 
et al (1981).
9 ln(coffee income) = ln(price) + ln(yield) + ln (land).
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Main findings
In this thesis the linking of small-scale farmers in low- and middle-income 
countries with modern food value chains was investigated. The relevance of 
this link is rapidly gaining prominence on the world agenda, as a result of the 
unprecedented population growth and accompanying urbanisation that started 
during the industrial revolution and is expected to last well into the 21st century. 
Feeding this urbanized world population will require millions of small farmers to 
be included in food value chains with extensive food safety and quality controls. 
There are hundreds of millions of such small farmers worldwide, and most of 
them live in poverty and food insecurity. If modern value chains would offer 
higher returns, they might be an important instrument in reducing world poverty. 
Clearly, if including small-scale farmers was easy we, the world, would already 
have done it. Yet we have not. Another open question is whether modern value 
chains offer higher returns and are potential instruments of poverty alleviation. 
In this thesis both the means of inclusion and its effect were studied. Specifically, 
how small-scale farmers can be included in modern value chains and how the 
inclusion affects them. 
The different types of relationships between firms and farmers were considered 
jointly as inclusion mechanisms, defined as organisational structures going 
beyond arm’s-length market transactions governing the economic relationship 
between a firm and rural households in developing countries, which allows 
the firm to purchase agricultural products from these households or employ 
household members in agricultural production or processing. By grouping these 
mechanisms according to their function – linking small-scale farmers to markets 
– the analytical focus could be placed on what the different forms have in common 
and how differences between forms might be explained. There exists a myriad 
of different inclusion mechanisms, ranging from almost market transactions to 
almost complete vertical integration. These different mechanisms affect different 
farmers in different ways, affecting not only outcomes like poverty and food 
security but also behaviour. 
When it comes to inclusion mechanisms, a distinction may be made between 
‘commercial and inclusive value chains’ (Harper et al., 2015) and inclusive business 
models. Commercial and inclusive value chains are inclusion mechanisms which 
include the poor, but do not specifically state an interest in improving their well-
being. Inclusive business models – the topic of this thesis - do state an interest 
in improving the well-being of those they include. The thesis is divided into two 
parts: the first part, consisting of chapters 2 and 3, considers the governance 
structure of inclusive business models, the second part, consisting of chapters 4 
and 5, the measurement of farm-level impact.  
In Chapter 2, existing theories on determinants of the type of governance 
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structure (Williamson, 1996) and the form taken by hybrid arrangements 
(Ménard, 2004) were applied to three governance structures governing the same 
transaction: sugar cane sourcing from small-scale farmers in KwaZulu-Natal. It 
was found that the move from market-based governance to hybrid arrangements 
could not be explained by only considering Williamson’s (1985, 1996) transaction 
characteristics of frequency, uncertainty, and asset specificity. A more complete 
understanding would at least require taking production characteristics of the 
local value chain into account. A comparison of the hybrid arrangements using 
Ménard’s (2004) dimensions of monitoring mechanisms, rent allocation, and 
enforcement mechanisms provided insight into their inner workings, yet fell 
short of a complete explanation of their specific form. An aspect not considered 
by either theory is the role of financial constraints, which was found to be relevant 
both for explaining the move from market to hybrid governance, as well as for the 
specific form taken by the hybrids. 
The analysis in Chapter 2 showed that the imbalance in investment capacity 
between firm and farmer caused the ability of the inclusive business model 
to create value to depend critically on the firm’s willingness to investment. 
This situation was believed to hold more generally for most inclusive business 
models, and therefore the influence of this dimension was further investigated in 
Chapter 3. In the context of weak public institutions in which inclusive business 
models operate, they are expected to rely heavily on safeguards included in the 
governance structure – private enforcement – rather than public enforcement. 
Two strands in the organisational economics literature were combined to study 
this relationship between firm investment and safeguards: transaction cost 
and positive agency theory. From transaction cost theory, the concepts of asset 
specificity and appropriability hazard were used to show how the context in 
which the firm’s investment was made influenced its risk exposure. From positive 
transaction cost theory, the concept of information asymmetry was used to show 
how production characteristics influenced the degree to which appropriability 
hazard may be controlled. There was a strong relationship between firm 
investment and safeguards; more investment meant more safeguards. The type of 
safeguards appeared to be influenced by production characteristics. In addition, 
co-investment by farmers was used to signal commitment to the agreement with 
the firm. 
In the second part of the thesis, a contribution was made to improved measurement 
of farm-level impact. Although the emphasis here was on the impact of value-
chain interventions, the results extend to other types of interventions. In Chapter 
4, the validity of a common indicator of food security, the Household Dietary 
Diversity Score (HDDS), was tested. This indicator measures household food 
access by asking whether certain food groups were consumed in the last 24 hours. 
The more food groups consumed, the higher is food security. The HDDS was 
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analysed using the Rasch measurement model, which allows for more accurate 
evaluation than ‘traditional’ methods like factor analysis and Cronbach’s alpha 
(Tennant and Conaghan, 2007). Data from Ecuador and Colombia show that the 
HDDS is not comparable between countries and not necessarily between groups 
within countries. Moreover, to make the sub-groups within which comparison is 
possible, detailed information of local dietary patterns is required, which defeats 
the purpose of using a simple indicator. Even when used within sub-groups, it is 
still not clear what the indicator measures, as food groups known to matter for 
food security, such as animal protein, were not or even negatively related to the 
overall score.1 Hence, we concluded that the HDDS is not a valid indicator of 
household food security.
When measuring impact, narrowly focusing on a single indicator or outcome is 
bad practice not only because the indicator might not be valid or reliable, but also 
because it risks excluding broader impacts, for example on livelihood choices. 
In Chapter 5, the effect of farm certification on the composition of income-
generating activities of coffee farmers was analysed. Upon certification, coffee 
income increased substantially as a result of higher prices, higher yields, and 
a larger share of land dedicated to coffee production. However, overall income 
increased by less than coffee income. In other words, farmers with certification 
received more income from coffee production, but less from other activities – 
in this case income from other crops and agricultural wage labour. These results 
suggest a re-allocation of labour to coffee production, implying that reaping the 
benefits of certification requires a willingness of the farmer to spend additional 
time on coffee production. 
Scientific contributions
The main scientific contribution of this thesis is for the first time recognising and 
studying inclusion mechanisms as a single and heterogeneous group. Earlier work, 
especially that stemming from de Janvry et al. (1991) and Goetz (1992), recognised 
that small-scale farmers were excluded from markets because of transaction costs, 
in particular fixed transaction costs. In this strand of the literature, no differentiation 
was made between which market these farmers were linked to, nor between types 
of farmers. Rather, it explained why these farmers were currently excluded from 
mainstream markets. Specific mechanisms, such as cooperatives and contract 
farming, were studied as ways to overcome these exclusionary transaction costs. 
More recently, the rapid rise of supermarkets and consumer certification led to 
literature studying the impact of such specific mechanisms on the incomes of 
included small-scale farmers. The question of whether all farmers were able to 
participate or whether some farmers were excluded was also addressed. However, 
no research specifically considered these different mechanisms as a group, as a 
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way to overcome the transaction costs excluding small-scale farmers. This thesis 
thus contains the first published attempts to analyse the governance structures of 
inclusion mechanisms as a group.
The governance structures of inclusive business models were jointly analysed 
through the lens of organisational economics in chapters 2 and 3. Previous research 
on these models was limited to internal evaluations by donor or implementing 
organisations and focused on learning outcomes of single or several models 
implemented within a single project. The lack of rigour and reference to theory 
in these studies has prevented their publication in the academic literature. Lack 
of reference to a common framework has also limited the comparability between 
such studies, as authors describe only those aspects which were considered to 
be the most relevant for each particular case. As a starting point for building a 
common framework of inclusion mechanisms, we selected transaction cost 
theory. This theory has the advantage of placing the analytical focus on the 
transaction itself – in this case the transaction between small-scale farmer and 
big business – and thereby framing the problem of governance in terms of 
common and differentiating characteristics. It also allowed building on previous 
research on small-scale farmer exclusion from markets. In Chapter 2, the extent 
to which existing theory could be directly applied to inclusion mechanisms was 
investigated, showing both which aspects could be explained by existing theory 
as well as highlighting areas where theory fell short and which requiring further 
theory-building. In particular, two areas were identified which are not covered 
by existing theory and require further analysis: the interrelationship between 
production characteristics of the local value chain and financial constraints of 
transacting parties. 
These areas were explored in more depth2 in Chapter 3, with particular emphasis on 
the investment made by the firm. The studied inclusion mechanisms all operated 
in a weak institutional environment – meaning farm-firm agreements had to rely 
on private rather than public enforcement – and involved financially constrained 
small-scale farmers. In these circumstances, the firm was responsible for the largest 
share of the investment. A strong relationship was found between firm investment, 
and hence the specific form of the governance structure, and production 
characteristics – similar to what was found in Chapter 2 – and appropriability 
hazard: the risk of opportunistic behaviour by farmers. Firm investment in turn 
had a strong influence on the specific form taken by the governance structure. In 
general, the higher the investment was, the more safeguards were included in the 
governance structure. This finding, that financial constraints have such a powerful 
influence on the specific form of governance structures, has implications for 
transaction cost theory beyond inclusion mechanisms. It shows that the identity 
of the partners to a transaction matters, not only ex-post but also ex-ante.
This thesis has also contributed to the discussion on measuring the impact of 
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development aid in general, and its impact on small-scale farmers in particular. 
Impact measurement has become increasingly important in the wake of the 
formulation of the Millennium Development Goals, the Paris Declaration of Aid 
Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action. Outcomes such as poverty and 
food security are frequently measured using quick-to-implement and easy-to-use 
indicators, which are fast and cheap. Given this prominence given to measurement, 
and the increasing reliance on indicators, it is surprising how little attention has 
been paid to the validity of these indicators. In Chapter 4, a contribution has been 
made to the field of impact measurement by testing the validity of one of the 
most frequently used indicators of food security, the Household Dietary Diversity 
Score (HDDS). Even though this indicator has been widely employed since its 
introduction in 2006, no validity test had thus far been conducted. Our finding 
that the indicator does not pass the validity test reemphasizes the importance of 
testing validity before using an indicator, or even worse, making it a mandatory 
component of the results framework of development programs, as was done by 
USAID (Swindale and Bilinsky, 2006). The validity of the HDDS was tested using 
Rasch analysis, a methodology developed in the 1960s for educational testing 
(Rasch, 1960) which is only recently gaining prominence in other sciences like 
medicine (Smith et al., 2008). Rasch analysis has an advantage over traditional 
methods because it does not only test whether an indicator is valid, but also allows 
exploring why this might be the case. Hence, it provides starting points for how 
the indicator might be improved. We suggest this type of validity tests to become a 
required step in the development of new indicators, to ensure indicators measure 
what they intend to measure, in each given population.
Farm-level impact measurement of certification or other supply chain 
interventions is often limited to outcomes directly related to the relevant crop. In 
the case of coffee certification, the most frequently studied outcome variables are 
coffee price, yield, and farm income. However, this narrow focus on crop-specific 
metrics ignores interactions between behaviour and outcomes. In Chapter 5, 
household behaviour is taken into account by looking at livelihood activities 
employed to generate an income. Rural households are known to depend on a 
variety of activities to make a living (Davis et al., 2010). An explicit link is made 
between the livelihood and certification literature by analysing the impact of 
coffee certification on households’ portfolio of income-generating activities. 
Recently developed multivariate probit and tobit models were used to illuminate 
how farm certification affects the activities households engage in, and the amount 
of income derived from them. Results clearly show that the impact of certification 
goes beyond direct income effects on the crop itself, and this most likely takes 
place through a re-allocation of labour. This demonstrates that although labour 
input is notoriously hard to measure directly in family farming systems, it may be 
effectively measured indirectly by applying revealed-preference approaches such 
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as the one employed in this chapter.  
Limitations
The conceptual framework presented in the introduction contains a call to 
acknowledge heterogeneity at both the inclusion mechanism as well as at the farm 
level. A large gap remains: in bringing these two levels of heterogeneity together. 
In the various chapters of the thesis, heterogeneity was only allowed at one level, 
never at both levels at the same time. The main reason for this was analytical. To 
analyse the effect of an inclusion mechanism on farm-level response, it is necessary 
to first understand the component parts or dimensions of the mechanism that 
is being evaluated. Only once the relevant dimensions are known can their 
impact be properly investigated. This is one of the main problems of the current 
literature on inclusion mechanisms, subdivided into supposedly homogeneous 
groups. When looking at the literature on contract farming for example,3 some 
studies find positive impacts, while others find negative impacts. Explaining 
these differences in impact requires understanding first of all the heterogeneity 
within the contract farming arrangement itself, and second of the heterogeneity 
within included farmers. However, the dimensions which might explain these 
differences are frequently not included in the studies, making ex-post explanation 
impossible. Until the relevant dimensions are discovered, simultaneous inclusion 
of heterogeneity at the inclusion mechanism and farm level is not possible. 
In order to build as much as possible on previous work, the disparate strands of 
literature on contract farming, certification, and cooperatives should be brought 
together under a single theoretical umbrella. At the very least, a theoretical 
comparison based on archetypes of each mechanism should yield dimensions 
to include in evaluation studies that would facilitate future comparisons. Ideally, 
this body of theory would also yield testable predictions. Instead, in this thesis 
theoretical development was based on non-categorised inclusion mechanisms. The 
reason for this is two-fold. First, before forcing archetypes of inclusion mechanisms 
into a particular theoretical mold, it was necessary to prioritize the identification 
of the extent to which this mold would make an adequate fit or whether further 
theory-building was required. This is the approach taken in Chapter 2. Second, 
by focusing on dimensions that are unique or common between archetypes, the 
heterogeneity within archetypes would have to be ignored. If the heterogeneity 
within archetypes turned out to be larger than that between them, the approach 
would be rendered useless. By instead analysing non-categorised inclusion 
mechanisms, it was more likely that the most important dimensions would be 
discovered. The extent to which these dimensions differ between archetypes was 
beyond the scope of this work.
In Chapter 3, which considers how firm investment and appropriability hazards 
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affect the governance structure of inclusive business models, a factor identified as 
important in the second chapter is consciously ignored: the role of the government. 
In almost all inclusive business models, the government or a civil society 
organisation plays an important role, either as a facilitator, donor, or regulator. 
What exact role these actors play and how their acting affects the specific form 
of the governance structure warrants further analysis.4 In the chapter this factor 
was ignored due to space limitations. This decision was deemed acceptable since 
in each of the models studied, responsibility for the on-going management of the 
initiative clearly lay primarily with the lead firm. However, it is not unthinkable 
that the role played by the government affected firm investment or the level of 
safeguards in such a way that models might have changed position in one of the 
results tables, albeit not in such a way that it would dramatically change the main 
conclusions.
Future research
Cooperation between public and private sector on development matters is likely 
to continue,5 at least into the near future, yet current knowledge about these public 
private partnerships in agricultural value chains is limited. To properly assess the 
advantages and disadvantages of different mechanisms for farmer inclusion in 
different settings, it is necessary to start considering these inclusion mechanisms 
as a group. Currently the literature is divided, with each mechanism - be it contract 
farming, certification, or cooperatives - being almost exclusively confined to its 
own cluster. A common framework is thus urgently needed. It was shown in this 
thesis that the approach of transaction cost theory works for inclusive business 
models; extending it to the full set of inclusion mechanisms should be the next 
step. 
An important dimension of inclusion mechanisms which warrants further 
research is the role of the public sector. Given the relatively recent emergence of 
public interest in making value chains more inclusive, there is little knowledge 
about how public funds could be used most effectively to generate an impact 
at farm level. Governments and civil society organisations want to know which 
mechanisms work, to determine whether it is worthwhile to increase funding.6 
However, by getting involved, these actors are changing the form taken by the 
governance structure - as was shown in chapter two – and hence might affect the 
sustainability of the model and the way it generates an impact at farm level. More 
research is needed to determine the scope and role of public sector engagement. 
A closely related dimension of inclusion mechanisms that was not explicitly 
considered in this thesis is which farmers may be reached by which inclusion 
mechanism. An important factor to consider is the investment required to make 
a business model profitable. Both the exogenous factors driving the investment, 
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such as crops and intended end-market, as well as the share of the investment 
which could be borne by outside donors without affecting incentives should be 
considered. Certain models might only work when farmers co-invest or require 
a minimum land size. However, not all models have such requirements. Clear 
identification of factors driving the specific form taken by inclusion mechanism 
should yield insight into which models work for whom.  
The impact of these inclusion mechanisms on the well-being of their intended 
beneficiaries should be accurately measured. Fortunately, impact evaluations are 
becoming increasingly common, although - perhaps because such evaluations are 
relatively new – they often have a narrow focus on a small set of outcome indicators. 
This narrow focus not only limits our understanding of how the intervention 
affects behaviour, but in the case of unreliable indicators might lead to erroneous 
conclusions. The traditional focus of economic statistics on representativeness is 
no longer sufficient. Economists need to look to other disciplines, like psychology, 
to step away from a narrow focus on representativeness and start considering 
construct validity. 
There are many ways in which farmer behaviour might be affected by inclusion 
mechanisms, far too many to measure. Hence, a common framework should be 
developed within which the governance structures of inclusion mechanisms can 
be understood. Although in this thesis a few hesitant steps were taken in the right 
direction, the road ahead is long, perhaps a thousand miles long. Thankfully, the 
air is thick with promise; it should be a fascinating journey!
Reflections on scientific method
When it comes to studying inclusion mechanisms and their impact on the 
behaviour and well-being of small-scale farmers, depth and breadth are not 
mutually exclusive, quite the contrary. In order to understand how inclusion 
mechanisms attain their objective of linking small-scale farmers to modern value 
chains and how these mechanisms affect human behaviour, depth naturally follows 
from breadth. It is therefore necessary to step away from narrow focus areas. 
Nothing is gained from categorising inclusion mechanisms into narrowly defined 
groups without understanding the relationship between them. Categorisation 
should be based on the dimensions which define the governance structure of 
inclusion mechanisms, not on names given to observed phenomenons. There is 
a lot of work left to be done, but the work in this thesis shows that approaching 
inclusion mechanisms as a single group is possible, and fruitful. Although the 
variety within this group might be dazzling, ignore it we cannot.
To reach the level of detail required to understand the breadth of the variety within 
the group of inclusion mechanisms, a heavier reliance on qualitative methods is 
required than is currently common within the field of agricultural economics. 
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More attention to the details of the inclusion mechanism should not be limited 
to studies focusing specifically on the governance structure but extend to impact 
studies. This is not to say we should do away with the quantitative impact studies 
which are becoming more common. Rather, agricultural economics should 
become more open towards mixed methods, including qualitative research in 
the economists’ toolbox. Most impact studies are effectively case studies, with 
high internal but limited external validity. In that respect, they differ little from 
case studies conducted using qualitative research methods. However, they differ 
from qualitative case studies by ignoring the deep contextualisation which well-
conducted case-study research requires. This limits their usefulness, as comparing 
results between different case studies is impossible without such contextualisation. 
Within quantitative research, there is an ongoing emphasis on representativeness 
and statistical causation. The importance of representativeness in the context of 
impact evaluations is sensible, in that proper attribution of project impact requires 
participants to be identical in both observable and unobservable characteristics 
from non-participants. One now well-known way to assure this is randomized 
allocation. Apart from the limitation that randomization might not always 
be ethical or feasible, sometimes it also just does not matter: it depends on the 
objective of the study. None of the data in this thesis adhered to the golden rules 
of randomized controlled trials. The case studies supporting chapters 2 and 3 were 
selected to capture variety, so-called purposive sampling. The data supporting 
chapter 4, on the HDDS, were collected within the context of a development 
intervention, which, not incidentally, is exactly the way the indicator was designed 
to be collected. Yet, reviewers and conference audiences alike always questioned 
representativeness. In any science, going against the stream is discouraged. 
Perhaps we should make sure the stream is broad enough to start with.
Mixed methods research would also assist in strengthening claims for causation. 
Any statistician will agree that statistics can never prove causation, whether using 
time series data - post hoc ergo propter hoc - or especially using cross-sectional 
data - cum hoc ergo propter hoc. Yet we appear obsessed with instrumental 
variables. Clearly, when an individual states that she took decision A because of B, 
that is causation. Of course, researchers need to be careful not to solicit desirable 
answers. Qualitative data are even more sensitive to such bias than quantitative 
data, yet this bias plagues both. While qualitative data is often dismissed as 
subjective, quantitative data receives far less scrutiny. Some studies show that 
potential bias might be substantial (Beegle et al., 2012a; Beegle et al., 2012b), with 
underreporting of income and agricultural production perhaps the most well-
known examples.  
Along a similar vein is the issue of construct validity, which is currently almost 
completely ignored in agricultural economics.7 Indicators are extremely 
convenient ways to cost-effectively capture information on policy-relevant 
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outcomes such as poverty and food security. However, whether they measure 
what they intend to measure across different contexts is not always certain. Yet, 
when scrutinizing the methods and data section of publications in agricultural 
economics, there usually is far more emphasis on representativeness than on 
construct validity. Most journals do not even allow space to include surveys, nor 
require online appendices containing them. The danger of not paying sufficient 
attention to the data collection and extraction process is that real scientific 
progress is slowed down. In the worst case, it could lead to situations such as the 
one currently plaguing social psychology, where empirical results which formed 
the basis of much theory building could not be reproduced (Yong, 2012). Within 
development, the stakes are high: people’s lives are at stake. When the wrong 
projects get supported because of an inaccurate indicator, less people are helped 
than would otherwise be the case. Validity matters. 
Mind your step
Like governance structures and farmers, policy makers are a heterogeneous 
bunch, consisting of local governments, international donor governments and 
organisations, and local and international civil society. Each actor has its own 
objectives, be it poverty alleviation, economic growth, domestic food production, 
or even votes. However, to attain any of these objectives, you need farmers. For 
simplicity it will therefore be assumed here that all policy makers are interested 
in the effect of the inclusion on the well-being of farmers and on minimizing 
the cost of sustainably doing so, sustainable in this context meaning ‘without 
requiring further intervention’. Looking at the projects studied in this thesis, this 
assumption seems reasonable. All actors grouped here as policy makers at least 
stated that the well-being of farmers was their foremost concern.
Attaining this objective is far from straightforward. When involved as an active 
third party, the policy maker has no direct stake in the firm-farm agreement. 
Its direct involvement is only sustained as long as it is bringing money to the 
table. Since this period is usually only several years, policy makers need to 
make sure to affect the governance structure in such a way that the inclusion 
objective remains viable after their involvement ends. This requires striking a fine 
balance between short and long-term objectives. The sugar cane case studied in 
Chapter 2 demonstrates how difficult finding this balance is. Local government 
was directly involved in setting up the cooperative model. In exchange for their 
financial support, it required the firm to work with local contractors, which did 
not yet exist. Training contractors, assisting them in getting up and running, and 
managing them proved so costly that it endangered the sustainability of the entire 
model. Tellingly, a few year later, when the firm wanted to include farmers in an 
area further to the north, they chose a different governance structure, without 
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government funding and without the requirement of having to work with local 
contractors. 
Apart from the short term-long term trade-off, choices need to be made regarding 
the type of involvement. Providing direct financing, might not be the best way to 
attain the inclusion objective. In Chapter 3 it was shown that in two case studies 
in Mozambique, farmers were asked to make a financial commitment before the 
firm would make theirs. The emphasis in this financial commitment was not on 
the financial component, but on demonstrating commitment. If they wanted to, 
the firms could have made the investment. However, by requiring the farmers to 
make an investment which is only useful if the agreement with the firm holds, 
and which becomes sunk otherwise, the farmers credibly demonstrated their 
commitment to keeping their side of the bargain. Such a signal of commitment is 
less credible if it is made with free money. Another risk of direct financing is that 
money is fungible. By financing some part of the inclusion mechanism, money is 
freed up that can now be used elsewhere. Hence, there is a risk of subsidizing firm 
profit, regardless of what is financed. Although denoting under which conditions 
direct financing is beneficial falls outside the scope of this thesis, it is clear that it 
is never without risk. 
As an international donor organisation interested in small-scale farmer inclusion, 
there are many potential projects to choose from. Therefore, it makes sense to set 
a target which allows for comparing projects. However, care is warranted. First, 
there is a risk that you are not measuring what you intend to measure. As was 
shown in Chapter 4, indicators, however sensible they might sound, might measure 
different things in different contexts, invalidating direct outcome comparisons 
between projects. Moreover, it might not be clear what exactly is measured. When 
using indicators, make sure they are tested for validity and reliability, and always 
use more than one. Second, it is clear that setting targets shapes incentives. As the 
old dictum goes: “tell me how you measure me and I will behave accordingly”. 
Different targets elicit different behaviour of agents, and therefore might well 
result in different governance structures. Measuring and setting targets should 
not be taken lightly. 
In addition to direct involvement, policy makers play an important indirect role 
in shaping inclusion mechanisms through designing the institutional context. 
Direct support might not always be the best choice. As was shown in Chapter 
5, inclusion mechanisms have several effects, not all of which are intended. 
Furthermore, heterogeneity within inclusion mechanisms makes it difficult to 
differentiate between projects. Since not all effects are known ex-ante, prudent 
policy makers might more effectively attain their objective of small-scale farmer 
well-being through careful design of the institutional context. We know from 
Chapter 2 how important the institutional context can be. Policies shape the 
organisational landscape. In Chapter 3 it was shown that weak institutions cause 
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firms to rely on private safeguards and controls. Such mechanisms are costly, 
reducing the overall value created within the inclusion mechanism. Moreover, 
the power in such private control mechanisms is necessarily skewed towards the 
firm, increasing its bargaining power vis-à-vis farmers. Building a reliable and 
accessible justice system would reduce the necessity to rely on private controls, 
increasing the size pie and the share received by farmers. Although this might be 
a long-term objective, it is something worth striving for. 
Wanted: operating manual for spaceship earth
Inclusion mechanisms are a market place. They provide a place for transactions 
to be conducted and for strangers to meet. Big business and small farmers 
sometimes appear like they are living on different planets. One drilled by the 
efficiency demanded to compete on global markets, the other charged with the 
responsibility of raising a family under the most adverse of circumstances. They 
are brought together by global forces outside of their own control. Population 
growth has pushed businesses to look across borders to supply bulging cities with 
food, one of the basic requirements for human survival. For farmers, population 
growth has reduced the size of landholdings, requiring them to generate the same 
value from ever smaller plots of land. The size of this challenge is evidenced by the 
number of small farmers living in abject poverty. In 2010, of the 3.1 billion people 
living in rural areas 60% were considered poor and 35% extremely poor (IFAD, 
2010). Given these staggering numbers and the on-going challenge of feeding 
an ever growing world population, how much may we reasonably expect from 
inclusion mechanisms?
Feeding the world is nothing new, nor is our concern about being able to do 
so. Our great ability at producing food is as much cause as consequence of the 
growth in human population numbers. Moving from hunting and gathering to 
farming – a process started over 10,000 years ago – made it possible to sustain 
ever denser human populations. Slowly but surely, farming spread to the furthest 
corners of the world, making hunting and gathering the exception, rather than 
the rule. By increasing yields and skill in farming on less favourable lands we 
have managed to make food production keep up with population growth, even 
if we did not always expect to be able to do so. Yet, a thing or two have changed 
since Malthus so famously expressed his concerns in his Essay on the Principles of 
Population (Malthus, 1798). Most importantly, increasing international trade and 
the integration of the world economy have made food production a global, rather 
than local issue, rupturing the link between local yields and population density. 
It is now possible for a country to sustain a high population without having a 
productive agricultural sector. 
A link which has not been ruptured is that between agricultural productivity and 
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rural income. The more value is created per hectare, the larger is the number 
of people able to generate an income from that piece of land, or the higher is 
their income. In most low and middle income countries there is a substantial gap 
between potential yield and actual yield. The good news is that the technology 
required to bring yields to their full potential is available, the only difficulty is 
getting it to the field. Here poverty is throwing a spanner in the works, creating 
a chicken-and-egg problem. Farmers need money to buy inputs and knowledge, 
but to get this money they need to produce more, for which they need inputs and 
knowledge. Directly providing inputs and training has been tried for decades, but 
this approach did not manage to break the cycle. A new problem presented itself: 
absence of a reliable market. Without a reliable market, or so it is now believed, 
farmers will be reluctant to adopt these new technologies, fearing that their 
investment might not pay off. In this context, inclusion mechanisms were brought 
to the fore as the silver bullet. Are they?
Ask any scientist a straightforward question and his or her answer will always be 
the same: it depends. When it comes to the silver bullet properties of inclusion 
mechanisms, the answer is not much different. For some farmers, they might 
improve well-being. By providing a clear market and offering the tools necessary 
to reach it – as the mechanism is designed specifically for the group of farmers 
it includes – it provides “incentivised learning”. However, it seems unlikely that 
all small-scale farmers will be included or that all included farmers will benefit 
equally. Although more research is required to determine the fine details, with 
some models undoubtedly proving to be more inclusive than others, there 
are at least two factors limiting inclusion and returns: fixed transaction costs 
and globalised output prices. Fixed transaction costs – those costs which are 
independent of the size of the transaction – are what inclusion mechanisms 
are designed to overcome. However, they will never be able to make such costs 
disappear completely, meaning there is some benefit to scale, however small this 
benefit may be. The second, and perhaps most important factor limiting what 
inclusion mechanisms can achieve are globalised output prices, which put a 
natural limit on how much value one hectare can generate. In order for a farmer to 
be able to attain a certain level of income, given optimal yields and market prices, 
a certain size of landholding is required. Below this threshold income level, crops 
compete directly with family members for resources. Households with income 
below this threshold level are considered poor. 
In economic theory a model has been suggested to capture this dynamic of poverty 
traps and persistent poverty (Carter and Barrett, 2006). Although it was not 
specifically developed for farmers or inclusion mechanisms, it demonstrates the 
process defining the limits of what market-based solutions can achieve. The idea 
is simple. Households hold assets which they use to generate income. These assets 
include land and labour, but also include factors which raise their productivity, 
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such as tools and skills. The total return to these assets fluctuates, meaning that 
a certain asset base might generate an income that causes the household to live 
above the poverty line in some years and below it in others. Households can only 
save, i.e. enhance their asset base, when they are above the poverty line. When 
they are below the poverty line, they might have to sell assets to survive. How 
do inclusion mechanisms fit into this picture? Basically, well-designed inclusion 
mechanisms are like an exogenous shock, increasing the returns to assets for 
farmers through providing any combination of inputs, knowledge, and higher or 
more stable prices. Only when this increase in returns is sufficient to lift farmers 
above the poverty line, here defined as the threshold required for saving to take 
place, can the firm be certain the farmer is able to keep his side of the bargain.  
What this means in practice is that firms will always prefer contracting with farmers 
with a larger asset base, which usually means more land. Especially those farmers 
with the ability to make an investment to credibly signal their commitment to the 
agreement are interesting partners - as was shown in Chapter 3. Moreover, the 
presence of fixed transaction costs makes the value generated by the transaction – 
which needs to be shared by firm and farmer – larger for larger farms. This is not 
to say that inclusion mechanisms will exclude small-scale farmers, just that firms 
prefer ‘larger’ small-scale farmers and that there exists a certain minimum size 
below which firms will not reach. Clearly, the minimum is flexible and depends as 
much on the mechanism as on the farmer. Most households that are commonly 
referred to as farmers are more accurately described as rural households with 
some land for farming. Worldwide, it is estimated that over 50% of the income of 
rural households is not generated on-farm (Davis et al., 2010). Of course, there is 
substantial variation between rural households. Some households might be more 
interested in inclusion mechanisms that allow them to obtain an income from 
their land without working it themselves. The mechanism described in the sugar 
cane case study described in Chapter 2 is one such example. Other households 
however, might want to be farmers but are lacking the opportunities to practice 
their profession. In the long run, those households need scale to enable them to 
generate a respectable income from farming alone. 
Increases in farm size have historically gone hand in hand with agricultural 
and economic development. The role of inclusion mechanisms in this trend is 
ambiguous. Some models appear to retard upscaling, others seem to enhance it. 
However, their contribution to the upscaling process is likely to be outweighed by 
their contribution to the transfer of agricultural technology. By design, inclusion 
mechanisms have an incentive to maximise the value of on-farm production. This 
is in the mutual interest of firm and farmer. Transferring technology is how this 
is most effectively achieved. As mentioned before, it is unlikely that all farmers 
will be reached by inclusion mechanisms. This is not necessarily a limitation. 
What matters is not as much how many, but which farmers are reached. Farming 
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is incredibly difficult. In high income countries only a small percentage of the 
population makes their living as a farmer, and of those only some are doing 
so successfully. In reality as well as metaphorically, sowing in fertile soil is an 
important precondition for high yields. Technology should be provided first 
to those farmers most likely to adopt it. Inclusive business models have an 
information advantage when it comes to selecting these farmers, and an incentive 
to find them. Those farmers who become early adopters can serve as an example 
to others and create local demand for the inputs and knowledge required to close 
the yield gap. Through this process, inclusion mechanisms might contribute 
importantly to agricultural development. 
That agricultural production needs to increase in low and middle income countries 
is beyond question. It needs to increase not only to produce the food needed to feed 
the growing world population, but also for its positive contribution to economic 
growth. Our success as a species has always been closely tied to our ability to 
produce sufficient food. Agricultural development is human development. In 
addition, over the centuries the locus of the problem has shifted from a regional to 
a global scale. The biggest problems facing the world today are global problems. To 
solve these problems, we need to start comprehensively considering the world for 
what it is: our home, spaceship earth. Solving global problems requires working 
together as a species. Yet, a large share of the world population is not in a position 
to positively contribute to tackling global problems. This needs to change. Poverty 
is an impediment to human progress. In the words of Buckminster Fuller: 
“We are not going to be able to operate our spaceship earth successfully nor for much 
longer unless we see it as a whole spaceship and our fate as common.”
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Notes
1 This is the equivalent of the worst students passing the hardest question 
in the exam just as frequently as the best students.
2 In memory of Jacques Cousteau (1910-1997).
3 As we are currently doing for a systematic review on the ‘Contract 
Farming for Increasing Income and Food Security of Smallholder 
Farmers in Low- and Middle Income Countries’ (3ie Systematic Review 
179
 General conclusion 
– SR6.1088).
4 All the world’s a stage, and all the men and women merely players 
(William Shakespeare, As You Like It, 1599.).
5 In an interview on 26 May 2015, the European Commissioner for Trade 
re-emphasized the shift from ‘a relationship based on development 
cooperation to a relationship based on trade, investment, and increased 
economic ties’ (EU development days, 2015).
6 An example of this is the funding of systematic reviews on farm-level 
impact of contract farming and certification by AGRA and DFID 
(www.3ie.org).
7 Probably equally so in general economics, but I do not know that 
literature well enough to dare make that assertion.
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Samenvatting voor de leek
Grote internationaal opererende ondernemingen zijn er gedurende lange tijd in 
geslaagd direct contact met kleine boeren in ontwikkelingslanden te vermijden. De 
hoge vaste kosten per zakelijk contact maakt het interessanter om een klein aantal 
grote handelspartners te hebben in plaats van een groot aantal kleine partners. Dit 
heeft geleid tot een duaal systeem met grote kapitaalintensieve landbouwbedrijven 
die produceren voor zwaar gereguleerde moderne toevoerketens aan de ene kant, 
en kleine arbeidsintensieve familieboerderijen die produceren voor de lokale 
markt aan de andere kant. Deze situatie is aan het kenteren. Door de snelgroeiende 
en naar steden verhuizende wereldbevolking is er een sterk toenemende behoefte 
aan veilig voedsel, en dit vergt gereguleerde en moderne toevoerketens. Meer 
land in gebruik nemen is geen optie, omdat bijna alle wereldwijd beschikbare 
landbouwgrond reeds in gebruik is. Productiviteitsstijging is hierdoor het enige 
alternatief. De landbouwgrond met de meeste potentie voor productiviteitsstijging 
is in handen van kleine boeren in lage- en middeninkomenslanden. Het 
ontbreekt de meeste van deze boeren echter aan de financiële middelen om 
deze productiviteitsstijging onafhankelijk te realiseren. Integratie in moderne 
toevoerketens zou een middel kunnen zijn om deze Gordiaanse knoop door te 
hakken en hun inkomenssituatie te verbeteren. De vraag is hoe.
De transactie van een kleine boer met de volgende partij in de toevoerketen 
noemt men een integratie mechanisme. In de eerste helft van dit proefschrift ligt 
de nadruk op zogenaamde ‘inclusive business models’, een subgroep van integratie 
mechanismen. Tien modellen uit Burundi, Ethiopië, Kenia, Mozambique en Zuid-
Afrika die verschillen in hun organisatiestructuur werden geanalyseerd door 
middel van transactiekosten theorie. In hoofdstuk twee werd getoetst in hoeverre 
de transactiekarakteristieken die werden voorgesteld door Williamson en de 
dimensies van hybride organisaties van Ménard de exacte organisatiestructuur 
van een casus in Zuid-Afrika konden voorspellen. Alhoewel deze theorieën als 
vertrekpunt zouden kunnen dienen voor de studie van ‘inclusive business models’ 
tonen de resultaten aan dat er nog heel wat werk verzet moet worden voor ze hun 
organisatiestructuur – hun ‘persoonlijkheid’ – exact kunnen duiden. Het gebrek 
aan financiële middelen van kleine boeren lijkt een belangrijke rol te spelen in het 
verklaren van deze ‘persoonlijkheid’. 
Welke rol dit gebrek aan financiële middelen speelt bij het integreren van kleine 
boeren in moderne toevoerketens werd onderzocht in hoofdstuk drie. Om precies 
te zijn werd er onderzocht wat het gevolg was van een combinatie van investeringen 
door het aankopende bedrijf en het risico dat de boer met deze investering aan de 
haal gaat op de waarborgen die onderdeel uitmaken van de organisatiestructuur. 
Alle bestudeerde casussen opereerden in landen met zwakke overheden, waarin 
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niet op de lokale rechtspraak vertrouwd kon worden om eventuele conflicten 
tussen handelspartners op een juiste manier op te lossen. Hierdoor ontstaat een 
situatie waarin het aankopende bedrijf niet alleen het gros van de investering 
maakt, maar ook op zichzelf is aangewezen om eventuele problemen voorkomend 
uit die investering op te lossen. Onze resultaten tonen dat bedrijven significante 
investeringen alleen dan maken, als ze de hieruit voortvloeiende risico’s afdoende 
intern kunnen afdekken. In situaties waarin het risico oncontroleerbaar lijkt 
wordt de investering tot een minimum beperkt.
Het tweede deel van dit proefschrift richtte zich op het meten van de impact 
van dit type integratiemechanismen op het welzijn van boerengezinnen in 
ontwikkelingslanden. Omdat kleine boeren vaak in armoede leven, hebben de 
publieke sector en sociaal begane ondernemingen interesse in het achterhalen van 
het armoedereductiepotentieel van specifieke integratiemechanismen. Jammer 
genoeg is het meten van impact verre van eenvoudig. Het vereist zorgvuldig en 
kritisch denken om te achterhalen hoe wat te meten. Gerelateerd hieraan werd 
in hoofdstuk vier een veelvuldig gebruikte indicator voor voedselzekerheid, de 
Household Dietary Diversity Score, geanalyseerd door middel van data van ruim 
duizend boerenhuishoudens in Colombia en Ecuador. Een specifiek soort analyse 
die nog niet eerder op een soortgelijk probleem werd toegepast (Rasch analyse) 
werd gebruikt om te bepalen of de vragen waar de indicator uit bestaat hetzelfde 
concept lijken te meten. De resultaten tonen dat dit niet het geval is. Nauwkeurigere 
inspectie liet zien dat de prestaties van de indicator verbeterd konden worden 
door lokale eetgewoontes in acht te nemen en bepaalde vragen die weinig of de 
verkeerde relatie hadden met het onderliggende concept achterwege te laten. Zelfs 
als dit gedaan zou worden is het echter nog maar zeer de vraag of de indicator een 
goede maatstaf voor voedselzekerheid kan bieden.
Alhoewel indicatoren een populaire methode zijn om impact te meten, bestaat 
er een risico dat ze niet gevoelig zijn voor specifieke gedragsveranderingen als 
gevolg van integratie in moderne toevoerketens. Dat dit risico reëel is werd 
aangetoond in hoofdstuk 5. In dit hoofdstuk werd de impact van certificering en 
de daaruit voortvloeiende toegang tot de markt voor hoogwaardige koffie op het 
inkomen van een groep van vijfhonderd kleinschalige koffieboeren in het zuiden 
van Colombia onderzocht. Het principe van ‘kostwinning’ waar onze analyse op 
gestaafd werd, neemt alle activiteiten mee die het boerenhuishouden onderneemt 
om in haar levensonderhoud te voorzien. De resultaten tonen dat gecertificeerde 
boeren een groter deel van hun inkomen uit koffie halen. Dit komt door hogere 
productiviteit, hogere prijzen, en door meer land met koffie te beplanten. Echter, 
hun totale inkomen neemt met minder toe dan hun koffie inkomen. Dit wijst er 
op dat de tijd en moeite die het kost om certificaten te behalen en te behouden 
ten koste gaan van andere rendabele activiteiten. Dit soort veranderingen in 
gedragspatronen dient in acht te worden genomen bij het meten van de impact 
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van certificering.
Dit proefschrift bevat drie duidelijke bijdragen aan de huidige stand van de 
wetenschap. Ten eerste, door specifiek nadruk te leggen op de gemeenschappelijke 
eigenschappen van integratie-mechanismen in plaats van ze als uniek en 
losstaand te beschouwen, kon de manier waarop deze mechanismen het mogelijk 
maken handel te drijven met kleinschalige boerenbedrijven uitgebreid worden 
onderzocht. Dit werd toegepast in hoofdstuk twee, waarin werd aangetoond dat 
transactiekosten theorie een goed punt van vertrek vormt voor het doen van het 
soort onderzoek beschreven in dit proefschrif. Echter, bepaalde eigenschappen 
van integratie mechanismen worden vooralsnog onvoldoende belicht. Met name 
de rol die het gebrek aan financiële middelen aan de kant van de kleinschalige 
boerenbedrijven speelt in het vormen van de organisatiestructuur verdient 
verdere aandacht. In hoofdstuk drie werd een eerste stap in die richting gezet. 
Samen vormen deze hoofdstukken het eerste wetenschappelijk gepubliceerde 
werk rond zogenaamde ‘inclusive business models’. 
Twee verdere wetenschappelijke bijdragen werden geleverd aan het meten 
van impact op het welzijn van het boerengezin. Ten eerste werd een voor dit 
onderzoeksveld nieuwe methodologie toegepast in hoofdstuk vier om het 
functioneren van een veelgebruikte indicator voor voedselzekerheid onder de loep 
te leggen. Deze methodologie, de eerder genoemde Rasch analyse, staat het toe om 
de bijdrage van individuele vragen aan het functioneren van de indicator als geheel 
te bestuderen, iets wat niet mogelijk is met traditionele methodes. Ten tweede werd, 
in hoofdstuk vijf, het belang van het in acht nemen van gedragsveranderingen op 
huishoudniveau als gevolg van integratie in toevoerketens aangetoond. Het gros 
van het onderzoek naar de impact van certificering richt zich op gemakkelijk waar 
te nemen factoren, zoals prijzen en productiviteit. Een toename van inkomen uit 
koffie wordt dan al snel geïnterpreteerd als een toename in welzijn. Echter, het 
onderzoek in dit proefschrift toont aan dat de impact van certificering verder 
reikt dan alleen het inkomen uit koffie en laat zien hoe een recent ontwikkelde 
methode gebruikt kan worden om dit zichtbaar te maken.
Deze bevindingen hebben drie duidelijke implicaties voor beleidsmakers. Ten 
eerste, dat de oneerlijke machtsverhouding tussen kleinschalige boerenbedrijven 
en grote internationaal opererende ondernemingen voor een deel veroorzaakt 
wordt door zwakke lokale overheden. Zolang bedrijven niet kunnen vertrouwen 
op lokale rechtssystemen, is een ongelijke machtsverhouding wellicht de prijs die 
betaald dient te worden om investeringen in landbouwontwikkeling mogelijk te 
maken. Ten tweede, dat mogelijkheden voor de publieke sector om dergelijke 
ongelijkheden weg te nemen beperkt zijn. Als het risico groot is dat een boer met 
een door het bedrijf gemaakte investering aan de haal gaat, moeten kleinschalige 
boerenbedrijven op een geloofwaardige manier hun betrokkenheid kunnen 
aantonen – wat mogelijk is door een investering in de relatie te maken. Een dergelijke 
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investering toont alleen dan daadwerkelijke betrokkenheid als deze gemaakt is met 
eigen middelen, niet wanneer deze gemaakt is met gedoneerd geld. Ten derde, dat 
wanneer beleidsmakers een keuze moeten maken tussen verschillende integratie 
mechanismen, de manier waarop het mechanisme geëvalueerd wordt zorgvuldig 
moet worden afgewogen. Er dient een keuze gemaakt te worden aangaande zowel 
de uitkomsten die meegenomen worden in de evaluatie als de manier waarop deze 
gemeten worden. Als de beslissing genomen wordt om indicatoren te gebruiken, 
is het van belang alleen geverifieerde indicatoren te gebruiken. Een evaluatie 
gebaseerd op een enkele indicator of uitkomst kan tot verkeerde conclusies leiden. 
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continuous support, my ship would have stranded long ago in the jungle of 
paperwork. Special thanks go to Annick, my chief financial officer, Sybille, my 
186
Strange bedfellows? Big business meets small farmer  Wytse Vellema
mother away from home, and Jozef, who is like the grandfather who knows where 
all the tools in the department are (in his desk drawer). 
The proposal for my PhD was titled “Smallholder farmer integration into 
modern agrifood supply chains: methodological innovations” and is built around 
measuring the impact of a contract farming arrangement of onions in Azerbaijan, 
a joint Unilever and Oxfam project. In April 2012, at the seas of change conference 
in The Hague - two weeks after starting my PhD - Jan Kees Vis told me the project 
would be killed. I needed a beer.
This is how I met Mark Lundy, research group leader Linking Farmers to Market 
at CIAT. He asked me why I needed a beer so badly, to which my response was 
“I’m a data analyst without data”. His reply was: “We’ve got loads of data”. We 
became friends immediately. He introduced me to Borderlands, a joint project 
of CIAT and CRS which aims to improve the livelihoods of around 3,000 coffee 
farmers on both sides of the Colombian-Ecuadorian border. Since January 2013 
l was even promoted lead researcher on this project, a mixed blessing at times 
when things did not go according to plan. Mark was always the great connector 
and strategist behind the scenes, putting rocks in the river upstream to make sure 
we had water where we needed it.
For CIAT, the project team consists of Carolina Gonzalez, Alex Buritica Casanova, 
and Fernando Rodriguez. All of them are great colleagues. Over time, through 
various meetings, work trips and shared frustrations we have become friends. 
Carolina is my ‘jefa Colombiana’. I would like to thank her not only for giving me 
so much responsibility and freedom within the project, but also for encouraging 
me to hang on, even when things were not going according to plan. Alex, apart 
from having a great last name, is also a gifted and hard worker. There is nobody 
I have worked with so intensely during the last years. Since I met him, he has 
gone from chief photocopier to chief data management and the go-to point for his 
colleagues regarding any statistical queries. All the work from data management 
to analysis for the chapter on coffee farmers we did together. Fernando is the 
oil in the machinery of the team, logistically and financially. He is also the most 
diplomatically gifted, and great at making clear what he thinks without actually 
saying it. On top of all of this, he is also my coffee dealer. All the Colombian coffee 
I have been sharing with you over the years was bought from him.
For CRS, the people I have worked most closely with are Andres Montenegro 
and Paola Benavides from Colombia, and Carlos Novillo and Alex Portilla from 
Ecuador, and Michael Sheridan, the project leader. Andres is a great person, and 
although we always had to diplomatically skirmish to defend our interests, we 
always had and will have plenty of common ground to fall back on. Paola once 
sneaked me into Samaniego, which I’m sure nobody would have permitted if they 
had known. We had a great time. Carlos is a special case, we never got along. 
Yet, from all the people I have worked with in these years, there is nobody who I 
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have learned so much from. Most importantly, I have learned that to assume that 
because you are in the same project you share the same goals is naive. The person 
and the organisation he works for are two separate things. Thank you Carlos, 
for making that crystal clear. Alex is the star programmer of the team. Working 
together on programming the tablets for monitoring and evaluation was a great 
experience. Michael is the person I have had least direct contact with, although he 
did interview me once for his coffee blog. Our strongest connection is through the 
outcomes of the project which he has been so vividly promoting through blogs, 
presentations, and workshops. Thank all of you for hosting me, working with me, 
and making me feel part of the team. 
The other pillar on which this PhD is build is the pair of projects with CDI 
and Pretoria University, on inclusive business models. Although there are too 
many people involved to thank each person individually, a few people deserve 
recognition. First of all, Jan Helder, for graciously introducing me to many of his 
contacts in South Africa, including Mandla and Wellington. Without him, it is 
unlikely my field work would have been in Africa. And of course to Monika Sopov 
and the project on inclusive business models which provided data for half of this 
thesis. Our short and to-the-point communication might have been a result of our 
shared KPMG history. 
From Pretoria University, I would like to thank Ward Anseeuw, the most amicable 
project leader anybody could wish for. From him I learned important rules of 
thumb that allow combining the personal with the professional, such as ‘the 
number of people minus one is the maximum number of bottles of wine you 
should put on the tab’. My thanks go to Wytske Chamberlain for always being 
critical on reduction and simplification and for showing me that it is possible 
to remain 100% Dutch even if you live abroad. And finally Tijo Salwerda for the 
quality social time, hiking in wildlife parks while discussing the lifestyle of the 
Mauritian elite. And of course a great many thanks to Wellington, Ingle, and 
Bosman for granting me access to their work, facilitating and giving all those 
interviews.
Finally, two individuals who strongly affected my professional development 
deserve recognition. First of all Claude Ménard for helping me build the theoretical 
framework on which chapter 3 in this thesis is built. A big name in institutional 
economics, he is also an extremely warm and welcoming person, who is truly 
dedicated to advancing theory. It has been a pleasure to work with him. And then 
of course Giel Ton, who defended his own thesis on 1 December. Giel invited me 
to join the systematic review on the impact of contract farming, which introduced 
me to many of the papers cited in this book. Moreover, I’d like to thank him for 
the many talks about the difficulty of measuring impact and for his inspiring 
dedication to making the world a better place for smallholder farmers. 
Although my thesis would not have been possible without the direct support of 
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everybody I worked with, the indirect support of those surrounding me allowed 
me to sustain my effort. First of all, I would like to thank those who embellished 
my private life in Gent. My housemate since the first hour, Lynn Jacob, has tried 
her utmost to integrate me into Flemish culture. She taught me local habits and 
lingo, and encouraged me to learn-by-doing. The Sunday cava, many dinners, 
parties, and hung-over days on the couch are among my fondest memories of my 
time in Ghent. My thanks also go to my squash partners, Diederik and Pieter, for 
providing an outlet for my energy and a great excuse for having a beer without any 
women present. Although Pieter could not always make it because of his drawing 
course, he more than made up for it by designing the cover of this book.
And then of course, there are my Dutch friends. The Monday group Ruben, Jeroen, 
Willem, Pieter, Pieter, Herman, and Romeo I would like to thank for the food, 
for both body and mind. Intellectual discussion and good food could not wish 
for a better home. The gentlemen of Proximitas, to wit Daan, Floris, Jan, Joep, 
Jurek, Lennaert, Manfred, Peter, Rogier, Ron, Rutger, Thales, Thijs, and Wouter I 
would like to thank for their teachings on gentlemanly behaviour, at all times. The 
weekends, the parties, the trips to the Philippines and Riga, were all legendary. 
Douwe Heeringa, another gentleman, I would like to thank for making Ghent his 
second home. It does not matter how long we have not spoken, it always seems 
like yesterday. Most of all, I would like to thank all of you for helping me preserve 
my Dutch identity, in that faraway land across our southern border.
The older I get, and I have gotten a lot older recently, the more I have come to 
value family. The loss of my grandfather, to which this book is dedicated, was a 
big blow. I was in Colombia for work when it happened and therefore one of the 
few people who could not be at his bedside while he died. He was like a second 
father. I thank my parents, Piet Vellema and Joke de Lange, for always being there 
for me and for providing the certainty that I have something to fall back on. The 
same goes for my sister Ditte and brother Jelmer. I highly value the advice of each 
of you. Moreover, your persistence in asking me when I would finally finish my 
PhD certainly helped me to keep up the pace and maintain focus. My big family, 
from both my mother’s and my father’s side I would like to thank for the laughs, 
the light conversation, and the mutual understanding that whatever happens we 
will always support each other.
The many travels which I had to make in the context of my PhD resulted not 
only in input for my thesis, they also enriched my personal life. The most vivid 
example of this is my girlfriend, Katherine Gonzalez Valdes, who I met, albeit 
only for a few minutes, at a fastfood stand in Colombia. I would like to thank her 
for supporting me, by coming to Belgium but also by absorbing the frustrations 
I brought home when I felt things were going too slow at work. Her patience has 
been an inspiration.
Making mistakes is inevitable, and I’m grateful to Lotte Staelens, Eline D’Haene, 
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Annelien Gansemans, Jelmer Vellema, Piet Vellema, Joep Hoveling and Ruben 
Mars for taking the time to meticulously check the final version of my thesis for 
grammatical errors. Indubitably, some errors still remain, but without them it 
would have been many more. All errors, both those removed and those remaining, 
are my sole responsibility.
Some people have the gift to be able to be brief. I do not think I am one of those 
people. I have tried to keep these acknowledgements as short as possible, but as I 
was writing I kept remembering more and more people to thank. Nevertheless, not 
everybody could be mentioned. My apologies to those who I felt obliged to ignore 
for sake of brevity; you are not forgotten. To all of you who I have mentioned and 
all of you who I have not, I would like to express my heartfelt appreciation for 
making this PhD a memorable journey!
Never forget: “The pleasure we derive from journeys is perhaps dependent more on 
the mindset with which we travel than on the destination we travel to.”
Alain de Botton, The Art of Travel
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List of abbreviations
B2C Business to consumer
CDI Centre for development innovation
CFSM Core food security module
CGIAR Consultative group for international agricultural research
CIAT International centre for tropical agriculture
CLR Coffee leaf rust
CRS Catholic relief services
DANE National administrative department of statistics (Colombia)
DIF Differential item functioning
ELCSA Latin American and Caribbean food security scale
ESS Equity share scheme
FANTA Food and nutrition technical assistance
FAO Food and agriculture organisation
GHK Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane
HDDS Household dietary diversity score
HFIAS Household food insecurity access scale
ICC Item characteristic curve
ICO International coffee organisation
IFAD International fund for agricultural development
IIED International institute for environment and development
INEC National institute of statistics and censuses (Ecuador)
IRF Item response function
NAMC National agricultural marketing council
OECD Organisation for economic cooperation and development
OED Oxford English dictionary
PPI Progress out of poverty index
RA Rainforest alliance
RM Rasch model
RV Recoverable value
SA South Africa
SASA South African sugar association
SASRI South African sugarcane research institute
THS Tongaat Hulett sugar
UN United nations
WFP World food programme
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